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ATOMISM AND THE PRIVATE MERGER CHALLENGE
Paul J. Stancil
INTRODUCTION
Much of the apparent schizophrenia in American economic history since the
Industrial Revolution is the result of a uniquely American tension: Americans prize and
encourage individual success, but they fear its entourage. That tension originates in
two equally fundamental but sometimes competing concepts of economic liberty:
freedom to succeed and freedom from concentrated power. That is, America idolizes
"competition," but it mistrusts the size and economic power that successful competitors
seek and sometimes acquire.I
The struggle between these two norms has played out repeatedly in the birth and
spasmodic evolution of American antitrust law. Most antitrust law has evolved to an
efficient equilibrium in two ways. First, competition policy itself has improved
substantially. Modem substantive antitrust theory focuses upon "freedom to,"
emphasizing consumer welfare and efficiency over once-dominant "freedom from"
impulses that produced a competition policy primarily focused upon the dispersion of
economic power as an end unto itself.2 Second, in most contexts, the law governing
private antitrust enforcement has evolved to increase the overlap between self-interest
and the public interest, and to limit opportunistic behavior on the part of private
plaintiffs.3
Indeed, private enforcement is an integral component of the federal antitrust
system, and every federal antitrust law gives private parties the right to pursue private
claims. The federal antitrust law goveming mergers and acquisitions is no exception-
private parties have the explicit statutory right to seek treble damages and injunctive
relief in connection with transactions that "may [tend to] substantially ... lessen
competition."'4 This is, on balance, a good thing. Federal enforcement resources are
Shareholder, Godfrey & Kahn, S.C., Milwaukee, Wisconsin, As of June 16, 2006, Visiting Assistant
Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. J.D., University of Virginia; B.A., University of
Virginia. I thank Professor Kenneth Elzinga and Mark Stancil for their review and insightful comments.
Special thanks also to Deputy Assistant Attorney General J. Bruce McDonald and the Antitrust Division of the
U.S. Department of Justice for providing draft data on recent merger filings.
1. See, e.g., PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION I 100, at 3-7, 111, at 97-114 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing desire
for competition and fear of monopolies as purposes for antitrust legislation).
2. Id. 100b, at 5-6.
3. See id. 103d, at 60-61 (discussing "charter of freedom" that the Sherman Act was to impose).
4. Robinson-Patman Antidiscrimination Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13a (2000); Clayton Act, ch. 323, §§ 4, 4A, 38
Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 15a (2000)); Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 209
(1890), repealed by Act of July 7, 1955, ch. 283, Pub. L. No. 137, 69 Stat. 282 (1955).
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limited, and private parties are often better able to detect and deter anticompetitive
conduct than distant federal enforcers.
But as important as private merger enforcement is, it also carries with it
substantial risks of opportunistic behavior. Private parties act in their own perceived
self-interest, and the implicit assumption behind private enforcement is that self-
interest and the public interest overlap sufficiently to justify the existence of a private
right of action. Where private enforcement rights exist, it is absolutely critical that (1)
the law minimize the costs associated with inefficient opportunistic behavior on the
part of private plaintiffs, 5 and (2) the private enforcement mechanism reflects the
current balance of policy considerations governing public enforcement.
6
Circumstances now demand a close evaluation of these goals in the area of private
antitrust merger enforcement. Although private antitrust merger litigation has a
relatively modest history, a number of recent developments suggest that private
enforcement will increase substantially in the near future. But if most areas of private
antitrust enforcement have reached an acceptable equilibrium, the law governing
postcompletion private merger challenges has not. That law instead continues to
encourage excessive opportunistic behavior. Moreover, while the law was arguably
consistent with the competition norms of previous generations, it is now fundamentally
inconsistent with current antitrust principles. The coming increase in private claims
demands that the law of private postmerger challenges be modernized.
Part I of this Article discusses the tensions inherent in the American competition
norm and briefly sketches the modest history of private merger challenges. Part II
explains how recent developments in antitrust law are providing new incentives for
private plaintiffs to challenge mergers. Part III identifies two anachronistic doctrines
governing postcompletion private merger claims that are fundamentally inconsistent
with current antitrust thinking: (1) a procedural and remedies structure that allows
private plaintiffs to impose massively disproportionate costs upon defendants, and (2)
antiquated and ill-fitting rules that unreasonably extend the time during which private
plaintiffs can sue.
Part IV of the Article concludes that these problems can be mitigated only by
legislative adoption of (1) fee- or cost-shifting rules lessening private plaintiffs' ability
and incentive to impose disproportionate costs upon defendants; (2) a "single damages"
rule for most private merger claims; (3) fixed, merger-specific statutes of limitation and
laches periods for private claims; (4) fixed, merger-specific rules rejecting tort-style
"accrual" standards; and (5) firm rules limiting the admissibility of postacquisition
evidence in postcompletion merger litigation.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 15a.
6. See id. (allowing recovery of attorney's fees); see also AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, 101,
at 11 (discussing the historical policy considerations of antitrust enforcement).
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I. THE COMPETITION NORM, ANTITRUST LAW, AND THE HISTORY OF PRIVATE
MERGER LITIGATION
A. Development of the Casus Belli
The tension between "freedom to succeed" and "freedom from success" has deep
roots in American economic history, although it was rarely obvious through the first
half of the nineteenth century. But as the Industrial Revolution took hold in the United
States, "freedom to" ultimately found itself on a collision course with "freedom from."7
The creation of national markets and the aggregation of economic power in large
industrial and agricultural producers ultimately led to repeated struggles for primacy
between these now-competing organizing principles. Throughout the early- and mid-
1800s, "freedom to" carried the day, as entrepreneurs built commercial empires and the
nation expanded westward.8
But by the late nineteenth century, the two principles were in open conflict, and
"freedom from" apparently had the upper hand. Fueled in part by a particularly potent
combination of significant industrial and agricultural concentration, utopian socialist
thought, and economic desperation, the inherent American suspicion of concentrated
power coalesced under the banner of "populism."9 This aggressive manifestation of the
"freedom from" impulse worked to weaken the institutional economic powers of the
age. 10 Because the industrial organization goals of this movement focused upon the
dispersion of productive capacity into ever-smaller units, the movement's competition
philosophy is best described as "atomistic."' l
Although the equilibrium point has shifted back and forth along the continuum
over time, the tug-of-war between America's lionization of success and its atomist
suspicions of size and power has remained a constant in American economic life over
the past century. Nowhere has this tension been more apparent than in the
development and interpretation of American antitrust law. 2
7. See generally MATTHEW JOSEPHSON, THE ROBBER BARONS: THE GREAT AMERICAN CAPITALISTS
1861-1901, at 3-31 (1934) (suggesting that the American Industrial Revolution accelerated dramatically after
1865 from elements in place well before the Civil War).
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., EDWARD BELLAMY, LOOKING BACKWARD: 2000-1887, at 11 (Alex MacDonald, ed.,
Broadway Literary Texts 2001) (1888) (telling utopian story of a young man from 1887 who awakens in year
2000 to find that his world of harsh economic competition has become a society based upon cooperation); see
also AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, 1 100b, at 4-6 (discussing populist theory of protecting consumer
welfare through antitrust legislation); JOSEPHSON, supra note 7, at 375-403 (depicting domination of certain
classes in aggressive economic age).
10. JOSEPHSON, supra note 7, at 375-403.
1I. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, 1 00b, at 4-6.
12. Among serious commentators, there is essentially unanimous agreement that certain aggregations of
economic power have negative societal effects; there is similar consensus that a purely atomistic economy
would be dreadfully inefficient. Thus, the conflict will continue to take place within a limited middle range
along a continuum bounded by "full economic 'freedom to' on one side and "pure atomism" on the other.
See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, 100b, at 4-6 (explaining conflict between populist theory of
consumer welfare and economic theory of market well-being).
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B. The Sherman Act and the Clayton Act
1. The Sherman Act
The antitrust laws owe their very existence to the nascent atomist sentiment of the
late- l880s and early- 1890s.13 In 1890, Congress passed the Sherman Act, which today
remains the primary American antitrust statute. 14 In strikingly ambiguous language,
section 1 of the Act declared that: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade.., is hereby declared to be illegal."' 5 In
similarly amorphous terms, section 2 of the Act prohibited "monopolization": "Every
person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize.., trade or commerce...
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.... 16 Section 7 of the Sherman Act also
provided a treble-damages remedy for "[a]ny person who shall be injured in his
business or property"'17 due to a violation of the antitrust laws.
Although commentators disagree as to the predominant congressional purpose of
the Sherman Act,' 8 there is little question that the atomist movement had a huge hand
in its enactment.' 9
13. Compare, e.g., Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of
Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 94-106 (1982) (detailing
congressional intent to prevent unfair acquisition of consumer wealth), with ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST
PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 51 (1978) (explaining purpose of the Sherman Act was consumer
welfare and ignoring any concern of unfairness between monopolists and consumers), and AREEDA &
HOvENKAMP, supra note 1, 101, 103, at 8-11, 40-61 (discussing the Sherman Act as a mode for regulating
competition).
14. Sherman Act, ch. 647, §§ 1-7, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ l-6a (2000)).
Numerous sources characterize Congress's passage of the Sherman Act as merely codifying the common law
concerning restraints of trade. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 13, at 20 ("Sherman and many of his colleagues
repeatedly assured the Senate, without objection by anyone, that they proposed merely to enact the common
law."). Notwithstanding these characterizations, the Sherman Act significantly altered the legal landscape.
15. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
16. Id. § 2.
17. Id. § 6a. Section 7 of the Sherman Act was later replaced by section 4, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), and was
formally repealed as superfluous in 1955 by 69 Stat. 283 (1955). Act of July 7, 1955, ch. 283, Pub. L. No.
137, 69 Stat. 282 (1955). As a side note, Congress's provision of a private treble damages remedy within the
Sherman Act itself presents substantial problems for the proponents of any theory suggesting that the Sherman
Act was initially intended to be "toothless." See, e.g., 21 CONG. REC. 3150 (1890) (statement of Sen. George).
18. Compare BORK, supra note 13, at 21-22 (arguing that the legislation was concerned with protecting
efficiency and consumer welfare), with RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS
AND OTHER ESSAYS 199-200 (1965) (arguing that the goals of the Act were not only economic, but also
political: to limit private accumulations of power, protect democracy (social and moral), and to protect
"competitiveness" as a fundamental trait of the national character), and Lande, supra note 13, at 105-06
(arguing that Congress was primarily concerned with distributive goals-redistributing economic surplus from
producers to consumers).
19. See JOSEPHSON, supra note 7, at 359 (quoting an unnamed Senator stating, in connection with the
passage of the Sherman Act, that "something must be flung out to appease the restive masses"). The scholarly
debate concerning the original goals of the antitrust laws and their optimal modern focus continues today,
although the focal point of that debate has shifted dramatically. See also Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman,
Fed. Trade Comm'n, Remarks at the American Bar Association Antitrust Section Fall Forum: Looking
Forward: Merger and Other Policy Initiatives at the FTC 1-2 (Nov. 18, 2004) (transcript available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/majoras/041118abafallforum.pdf) (quoting Janet McDavid, What a Kerry Victory
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The passage of the Sherman Act represented a major victory for atomism, but it
was not a decisive stroke. The "freedom to" narrative retained substantial power even
after the Act was enrolled, and proponents of individual economic liberty clashed with
opponents of size and success repeatedly but inconclusively for the next seventy-five
years. 20 As a result, from 1890 until the mid-1970s, American competition policy lived
in a relatively constant state of low-level cognitive dissonance, pulled in opposite
directions by relatively equally matched norms.2' Although trends shifted over time,
neither side could ever claim complete victory.
2. The Clayton Act
In 1914, atomism won another major legislative victory with the passage of the
Clayton Act.22 Among other things, the Clayton Act added two weapons to public and
private antitrust enforcers' arsenals. First, section 16 of the Act authorized private
antitrust plaintiffs to seek injunctive relief for antitrust violations, in addition to the
treble damages already authorized under the Sherman Act.23 Also, for the first time,
Section 7 of the Clayton Act formally prohibited corporations from purchasing the
stock of a competitor if that purchase would "tend to substantially lessen competition"
or tend to create a monopoly in any market:
Means for Antitrust Law, GLOBAL COMPETITION REv. (2004), available at http://www.globalcompetitionre
view.connews/newsjitem.cfm?itemid=2007). Compare BORK, supra note 13, at 408 (explaining political
and social effects of the Act); Frank H. Easterbrook, Correspondence, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MiCH. L.
REV. 1696, 1706, 1708, 1713 (1986) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy] (describing shift in
use of law to aid consumers from the unreliable neoclassical model of the Chicago School to the present
indeterminate models), and William J. Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the Integration
of Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 207, 207 (2003) (advocating
anti-trust laws for efficiency rather than competitive purposes), with Joseph F. Brodley, Post-Chicago
Economics and Workable Legal Policy, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 683, 695 (1995) (believing that a new melding of
modem theories can strengthen the anti-competitive nature of the law to promote efficiency and consumer
welfare), and Reza Dibadj, Saving Antitrust, 75 U. COLO. L. REv. 745, 802 (2004) (tracking the evolution of the
law to understand its flaws and placing it back on track for competitive purposes).
20. See William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy Enforcement Norms, 71
ANTITRUST L.J. 377, 379 (2003) (persuasively arguing that the prevailing "pendulum" narrative of antitrust
enforcement-too much in the 1960s and 1970s, too little in the 1980s, and "just right" in the 1990s and
beyond-is overly simplistic and that it ignores the incremental evolution that took place during those
periods). Kovacic's evolutionary argument is consistent with the thesis of this Article, and none of the
characterizations contained herein are intended to suggest that antitrust law historically has existed on a static,
zero-sum continuum from "good" to "bad."
21. Professor Lande appropriately criticizes Bork's "efficiency" interpretation of congressional intent as
ahistorical. See Lande, supra note 13, at 94-106 (discussing the legislative history which prioritizes the
protection of consumer welfare against unfair competition). He also correctly identifies the populist
underpinnings of the antitrust laws. Id. at 87-89. But it is helpful to divorce Bork's evangelical excesses from
his antitrust theology. Bork's normative approach to the antitrust law is largely correct, despite the statutory
interpretation concerns his reimagining of history attempts to deflect. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note
1, 1 103d, at 57-61 (protesting the emphasis placed on the policy significance of legislative history).
22. Clayton Act, ch. 323, §§ 1-26, 38 Stat. 730-40 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 29
U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (2000)); see also 51 Cong. Rec. 9085-89 (1914) (statement of Rep. Kelly) (expressing
concern over the growth of trusts and monopolies in terms of size and political power).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (allowing injunctive relief "against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the
antitrust laws").
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No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital of another corporation
engaged also in commerce, where the effect of such acquisition may be to
substantially lessen competition between the corporation whose stock is so
acquired and the corporation making the acquisition, or to restrain such
commerce in any section or community, or tend to create a monopoly of any
line of commerce.
24
Because the Clayton Act expressly defined section 7 as an "antitrust law,"25 the
Act necessarily authorized private plaintiffs to seek both damages and injunctive relief
in connection with prohibited transactions. 26 Although anticompetitive mergers and
acquisitions had been illegal under the Sherman Act as well (prohibiting
"monopolization" and "combinations" in restraint of trade), 27 section 7 made this
prohibition explicit, and it substantially relaxed the liability standards under which a
transaction violated the law.
28
3. The Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950
As originally drafted, section 7 of the Clayton Act was not particularly effective,
29
prohibiting only anticompetitive stock acquisitions. 30  Many purportedly
anticompetitive transactions were able to circumvent these narrow prohibitions by
avoiding stock transactions.
3
'
In 1950, Congress atomized again, enacting revisions to section 7 that one leading
commentator has described as deriving from an especially "outspoken concern for
small-business welfare." 32  With the Celler-Kefauver Act, Congress broadened the
scope of section 7 to prohibit a far wider cross-section of potentially anticompetitive
transactions, explicitly condemning asset acquisitions as well. 33 The Celler-Kefauver
amendments effectively closed loopholes in the original version of section 7 and
provided antitrust enforcers-public and private alike-with a substantially stronger
tool with which to accomplish atomistic ends. In the three decades following the
Celler-Kefauver amendments, the atomist worldview was ascendant in the antitrust law
24. Id. § 18.
25. Id. § 12.
26. Id. §§ 15, 26.
27. See N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 325 (1904) (condemning anticompetitive stock
mergers pursuant to section 1 of the Sherman Act).
28. See FREDERIC M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 174 (1990) (detailing the intricate network of cartels used to side-step monopoly
nomenclature).
29. See id. at 175 (describing "gaping loopholes" left by original act).
30. See supra note 24 and accompanying text for the original construction of section 7.
31. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 314 n.25 (1962) (summarizing FTC annual
reports beginning in 1928 identifying and decrying loophole).
32. Herbert Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 24
(1982).
33. Celler-Kefauver Act, 64 Stat. 1125-26 (1950), amending Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000)) (prohibiting mergers that will substantially lessen competition).
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generally, and it was especially dominant as to merger challenges.34 As a result, the
horizontal merger fell into scandalous disrepute.
35
C. The Problem of "Honorable Success"
Courts interpret the Sherman Act in the context of conduct, not status. 36 The Act
defines classes of commercial behavior the law will not tolerate in the pursuit of
profit, 3" but it does not attempt to address the more difficult question arising from
honorable success: How much success is too much?
Businesses do not cut costs, improve quality, or innovate out of altruism. They do
so in the hope that the next innovation, the next price cut, or the next efficiency
improvement will put them over the top. The best competitors want nothing more than
to destroy their rivals, and society encourages them to do so, because competition
benefits consumers. They pay lower prices for greater quantities of better goods.
Profits provide the incentive to compete; the opportunity to seek ever-higher profits is
integral to a market economy.
Even so, when a successful competitor has cleared the field of its opponents,
however honorably, the law and economists alike are understandably worried. Now a
monopolist, the successful competitor can raise its price or decrease the quality of its
products. 38  Monopoly inefficiently benefits the monopolist at the expense of
consumers, so long as the monopolist effectively controls the market.39 There exists,
therefore, a perpetual temptation to curb the excesses invariably associated with
monopoly, to allow success to bloom as briefly as possible before harvesting its fruit
and distributing it for the common good. American suspicion of size and power
magnifies this temptation.
But there is no easy answer to the monopoly profit question, assuming that the
monopolist has obtained its market power "fairly." The monopolist's higher profits,
while detrimental to consumers in the short term, are also a beacon drawing new
contestants into the fray. Without the prospect of spectacular success, and without the
opportunity to get some of what the monopolist has, the fires of competition sputter and
may ultimately die.40
34. See id. (prohibiting mergers with language that bolstered the atomistic goals).
35. See also SCHERER & Ross, supra note 28, at 175-76 (discussing hard-line approach of dramatic
increase in government enforcement activity and appellate success in challenging mergers). See infra note 49
for an explanation of horizontal mergers.
36. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REv. 213, 229 (1985) (noting the
Warren Court's punishment of conduct).
37. Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000)).
38. To a lesser extent, the same is true of any successful dominant firm, whether it is technically a
monopolist or not. Although a "competitive fringe" may constrain the dominant firm's pricing to some extent,
the dominant firm will still enjoy some pricing power, and will typically set its output lower than it would in a
competitive market. DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1990),
reprinted in E-COMMERCE ANTITRUST AND TRADE PRACTICES: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR DOING BUSINESS
ON THE WEB 131 (Harry S. Davis & Rebecca P. Dick eds., 2000).
39. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. MCEACHERN, MICROECONOMICS: A CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION ch. 9
(6th ed. 2002).
40. See WILLIAM BAUMOL, JOHN PANZAR & ROBERT WILLIG, CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE
2005]
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Over time, the Sherman Act has reached an uneasy but efficient truce with the
problem of honorable success.4 Similarly, section 7 of the Clayton Act has also
implemented a cease-fire with the market power problem, at least in the context of
government merger enforcement actions. But the process was difficult. The story of
the long and contentious parley between "freedom from" and "freedom to" is central to
understanding the problems and solutions identified in this Article.
1. The Atomism Paradigm
Throughout the middle of the twentieth century, antitrust law directed its efforts
toward promoting and maintaining what enforcers and academics of the time
considered ideal market structure. 42  Rather than focusing upon the welfare of
consumers (i.e., focusing upon price, total output, quality, choice, etc.), enforcement
efforts and decisional law instead focused upon the number and size of competitors in a
given market. 43 According to the theory of the day, the structure of a market drove the
conduct of its participants, which in turn dictated the performance of that market.
Led by Joe Bain, Edward Mason, and other Harvard economists, the "structure-
conduct-performance" ("S-C-P") school articulated "atomistic" markets-markets
consisting of a large number of small producers-as the ideal. 44 These economists and
the antitrust enforcers they influenced 45 were inherently pessimistic about markets and,
more importantly, about any moderately concentrated market's ability to produce
competitive results without help. Accordingly, they spoke in terms of fostering
THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 209 (1982) (detailing a theory that if a monopoly holds entire power over a
market new market entrants will not come forward because they will not be able to succeed); Frank H.
Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (1984) (theorizing that monopolies delay
competition and that antitrust law exists to speed up this inevitability); Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy,
supra note 19, at 1701 (explaining how monopolistic competition fosters desire to enter into competition).
41. See infra Part I.C.2 for a discussion of current academic analysis and the actual use of the Sherman
Act.
42. See Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, supra note 36, at 214-222 (summarizing historical
trends in antitrust enforcement). Hovenkamp's prediction that the Chicago School would also fall by the
wayside has proved less than prescient, but his summary of the historical schools of antitrust thought is
nonetheless instructive. Id.; see also Kovacic, supra note 20, at 430-42 (discussing mergers and the possibility
of increased efficiency and preserving a decentralized economic structure).
43. See Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, supra note 36, at 214-69, for a discussion of the
past ideals of the Chicago School and the current ideology of its critics.
44. See, e.g., JOSEPH BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION: THEIR CHARACTER AND CONSEQUENCES IN
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 53-113 (1956) (discussing the issue of large firms as a barrier to entry for small
firms); EDWARD S. MASON, ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION AND THE MONOPOLY PROBLEM 354 (1959) (defining
optimal economic model as one without a dominant market leader).
45. See CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS
44 (1959) (discussing four alternative goals for antitrust policy and advocating one that limits market power).
Professor Turner later headed the Antitrust Division at the Department of Justice as an Assistant Attorney
General appointed by President Johnson. See also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MERCER GUIDELINES § 3.0 (1968),
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/hrnerger/ 1247.pdf [hereinafter 1968 MERGER GUIDELINES] (creating two-pronged
conduct and geographic approach to market definition, with emphasis on effective competition amongst all
sellers). Kolasky and Dick correctly note that the 1968 Guidelines included a rudimentary "efficiencies"
defense, and that they are therefore an improvement over the purely atomistic approach of the Warren Court,
but the 1968 Guidelines are still atomistic at heart. Kolasky & Dick, supra note 19, at 212-214.
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"workable competition" by using government intervention to demolish, or at least
prevent, the development of subjectively undesirable market structures. 46
Atomism was more than the ideal, though. It was also the explicit normative goal
of antitrust enforcement, and in particular, of section 7 enforcement.4 7 Although the
atomism norm was difficult to implement against traditional single-firm success,
48
mergers and acquisitions were another story. For many years, it was virtually
impossible to obtain government approval for any horizontal merger49 in which the
merged parties would enjoy more than five to ten percent market share in any given
market.50 Though government challenges faced practical difficulties, "big is bad" was
an apt description of the prevailing merger enforcement philosophy for much of the
twentieth century.
51
Additionally, because antitrust law was primarily concerned with market
structure, enforcers and courts alike were inherently suspicious of size, however
obtained. Despite the ostensible legality of market share gained by virtue of "superior
skill, foresight, and industry,"52 enforcers and courts both looked for ways in which
large market participants could be chopped down to size. Section 7 offered a back door
through which enforcers could essentially challenge size alone, and they often took
advantage of that opportunity.
53
2. The "Chicago School" Revolution, Post-Chicago Learning, and the Current
Antitrust Equilibrium
Atomism has lost currency with most government antitrust enforcers and with
most courts as well. 54 Although market structure continues to matter, atomism is no
longer the implicit goal of competition law. Nor does atomism feature prominently
46. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, supra note 36, at 214; see Easterbrook, Workable
Antitrust Policy, supra note 19, at 1700 (renaming the "workable competition" ideology to be the "workable
antitrust policy school").
47. 21 CONG. REc. 3150-51 (statement by Sen. George) (discussing goals of section 7 of the Sherman
Act of 1890).
48. But see United States v. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (certified to the Second Circuit by the
Supreme Court).
49. Loosely speaking, a "horizontal" merger involves combining the business assets of actual or
potential direct competitors.
50. See, e.g., 1968 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 45, § 6 (describing when the DOJ would challenge
mergers).
51. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, supra note 36, at 217-26.
52. See Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 430 (discussing the legislative history of the Sherman Antitrust Act and
rejecting intent for evidence of monopolistic conspiracy). Alcoa is one of several important antitrust cases
from which modem courts continue to draw language, even while rejecting their holdings and results.
53. See, e.g., United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 552-53 (1966) (arguing the substantial
showing of proof provided evidence of a monopoly through corporate acquisitions); Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at
334 (holding that a merger would substantially lessen competition in violation of the Clayton Act); United
States v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. (DuPont 1), 353 U.S. 586, 592 (1957), modified in, 366 U.S. 316,
328-31 (1961) (finding that an acquisition that results in limiting competition comes into conflict with section
7 of the Clayton Act); United States v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp. 129, 145 (N.D. Cal. 1966)
(finding that an acquisition limits competition in violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act).
54. Dibadj, supra note 19, at 772.
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within the substantive law governing premerger" section 7 challenges. Instead,
modem enforcers tend to analyze markets from the other direction, seeking outcomes
that maximize consumer welfare.56 This in turn elevates efficiency goals over market
structure goals in many cases, and has created an antitrust environment in which size is
often tolerated because it produces greater overall utility for consumers.
This change began to take root in the 1970s, and arose out of the work of Aaron
Director and his proteges at the University of Chicago.5 7 Although it is difficult to
define the precise boundaries of "Chicago School" thinking, its primary trait was a
deep skepticism of the static and inherently collusive world posited by the S-C-P
crowd. 58 Instead, Chicago School adherents emphasized the inherent dynamism of
most markets and counseled caution rather than intervention as the default response to
allegedly anticompetitive practices. 59 At its most extreme, the Chicago School was
deeply skeptical that the antitrust laws had any value at all. Some suggested that
inevitable "chiseling" and "cheating" would serve to prevent sustained price fixing and
other collusion.60 Others doubted that it was necessary to prohibit monopolization or
concentrating mergers, because most markets are "contestable"--that is, subject to
entry or the threat of entry-which would keep prices at competitive levels. 61
If Director and his proteges provided the theological underpinnings for the new
antitrust, Professor Robert Bork was the new religion's most effective evangelist. In
his deeply influential 1978 book, The Antitrust Paradox, Bork attacked the atomism
paradigm in prose accessible to the general public. 62 Bork argued that a "consumer
welfare" standard is the only viable metric on which to judge the competitive merits of
a particular practice or transaction, and that antitrust law should abandon its fascination
with "perfect competition" in favor of ensuring efficient production.63 Bork and the
55. For linguistic convenience, "premerger" in this context refers also to challenges brought soon after
completion.
56. See, e.g., Kolasky & Dick, supra note 19, at 207 (noting the DOJ's focus on efficiency as the
ultimate goal, and competition as merely a means).
57. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 13, at 145 (discussing Aaron Director's hypothesis on the "logic of price
theory, that would-be monopolists would always prefer mergers to predation"); WARD S. BOWMAN, JR.,
PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC APPRAISAL 57, 58-59 (1973) (explaining Aaron
Director's theory of monopolistic competition); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, AN ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVE 174 (1976) (crediting Aaron Director with developing new theory of tying); John McGee,
Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, I J.L. & ECON. 137, 138 n.2 (1958) (explaining that he
wrote his work as a reaction to Aaron Director's theory); Lester G. Telser, Abusive Trade Practices: An
Economic Analysis, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 488, 489 (1965) (thanking Aaron Director for his
inspirational theory of "applying economic analysis to antitrust problems").
58. See, e.g., Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, supra note 19, 1707-09 (noting the Chicago
School's pejorative description that the atomistic model's simplification is in fact oversimplification).
59. See id. at 1701, 1706-09 (responding to pejorative descriptions of Chicago School thinking as
"static").
60. See, e.g., Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, supra note 19, at 1701 (indicating that "[t]he
desire to make a buck leads people to undermine monopolistic practices").
61. See also BAUMOL, PANZAR, & WILLIG, supra note 40, at 351-56 (discussing monopolies and ability
of competitors to enter a market). Baumol is not technically a Chicago School economist, but the theory of
contestable markets is often associated with Chicago School thinking.
62. BORK, supra note 13, at 48-49.
63. Id. at 107-15.
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Chicago School prophets whose work he promoted radically reshaped antitrust law.
The consumer welfare standard they promoted is now ingrained in the fabric of modem
antitrust law.
64
Some commentators now suggest that antitrust has entered a "post-Chicago"
period.65 Although the current equilibrium does stop short of adopting the Chicago
School catechism chapter and verse, a "post-Chicago" nomenclature understates the
depth and breadth of the Chicago School's influence upon current antitrust thinking.
Time and empirical experience have somewhat undermined some extreme positions
associated with the Chicago School. 66 For example, over the past decade, government
enforcers have uncovered a number of effective, long-running price fixing
conspiracies. 67 Similarly, recent merger research suggests that not all transactions are
efficient, 68 and the theory of contestable markets has not gone unchallenged either.
69
Nonetheless, the Chicago School's "defeats" have related primarily to its predictive
components, not its normative framework. The "consumer welfare" standard now
frames the debate in virtually every dispute.
70
64. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, supra note 36, at 283-84.
65. See, e.g., Joseph F. Brodley & Ching-to Albert Ma, Contracting Penalties, Monopolizing Strategies,
and Antitrust Policy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1180 (1993) (summarizing development of the "law and
economics" approach to penalties); Frederic M. Scherer, Some Principles for Post-Chicago Antitrust Analysis,
52 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 5, 7 (2001) [hereinafter Scherer, Post-Chicago Analysis] (proposing the Chicago
School's weakness of "far too few careful empirical studies" as the jumping-off point for post-Chicago
analysis).
66. Critics of the modem "efficiency" paradigm are quick (and correct) to point out that time and
experience have softened the hard-line positions of the 1970s antitrust insurgency. Cartels and other
anticompetitive behaviors have proved somewhat more persistent than skeptical economic theory might have
predicted. See, e.g., Frederic M. Scherer, International Trade and Competition Policy, in COMPETITION AND
TRADE POLICIES: COHERENCE OR CONFLICT? 20-23 (Einar Hope & Per Maeleng eds., 1998) [hereinafter
Scherer, International Trade] (discussing the jurisdictional problems and cooperation required in addressing,
among other things, the creation of cartels). Similarly, some recent research is skeptical that efficiencies
always result from mergers. See Scherer, Post-Chicago Analysis, supra note 65, at 10-23 (showing examples
and evidentiary studies to illustrate that the Chicago School has always been compromised in ideology).
Nonetheless, the shift in focus from the 1960s to present has been so complete that this "softening" is relevant
only on the margins. The efficiency norm continues to define the terms of the debate: the "softening" is not a
"shift." See Kolasky & Dick, supra note 19, at 207 ("There is a widening consensus among jurisdictions with
competition laws that 'the basic objective of competition policy is to protect competition as the most important
means of ensuring the efficient allocation of resources-and thus efficient market outcomes-in free market
economies."' (quoting Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev., Competition Policy and Efficiency Claims in
Horizontal Agreements, OECD/GD(96)65, at 5, 1996)). See also Majoras, supra note 19, at 1-2 (quoting Janet
McDavid, What a Kerry Victory Means for Antitrust Law, GLOBAL COMPETITION REV. (2004), available at
http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/news/newsitem.cfm?itcmid=2007) (discussing antitrust policy as
a bipartisan effort).
67. See Scherer, International Trade, supra note 66, at 20-23, for a discussion of the conduct of
international businesses and the committee's attempts at determining and addressing the issues raised by such
conduct.
68. See Scherer. Post-Chicago Analysis, supra note 65, at 10-23, for an acknowledgment of the need for
further case studies on economic efficiency.
69. See Dibadj, supra note 19, at 762-63, for an explanation of the Post-Chicago School as a reaction to
the Chicago School's lack of reality. See also Thomas B. Leary, The Essential Stability of Merger Policy in
the United States, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 105, 121 (2002) (noting that theory is often subordinated to reality).
70. This is not to say that the current equilibrium is to everyone's liking. See, e.g., Joseph F. Brodley,
Patrick Bolton & Michael H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L.J.
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Moreover, the current equilibrium enjoys broad-based support from both major
political parties. As Janet McDavid wrote on the eve of the 2004 presidential election,
[T]oday's antitrust policy "was built on a broad consensus from prior
Republican and Democratic administrations that has bipartisan support,
shared to a large degree by both academics and the business community,
which recognize the importance of well-grounded antitrust enforcement in
keeping markets open, and see antitrust as an alternative to regulation."'71
a. The Modern Sherman Act
As it stands now, neither sections 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act condemn success-
even market-dominating success-unless the successful business crosses one of two
lines in the sand. First, it cannot unreasonably restrain trade in concert with other
market participants.72 Compared to the atomistic past, "unreasonable restraints" are
now relatively narrowly defined.73 Second, it cannot unfairly exclude its competitors.
If a monopolist achieves and maintains its position through the exercise of "superior
skill, foresight, and industry,"74 the Sherman Act will not deny the firm its monopoly
profits so long as it maintains its position "fairly."
75
"Hard-core" cartel activity-overt horizontal price fixing, bid rigging, market
allocation-remains per se illegal. 76  But section 1 of the Sherman Act no longer
peremptorily condemns a number of practices that once received per se treatment.
77
Instead, the vast majority of restraints are now evaluated under the "rule of reason"-a
fact-specific balancing inquiry weighing the procompetitive benefits of a restraint
against its anticompetitive effects.
78
2239, 2240 (2000) (discussing predatory pricing as unfavorable but economically desirable); Dibadj, supra
note 19, at 752-75 (explaining the Chicago School's spin on consumer welfare as "allocative efficiency");
Eleanor M. Fox, What Is Harm to Competition? Exclusionary Practices and Anticompetitive Effect, 70
ANTITRUST L.J. 371, 372 (2002) (arguing that the U.S. government prefers to stay out of antitrust issues unless
a consumer or total wealth is affected).
71. Majoras, supra note 19, at 1-2 (quoting Janet McDavid, What a Kerry Victory Means for Antitrust
Law, GLOBAL COMPETITION REV. (2004), available at http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/news/news
item.cfm?itemid=2007).
72. The "concerted behavior" rules apply to all market participants, not just market dominating firms.
But outside the "per se" categories, the "unreasonably" requirement mandates significant market effects.
73. Compare State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) (overruling Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145
(1968) (holding that vertical maximum price fixing is a per se violation of that statute), Continental T.V., Inc.
v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (returning to rule of reason to govern antitrust interpretation), and
Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985) (holding that the
applicable test was the rule of reason test and not a per se rule), with United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,
388 U.S. 365 (1967) (utilizing the rule of reason to conclude that there was an unreasonable restraint of trade),
and Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (noting that certain actions interfere with the
trading power of other manufacturers).
74. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 430.
75. KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 45, at 94-99 (discussing per se rules and alternative theories).
76. See, e.g., AMER. BAR Assoc., SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 58
(5th ed. 2002) [hereinafter "ALD 5TH"].
77. See id. (noting that practices such as tying arrangements and group boycotts are per se illegal). See
supra note 72 for an explanation of "per se categories."
78. KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 45, at 98-99 (discussing per se rules and alternative theories).
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In the context of unilateral behavior, the Sherman Act forbids only
"monopolization" and "attempted monopolization" of markets.79  To sustain a
"monopolization" claim, a plaintiff must currently prove both that the alleged
monopolist possesses "monopoly power" in a given market, and that it engaged in
"exclusionary conduct" that had the effect of sustaining or increasing its monopoly
power.80 In order to prove attempted monopolization, a plaintiff must show that the
defendant (1) specifically intended to monopolize a given market, (2) engaged in
ex'lusionary behavior, and (3) enjoyed a dangerous probability of success.81
b. Modern Merger Review
Although the text of section 7 of the Clayton Act is largely unchanged since its
revision in 1950,82 its substantive meaning has shifted dramatically since the Chicago
School began to gain judicial followers in the 1970s. The statute now countenances
(even encourages) transactions that would have been seen as unthinkably
anticompetitive under the same provision only a generation ago.8 3  In 1968, the
Department of Justice issued a set of Merger Guidelines deeply steeped in the atomist
tradition, with presumptive illegality tied to very small market shares and market share
79. Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 2, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). This does not include single-firm
price discrimination claims brought under the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a(a)-(c) (2000).
80. "Exclusionary conduct" is now also narrowly defined. See Verizon Comm. Inc. v. Law Offices of
Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P., 540 U.S. 398, 411-14 (2004) (holding that there is no duty to deal in antitrust policy);
Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 219 (1993) (ruling that attempting
to rest an entire case on predatory pricing plan is not enough to recoup losses). But see LePage's Inc. v. 3M,
324 F.3d 141, 144 (3d Cir. 2003) (defining exclusionary conduct more broadly), cert. denied, 542 U.S. 953
(2004).
81. See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993) (laying out the criteria for an
attempted monopoly).
82. In 1980, the Act was again expanded to cover firms engaged "in any activity affecting commerce"
and to cover partnerships and individuals as well as corporations. Pub. L. No. 96-349, § 6a, 94 Stat. 1157
(1980) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000)) (explaining when stock acquisition of a corporation
will be a violation of antitrust law).
83. For example, under the 1968 Merger Guidelines, a merger between two firms in a ten-firm market
split evenly between ten producers ordinarily would have been subject to challenge. 1968 MERGER
GUIDELINES, supra note 45, 6. That same merger would fall in the "moderately concentrated" category
under the current Merger Guidelines, suggesting some level of scrutiny, but as a practical matter is unlikely to
be investigated, much less challenged. Compare DEPT. OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N 1992 HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES 1.51(b) [hereinafter 1992 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES] (April 8, 1997
revisions), available at www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelineslhorizbooklhmgl.html, with DEPT. OF JUSTICE
AND FED. TRADE COMM'N, MERGER CHALLENGES DATA, FISCAL YEARS 1999-2003, at 4 tbl.l (2003),
available at www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/201898.pdf. Of 1263 mergers "challenged" by the agencies from 1999
through 2003, fewer than 1.3% involved markets as unconcentrated as hypothetical. Id. In 1988, the House
Judiciary Committee compared govemment merger investigations and challenges in two periods: 1979-1980
and 1982-1987. Though its data was imperfect, the Committee concluded that the probability of significant
investigation was 2.7 times greater in 1979-1980 and the probability of challenge 3.6 times greater. See House
Subcommittee's Analysis of Federal Enforcement: Federal Merger Enforcement (1979-1987), 54 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1357, at 476, 476-78 (March 17, 1988) (depicting graphically federal merger
enforcement between 1977-1987); see also AMER. BAR ASSOC. ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH No. 16,
PRIVATE LITIGATION UNDER SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT: LAW AND POLICY 1-7 (1989) [hereinafter ABA
MONOGRAPH No. 16] (on file with author).
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increases for horizontal mergers. 84 By the time the DOJ issued the 1982 Guidelines,
atomism was out and consumer welfare was in.
85
Riding the crest of the Chicago School wave, the substantive standards under
which mergers are reviewed for their competitive impact have swiveled almost a full
180 degrees since the early 1970s. As a practical matter, the transformation in the
substantive merger review law from the 1960s to the 1980s is best understood as a
complete reversal in the presumptions associated with merger transactions.
86
Oversimplifying only slightly, horizontal mergers were presumptively illegal in the old
world and they are presumptively legal in the new.
87
This reversal of presumptions required a rethinking of the incentive structures
associated with antitrust merger enforcement. When the default rule shifts from
"presumptively bad" to "presumptively good," it makes sense to ensure that the law
governing merger challenges does not work at cross-purposes with the new goals. The
rules governing government enforcement in the context of premerger review are now
generally consistent with a standard of presumptive legality. The rules governing
private postmerger challenges are not.
D. History of Private Merger Challenges 1914-2000-A Perpetual Perfect Calm
The first reported private claim under section 7 of the Clayton Act was decided in
1917.88 This was just three years after Congress passed the Clayton Act in response to
concerns that the Sherman Act's retrospective focus and difficult liability standard did
not offer sufficient protection from anticompetitive transactions. 89 But despite the fact
that private challenges have always been a part of the section 7 enforcement
framework, private antimerger suits have always been far less common than antitrust
"conduct" suits challenging alleged conspiracies, monopolization, or price
discrimination.9"
84. See 1968 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 45, 5-6 (contrasting when the DOJ will challenge
mergers that are highly concentrated and when it will challenge mergers that are less highly concentrated).
85. The Supreme Court's 1974 opinion in United States v. General Dynamics Corp. represented the
beginning of the end, in some ways, for an atomism-driven merger policy. See Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415
U.S. 486, 498 (1974) (holding the government's showing of significant concentration not enough to prove
substantial lessening of competition).
86. See, e.g., Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Statement Before the American Bar
Association Antitrust Section Annual Meeting: Antitrust Enforcement at the Federal Trade Commission: In a
Word, Continuity (Aug. 7, 2001), available at www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/murisaba.htm ("Rigid reliance on
concentration statistics and structural presumptions [will] no longer suffice, we have to look at the competitive
dynamics of the market").
87. A "presumptions" focus also helps illustrate the reality of continued enforcement against truly
anticompetitive mergers. Conventional wisdom notwithstanding, recent government enforcement has not been
"anything goes," but the law has returned the burden of proof to merger opponents. Id.
88. See Niles-Bement-Pond Co. v. Iron Molders' Union, Local No. 68, 246 F. 851, 864 (S.D. Ohio 1917)
(finding the case did not fall within section 7 of the Clayton Act), rev'd on jurisdictional grounds, 258 F. 408
(6th Cir. 1918), ajfd, 254 U.S. 77 (1920).
89. See SCHERER & Ross, supra note 28, at 174-75 (discussing the pre-Clayton Act interpretation of the
Sherman Act and that the purpose of the Clayton was to prevent trusts from forming prior to their creation).
90. There were a total of 144 private merger challenges filed in the twelve years between 1977 and 1988.
ABA MONOGRAPH No. 16, supra note 83, at 9-12. From 1981 to 1986, the number of private merger
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There are several obvious explanations for the apparent unpopularity of private
merger challenges. First and foremost, there are almost certainly fewer competitively
sensitive mergers and acquisitions than there are alleged "conduct" offenses.9 1
Relatively fewer questionable mergers necessarily mean relatively fewer potential
merger challenges. Accordingly, we should not be concerned with whether there are
too few (or too many) merger challenges relative to other types of private antitrust
suits. Rather, the relevant questions are: (1) whether structural factors have dampened
enthusiasm for private section 7 litigation in the past, and (2) whether those factors are
likely to suppress private merger claims in the future.
Three separate sets of factors have suppressed the level of private enforcement
activity in the three distinct historical periods of section 7 enforcement from 1914 to
2000. From 1914 to 1950, private and public enforcement alike were hampered by a
statute riddled with loopholes.9 2 From 1950 to 1978, a deeply atomistic competition
policy overdeterred private claims by overdeterring overall merger activity. 93 Finally,
from 1978 to 2000, increases in horizontal merger activity and relaxation of the
substantive liability standards governing section 7 claims were offset by a number of
developments that severely circumscribed private parties' legal and practical ability to
pursue claims.
94
1. 1914-1950-A Wrong Without a Remedy
In its original form, section 7 did little to stem the tide of allegedly
anticompetitive mergers. Congress drafted the original text in response to a series of
horizontal stock acquisitions that merging parties had used to circumvent the Sherman
Act during the 1895-1904 merger wave and thereafter. 95 One Progressive member of
Congress described the problem in this way: "Trusts have been ordered dissolved in the
past, and the only change effected was one in the methods of bookkeeping. It is time
for straightforward action and an honest effort to protect the people from the powers
challenges approximated the number of government merger challenges. See id. (reporting the oligarchical
methods used to avoid antitrust liability). By contrast, the Georgetown Private Antitrust Litigation Project
sampled five district courts from 1973 to 1983. In each year of the survey period, there were at least 100
private antitrust suits filed in each of the five sampled districts (Southern District of New York, Northern
District of Illinois, Northern District of California, Eastern District of Missouri, Northern District of Georgia),
and a total of 1938 cases over the eleven survey years. Thomas E. Kauper & Edward A. Snyder, An Inquiry
into the Efficiency of Private Antitrust Enforcement: Follow-on and Independently Initiated Cases Compared,
74 GEO. L.J. 1163, 1175, 1177 tbl.2 (1986); see also Steven C. Salop & Lawrence J. white, Economic Analysis
of Private Antitrust Litigation, 74 GEO. L.J. 1001, 1006 tbl.4 (1986) (analyzing same data, concluding that
private merger claims were included in 5.8% of all sampled antitrust claims, and constituted the primary
allegation of wrongdoing in 2.6%).
91. See also RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE
ACQUISITIONS 11-38 (2d ed. 1995) (identifying four previous merger waves in the United States, the fourth
ending not later than 1991). See generally SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 28, at 153-98 (discussing a textbook
treatment of historical U.S. merger activity).
92. See infra Part I.D.1 for a discussion of enforcement of section 7 from 1914-1950.
93. See infra Part I.D.2 for a discussion of enforcement of section 7 from 1950-1978.
94. See infra Part I.D.3 for a discussion of enforcement of section 7 from 1978-2000.
95. See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. 294, 314 n.21 (1962) (discussing reasons the original Act was interpreted
to be limited to horizontal mergers by enforcing agency and courts).
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that prey upon them." 96 Like many statutes drafted in response to a specific perceived
problem, the law insufficiently addressed the myriad ways in which that problem could
manifest. The original language prohibited only potentially anticompetitive stock
acquisitions.
97
Businesses quickly found ways to circumvent the new law. Asset sales, lease
agreements, and transactions involving partnerships and other non-corporation entities
did not fall under the express terms of the Act, and the stock sale became less common,
especially in connection with acquisitions with true anticompetitive potential. 98
During this period, government and private enforcers alike also first came to
terms with section 7's practical limitations.99 The government and private parties had
the right to seek precompletion injunctive relief in connection with a transaction that
threatened competitive harm. 00 But they were often unable to slow or stop even
preannounced mergers before completion unless they won a race to the courthouse they
often did not know they had entered.
2. 1950-1978
In 1950, the Celler-Kefauver Act solved one of section 7's perceived problems,
expanding coverage to prohibit essentially any potentially anticompetitive corporate
merger or acquisition.10' This might have opened the floodgates for private
enforcement of section 7, but it did not. The relative absence of significant private
merger challenges during this period is best explained as a side effect of the atomism
norm's dominance in American antitrust law during those years.
Also in the 1950s, Joe Bain and others introduced the structure-conduct-
performance literature to antitrust enforcers.10 2 S-C-P theory dovetailed almost
seamilessly with the "freedom from" impulse, decrying the existence of concentrated
markets, and offering rigorous economic justification for Americans' reflexive
suspicion of size and economic power. As a result, antitrust became increasingly
hostile to mergers of all types. It was particularly suspicious of horizontal mergers. 0 3
96. 51 CONG. REC. 9086 (1914) (remarks of Rep. Kelly).
97. See supra Part 1.B.3 for a discussion of section 7 as originally enacted. Supporters of the 1950
amendments contended that the 1914 Act's language was "the result of accident or an unawareness that the
acquisition of assets could be as inimical to competition as stock acquisition." Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 313.
The Supreme Court disagreed, noting that asset acquisitions had been considered and dismissed as unimportant
to a bill primarily directed at preventing the development of holding companies that secretly acquired
competitors by purchasing their stock. Id. at 313-14.
98. See id. at 314 (describing what the original Clayton Act did and did not permit).
99. Id. at 314.
100. See id. (describing proposed amendments that would have required prior notification of companies'
plans so that plaintiffs could pursue injunctive relief in advance).
101. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text describing the broadening of section 7 to target
additional anticompetitive actions.
102. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text, recounting the belief of the S-C-P school that
atomistic markets are ideal markets.
103. See, e.g., Robert Pitofsky, Kirkpatrick Lecture: Antitrust at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century.-
The Matter of Remedies, 91 GEO. L.J. 169, 170 n.2 (2002) (referencing case that blocked horizontal merger of
two Los Angeles supermarket chains with combined market share of 8-9%).
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Because S-C-P taught that even moderate concentration was to be avoided, government
antitrust enforcers routinely challenged horizontal mergers involving modest market
shares. 104
The liability standards in place from the 1950s through the 1970s tended to
generate significant Type I errors, declaring presumptively illegal many mergers that
were in fact competitively neutral or even procompetitive under modem standards. 105
These "false positives" overdeterred horizontal merger activity, at least from the
perspective of a consumer welfare standard. 10 6 And that, in turn, deterred suits
dependent upon that activity for their genesis. 1
07
a. The Liability/Relief Disconnect
Most of the "easy" cases during this period were government enforcement actions.
These government challenges did not usually involve damages claims, and did not
technically preclude private plaintiffs from making parallel claims.108  But the
government tends to challenge transactions before or near the time of completion. 0 9 A
private plaintiff would have virtually no incentive to seek a duplicative injunction, and
little incentive to sue for the limited damages that could have accrued from the time of
the merger to the time of an early government suit. There was relatively little low-
hanging fruit for private plaintiffs to pick.
104, Id. at 170.
105. See, e.g., SCHERER & Ross, supra note 28, at 176 (describing increased enforcement activity in
1950s and 1960s and noting that the Celler-Kefauver Act was "consciously structuralist").
106. The merger wave from 1955 to 1973 involved primarily conglomerate mergers that did not raise
substantial competitive concerns. Id. at 158. There is some evidence that merging parties substituted away
from horizontal transactions in part because of the antitrust risks associated with those transactions. Id. ("The
strict enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws deflected merger activity into non-horizontal categories and restrained
increases in seller (that is, horizontal) concentration below what they would have been under unfettered
conditions.") The fourth merger wave in the 1970s and 1980s demonstrated that the third merger wave's focus
on conglomerate transactions did not improve consumer welfare. A substantial percentage of the mergers in
the 1980s "deconglomerated" the inefficient conglomerates formed in the 1960s and early 1970s. See
generally id. (discussing the reasons the 1980s ended the conglomerate wave of the 1960s and 1970s).
107. A record number of mergers in 1969, for example, should not be misinterpreted as counterargument
to this point. Over seventy percent of the mergers during the third merger wave were primarily conglomerate
in character. See GILSON & BLACK, supra note 91, at 17 (arguing that the third merger wave was largely one
of conglomeration and diversification, characterized by rapid acquisition of lines of business outside acquirers'
"traditional areas of interest.").
108. The federal government is authorized to seek only equitable relief in most antitrust cases. See
Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 4, 26 Stat. 209 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 4 (2000)) (authorizing "proceedings in
equity"). Damages claims by the United States are authorized only when the United States itself is "injured in
its business or property," in which case it may seek treble damages. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 4A, 38 Stat. 730
(1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 15a (2000)). Accordingly, even when the federal government
challenges a transaction well after its completion (and ostensibly after damages have accrued), damages claims
in most cases will remain available to private plaintiffs under section 26 of the Clayton Act. Id. § 26.
109. But see United States v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. (DuPont 1), 353 U.S. 586, 598 (1957)
(noting that, whenever threat of prohibited effects becomes apparent, no decisions in suits brought near time of
completion foreclose later suits by the government). See infra Part IIl for a discussion of problems with laws
governing private merger challenges.
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As important, until the 1980s, there was only limited correlation between liability
standards and damages in merger cases. Plaintiff-friendly, atonism-seeking precedent
may have supported liability for a merger combining two companies with a combined
market share of less than ten percent in a market considered competitive by today's
standards," 0 but a private plaintiff understandably would have been hard-pressed to
prove damages resulting from that combination."' Installing liability roadblocks at (or
beyond) the extreme outer boundaries of potentially anticompetitive behavior may have
deterred merging parties from crossing the threshold into truly objectionable conduct,
but it also deterred private parties from patrolling those borders. Under the
circumstances, even automatic trebling of damages may not have offered sufficient
incentives for private plaintiffs to challenge many mergers that would have been illegal
under then-prevailing standards.
b. The Availability of Injunctive Relief
Private section 7 plaintiffs have always been able to seek injunctive relief. But
the availability of injunctive relief alone typically would create sufficient incentive to
sue for only three special classes of plaintiff: state government enforcers, hostile
takeover targets themselves, and competitors within the merging companies' industry.
The Supreme Court rendered two of these classes more or less irrelevant in 1978.112
State enforcers continue to seek or at least threaten injunction actions in connection
with questionable mergers, but competitors and takeover targets have found it more
difficult to challenge mergers after the Supreme Court limited standing to those who
are threatened with an injury "of the type the antitrust laws were designed to
prevent."' 13
As a general rule, suits for injunctive relief are considerably less attractive to most
private plaintiffs than treble damages suits.1 14  And injunctions alone do not
compensate contingency-fee lawyers. Moreover, injunctive relief in merger cases is
most effective as a preventive measure, but as a general rule, most private suits will be
filed after the mergers they challenge have been completed." 5 Viewed after the fact, it
110. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying for a discussion of the atomism paradigm.
11. See Gottesman v. Gen. Motors Corp., 414 F.2d 956, 961 (2d Cir. 1969) (determining that "plaintiffs
cannot rest on a showing of a violation of § 7," but must prove actual harm).
112. See infra Parts I.D.3.b-c discussing the antitrust injury doctrine.
113. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). See infra Parts l.D.3.b-c
for a discussion of antitrust injury doctrine.
114. At least one commentator believes that these plaintiffs deserve enhanced stature in the eyes of the
law. See Joseph F. Brodley, Antitrust Standing in Private Merger Cases: Reconciling Private Incentives and
Public Enforcement Goals, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1, 25-26 (1995) [hereinafter Brodley, Antitrust Standing]
(arguing that the private enforcement system should be modified to permit more effective private enforcement
of anticompetitive mergers). However, as of this writing, competitors and merger targets find it difficult to
sustain lawsuits in light of the Supreme Court's "antitrust injury" doctrine. See infra Parts l.D.3.b-c for a
discussion of limitations on standing imposed by Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat and Illinois Brick
Co. v. Illinois.
115. Private plaintiffs may file a section 7 action for injunctive relief before a transaction is completed.
See Clayton Act, ch. 323 § 16, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 26 (2000)) (authorizing suit
for "threatened loss or damage") (emphasis added); 15 U.S.C. § 18 (transaction violates statute if its effect
"may be substantially to lessen competition.") (emphasis added); see also California v. Am. Stores Co., 495
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is no certain thing that a suit seeking only injunctive relief against a previously
consummated merger would ultimately address a potential plaintiffs actual or
threatened injuries. This was especially true before 1990, when the availability of a
divestiture remedy for private plaintiffs was an open question. 116 It could have been
difficult indeed for a private plaintiff to justify an antimerger injunction suit in the
absence of significant provable damages.
c. Government as Torchbearer
The fact that there was little private enforcement of section 7 from 1950 to 1978
does Uot mean that the law or its enforcers took a laissez-faire attitude toward mergers
or antitrust enforcement. To the contrary, prevailing antitrust thought from the 1950s
through the 1970s was actively hostile to horizontal mergers, and the government
enforcement culture was driven by the atomism norm."17 The influence of atomistic
thinking was nowhere more apparent than in the Supreme Court's landmark 1962
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States118 decision. In Brown Shoe, the Court upheld a
government challenge to Brown Shoe's acquisition of Kinney Shoe-a transaction that
resulted in a combined market share of approximately 5.2% of national shoe
production. 119
The Brown Shoe decision sent a clear message to potential acquirers that
horizontal acquisitions were inherently suspect, and the law would not countenance any
significant increase in market concentration, even if it improved efficiency:
[W]e cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote competition
through the protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses. Congress
appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices might result from the
maintenance of fragmented industries and markets. It resolved these
competing considerations in favor of decentralization. We must give effect to
that decision. 12
0
The Brown Shoe decision was just one in a series of government cases that reinforced
the atomism norm during this period. 121 Government promotion of atomistic markets
was so "effective" that little private enforcement was even possible. 122
U.S. 271, 283 (1990) (confirming state may seek injunctive relief under 15 U.S.C. § 16). However, outside the
context of reportable transactions that will, by definition, be subject to government scrutiny and private free-
rider issues, the typical private plaintiff would have little ability to mobilize resources against a transaction
before closing.
116. See Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. at 283 (interpreting 15 U.S.C. § 16 as permitting relief in the form of
divestiture).
117. See supra Part I.C.I for a discussion of the atomism paradigm.
118. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
119. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 303 (reporting perspective market shares of Kinney and Brown at time of
proposed merger). The Brown Shoe opinion has been roundly criticized by a host of Chicago School-
influenced commentators in connection with its theory of vertical harm, its approach to market definition, and
other issues. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 13, at 198-216 (characterizing Brown Shoe as "the crash of merger
policy"). This Article is concerned with Brown Shoe only insofar as it was emblematic of an atomism-driven
enforcement norm at the time.
120. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 344.
121. See, e.g., Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. at 552 (finding that the intent of section 7 is to "[arrest]
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3. The Perpetual Perfect Calm Continues: Private Merger Challenges, 1978-
2000
Starting in 1978, a new series of events effectively guaranteed that private merger
challenges would remain at the margins of antitrust enforcement, even as the overall
pace of horizontal merger activity increased exponentially. Courts still resolved the
occasional private claim, 123 but by 2000, successful private challenges were
increasingly rare. Four separate events share responsibility for that state of affairs: (1)
passage of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act in 1976 (effective September 5, 1978), (2) the
Supreme Court's 1977 adoption of the so-called Illinois Brick bar against indirect
purchaser suits, (3) the Supreme Court's introduction and amplification of the "antitrust
injury" doctrine in 1977 and 1985, and (4) the rise of the Chicago School and the
introduction of the Justice Department's 1982 Merger Guidelines and their progeny.
Together, these developments dramatically curtailed private parties' incentives and
ability to challenge potentially anticompetitive mergers, even as merger activity was
taking off under Chicago School rules.
a. Hart-Scott-Rodino
By 1976, federal antitrust enforcement agencies were thoroughly frustrated by
their inability to enforce section 7 effectively. 124 This frustration stemmed in large part
from federal enforcers' limited success in challenging potentially anticompetitive
transactions before completion, and in the related difficulties enforcers faced in
obtaining effective relief once the subject businesses had been integrated. 25  In
response, Congress passed the Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, also known as the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act or simply "HSR."' 126 The Federal Trade Commission's rules
concentration in the American economy, whatever its cause, in its incipiency"); United States v. Von's
Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1966) ("The facts of this case present exactly the threatening trend toward
concentration which Congress wanted to halt"); Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp. at 149 (concluding
that Schlitz's merger with two American brewing companies had "serious anti-competitive consequences").
122. See supra Part I.D.2.a for a discussion of the disincentives for private plaintiffs.
123. Interestingly, the absolute pace of private merger challenges seems to have remained relatively
constant during the ten-year periods on either side of the 1978 implementation of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act
thresholds and the Supreme Court's 1977-1978 Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat and Illinois Brick decisions. A cursory
review of Westlaw cases reveals approximately 130 reported cases involving private merger challenges during
each ten-year period. This is broadly consistent with the trends identified in this Article. "Takeover target"
and competitor suits popular in the pre-HSRIPueblo Bowl-O-Mat/Illinois Brick period were less viable after
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, and HSR established premerger screens that further discouraged private enforcement.
On the other hand, the relaxation in liability standards quasi-codified by the 1982 and 1984 Merger Guidelines
paradoxically encouraged at least some additional private litigation by fostering additional merger activity and
renewed private interest in challenging horizontal transactions. Similar numbers of private challenges on
either side of the 1978 divide seems about right. See ABA MONOGRAPH No. 16, supra note 83, at II (pace of
government and private merger challenges approximately equal from 1981-1987).
124. See, e.g., William J. Baer, Dir., Bureau of Competition, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Prepared Remarks
Before the Conference Board: Reflections on 20 Years of Merger Enforcement Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Act (Oct. 29, 1996) (transcript available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/hsrspeec.htm) (summarizing
issues leading to the passage of HSR); see also SCHERER & Ross, supra note 28, at 188-90 (discussing the
immense burden placed on government enforcers attempting to block conglomerate mergers).
125. See id. (discussing obstacles to effective enforcement prior to 1976).
126. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435 (1976) (codified as
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implementing HSR went into effect on September 5, 1978.127 The statute erects
government roadblocks in the path of pending mergers and illegalizes "merger by
ambush" techniques. 128  Under HSR, all transactions meeting certain size/value
thresholds must be reported to the federal government before completion.
129
Proponents of reportable transactions must supply the government basic
information regarding the transaction and its likely competitive effects. 130 Moreover,
HSR imposes a waiting period during which the parties cannot complete the
transaction. During that waiting period, the government may investigate the potential
competitive impact of the merger. Reportable mergers cannot move forward unless
and until the agencies explicitly or implicitly authorize consummation. Parties failing
to make premerger filings in connection with a reportable merger are subject to
substantial penalties. 131 Harsh sanctions also await parties who begin integrating their
businesses before receiving final government approval.
132
In the event that the government concludes that a proposed merger warrants
further investigation, it may issue subpoenas (known colloquially as "Second
Requests") 133 to the parties. Second Requests further delay consummation until the
parties have completed their responses. Throughout the HSR process, the government
and merger parties often negotiate regarding the actual competitive significance of the
transaction and potential remedies (e.g., divestiture of overlapping assets, etc.) that
might address agency concerns. If the parties fail to reach agreement, the government
can file suit to block the merger.
134
But courts have tried relatively few merger cases since HSR went into effect. 135
The vast majority of merger issues are resolved without litigation, and when the
government expresses its intention to block a merger, the parties often abandon the
deal. 136 As a result, most of the "case law" governing the analysis of mergers today
comes not in the form of reported decisions, but instead exists as accumulated internal
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2000)).
127. See 43 Fed. Reg. 34,443 (Fed. Trade Comm'n July 29, 1978) (preparing for promulgation of final
rules and establishing adoption date); 43 Fed. Reg. 34,537 (Fed. Trade Comm'n July 31, 1978) (promulgating
final rules and establishing adoption date).
128. Baer, supra note 124.
129. HSR replaced a much more limited premerger notification program that the FTC had implemented
in 1969. See, e.g., 39 Fed. Reg. 35,717 (Fed. Trade Comn'n Oct. 3, 1974) (outlining need for expanding
advance notification system).
130. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a)-(d) (2000).
131. Id. § 18a(g).
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM'N, BUREAU OF COMPETITION, PREMERGER NOTIFICATION OFFICE,
INTRODUCTORY GUIDE III TO THE PREMERGER NOTIFICATION PROGRAM: MODEL REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL
INFORMATION AND DOCUMENTARY MATERIAL (SECOND REQUEST) (2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/
hsr/introguides/guide3.pdf.
134. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(f).
135. Some of this decline is likely attributable to changes in substantive liability standards. See supra
Part I.C.2. for a description of the shift in emphasis from atomistic theory to consumer welfare protection led
by Chicago School.
136. Warren S. Grimes, Transparency in Federal Antitrust Enforcement, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 937, 946
(2003).
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agency wisdom and HSR counsel lore.137 Government theories and party responses are
rarely tested before a judge. 138 The Supreme Court has not issued a substantive merger
decision in over thirty years. 1
39
Although it is hard to draw firm conclusions from a limited dataset, it seems clear
that HSR significantly reduced the number of meritorious private antimerger suits, at
least relative to the overall annual number of horizontal mergers and acquisitions. 4
0
By establishing a formal mechanism for premerger review, HSR limited the number of
transactions likely to be subject to private challenge.' 4' HSR also affected courts'
willingness to intervene in connection with mergers that (1) had not been subject to
filing requirements, (2) were left uninvestigated after premerger reporting, or (3) were
investigated but allowed to proceed by government enforcers. The absence of
government action on a particular merger, while of no formal legal significance, had
some impact on a potential plaintiff's pre-suit analysis.
HSR decreased incentives for private plaintiffs to file suit from the date it went
into effect in 1978 because it subjected mergers above a certain size threshold to
premerger government review. 4 2 And because of a significant flaw in the drafting of
HSR, private suits became less attractive every year thereafter. For most transactions,
the original provisions of HSR established a $15 million filing threshold-if a
137. E.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Modes of Regulatory Enforcement and the Problem of Administrative
Discretion, 50 HASTINGs L.J. 1275, 1307 (1999) (stating that "the antitrust agencies' 'enforcement policies'
are in effect the law of antitrust mergers today); Grimes, supra note 136, at 945-47 (explaining that agency
discretion in enforcement provides guidance within the agency and to a few "privileged outsiders" but not to
the public); Gary L. Reback & Christopher O.B. Wright, Government Antitrust Review of High Technology
Mergers, COMPUTER LAW., June 1992, at 1, 3 ("Merger review under the antitrust law is primarily conducted
by administrative agencies; staff attorneys and economists inside the Federal Government evaluate the
competitive effects of mergers more often than do federal judges").
138. Economists play a unique and central role in defining the functional law of merger challenges. The
dozens of reported cases analyzing section 7 of the Clayton Act are essentially meaningless to the practitioners
of the dismal science charged with analyzing the competitive effects of a merger. In the vast majority of
contested cases, it comes down to whether government economists are more persuasive than their counterparts
retained by the merger proponents. As a result, the antitrust community tends to have a more academic focus
than most other legal disciplines, and the level of interaction between government lawyers and economists and
their private counterparts is remarkable.
139. See supra note 85 for a discussion of General Dynamics marking the end of the Supreme Court's
substantive merger decisions. The Supreme Court has issued three opinions in private section 7 cases since
1978. See infra Parts I.D.3.b-c for an examination of Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Illinois Brick, and Cargill, Inc. v.
Monfort of Colorado, Inc. Each of these opinions is important in understanding the past and future role of
private challenges. But none addressed the substantive liability standards applicable under section 7.
140. It is extremely difficult to extract the effects of any one individual development upon the frequency
of private merger challenges. A number of these developments occurred virtually simultaneously. In addition,
there are numerous other factors in play, including the overall pace of merger activity, the relative level of
government enforcement, etc.
141. Government inaction after a premerger filing does not preclude private suits as a matter of law.
ABA MONOGRAPH No. 16, supra note 83, at 54-55. But if the government chooses not to challenge a
particular transaction after HSR review, private parties are likely to think twice before filing their own lawsuit.
142. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435 (1976) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § I8a(a)(I)-(2) (2000)). The absolute number of reported private merger claims is not
terribly helpful in evaluating the effects of any particular legal factor, primarily because any law-driven trends
are likely to be overwhelmed by the trends in the overall level of merger activity.
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transaction's total value was less than $15 million, the parties were not required to
make a premerger filing and could consummate their merger without prior government
approval. 143  This did not mean that mergers without filing requirements were
presumptively legal. Rather, the $15 million thresholds acted as a filter, such that the
government's limited resources could be focused upon transactions with greater
potential competitive impact.
But HSR's original transaction value thresholds did not increase to keep pace with
inflation. From 1976 through 2000, the $15 million threshold stayed the same in
nominal dollars. In real terms, the filing threshold fell dramatically. In 1985, a $15
million transaction would have been equivalent in real terms to an $8.5 million
transaction in 1976 dollars. 144 A $15 million transaction in the year 2000 would have
been a $5.9 million transaction in 1976 dollars. 145  As a result, there were
proportionally more premerger filings every year due to inflation. By 2000, this
included thousands of annual filings for transactions far smaller in real terms than HSR
captured in 1978.
By the close of the century, premerger filings were overwhelming the federal
government, and a large and ever-increasing percentage of potentially anticompetitive
transactions was subject to at least token government review. 146 As a result, federal
enforcers identified and addressed the vast majority of potentially anticompetitive
mergers, albeit at substantial cost to their other enforcement efforts. If there was little
low-hanging fruit available to plaintiffs before 1976, the tree had been picked clean by
2000.
143. The actual thresholds for premerger filings were (and remain) fairly complex, and there were (and
are) a number of different ways in which a transaction could trigger a premerger filing requirement. See, for
example, 15 U.S.C. § 18a for the current set of threshold tests (actual monetary thresholds are available at
Revised Jurisdictional Thresholds for Section 7A of the Clayton Act, 70 Fed. Reg. 5020-01 (Jan. 31, 2005)).
For purposes of this Article, however, the most common "size-of-transaction" threshold is sufficient to
illustrate the issues. The other thresholds are subject to the same analysis, although the dollar values for those
thresholds are different.
144. Indexed on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) using calculator available at
http://wwwl.jsc.nasa.gov/bu2/inflateGDP.html.
145. Indexed on Gross Domestic Product (GPD) using calculator available at
http://wwwl.jsc.nasa.gov/bu2/inflateGDP.html.
146. In 2000, the agencies reviewed a total of 4,926 reportable transactions. FED. TRADE COMM'N,
BUREAU OF COMPETITION & DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST Div., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: FISCAL
YEAR 2003 app. A (summarizing annual transactions 1994-2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2004/09/
040903hsrrptO3.pdf. In 1993, the agencies reviewed 1,846 reportable transactions. FED. TRADE COMM'N,
BUREAU OF COMPETITION & DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST Div., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: FISCAL
YEAR 1997 app. A (summarizing annual transactions 1988-1997), available at
http://www.ftc.govlbc/hsr/97annrpt/ann972.htm. Although some of the increase is a function of an overall
increase in merger activity, some is attributable to the falling real thresholds. $15 million in 2000 would be
equivalent to $13.25 million in 1993 (indexed on Gross Domestic Product (GPD) using calculator available at
http://wwwl .jsc.nasa.gov/bu2/inflateGDP.html).
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b. The Antitrust Injury Doctrine
In 1977, the Supreme Court in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.
147
rejected a private merger challenge brought by a bowling alley owner upset that a large
company had purchased a failing rival. The Court rejected the plaintiff's section 7
claim, reasoning that the plaintiff's injury would have been the result of increased
competition in the local bowling alley market. 48 According to the Court, that was not
the kind of injury Congress had in mind when it created a private right of action under
the Clayton Act.'49 The Court held that in order to have standing to sue, private
antitrust plaintiffs must demonstrate that they suffered an "injury of the type the
antitrust laws were intended to prevent."' 50  This is typically interpreted as a
requirement that the plaintiffs injury result from increased prices or decreased
output. '5 I
In 1986, the United States Supreme Court extended this "antitrust injury"
requirement to private merger plaintiffs seeking solely injunctive relief.52 In Cargill,
Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc.,'53 a meat-packing company sought to block the
merger of two larger competitors. 5 4  Applying Brunswick explicitly, the Supreme
Court held that any increase in price attributable to the merger would in fact benefit the
plaintiff, and that the plaintiff therefore lacked standing to file an injunction suit
regarding that threatened injury. 55
The Cargill plaintiff also alleged that it would be a victim of exclusionary conduct
on the part of the merged firm designed to drive it out of business. 156 The Court
recognized that exclusionary behavior would constitute "antitrust injury" to a
competitor, but held that the plaintiff had failed to provide sufficient evidence in
support of its claim. 1
57
Brunswick and Cargill had an obvious and immediate effect on private merger
challenges, severely limiting the types of potential plaintiffs that could maintain a suit
under section 7.t58 Although persuasive arguments can be made that the antitrust
injury doctrine furthers legitimate antitrust goals and creates appropriate disincentives
to opportunistic behavior, there is little doubt that it further discourages certain highly
147. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
148. Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at 490.
149. Id. at 487-88.
150. Id. at 489.
151. See, e.g., Ball Mem'I Hosp. v. Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1334 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating
that "antitrust injury" means injury from higher prices or lower output).
152. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 113 (1986).
153. 479 U.S. 104 (1986).
154. Cargill, Inc., 479 U.S. at 106-07.
155. Id. at 116-17.
156. Id. at 117.
157. Id. at 118-19.
158. See generally ABA MONOGRAPH No. 16, supra note 83 (describing effects of "antitrust injury"
decisions on frequency of private challenges).
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motivated but potentially opportunistic private plaintiffs from even making the
attempt. 15 9
In the history of private challenges before 1986, the most common plaintiffs were
the competitors of the merging parties. 160 While competitors are one of the groups
most likely to be upset by a competitor's merger, the Supreme Court recognized in
Brunswick and Cargill that they are not particularly good plaintiffs. 161 Competitors do
not and should not have standing to complain about increased prices resulting from the
merger, which would benefit them as market participants. Instead they face a far
higher hurdle-in many circuits, they must prove that the merged firm is likely to
engage in successful exclusionary conduct that will hurt the plaintiffs themselves.
162
Some courts have established liberal standards for standing based on future
exclusionary behavior by the more-powerful merged entity.163 Regardless, the antitrust
injury doctrine has further limited private merger challenges.164
The antitrust injury doctrine also limits the ability of hostile merger takeover
targets to challenge unattractive transactions on antitrust grounds. 165  A purchased
159. For a different perspective on the antitrust injury doctrine in the context of private merger suits, see
Brodley, Antitrust Standing, supra note 114, at 16, which suggests that "the antitrust policy doctrine addresses
the problem of the wrongly motivated private litigant by scrutinizing the plaintiff's injury to determine
whether the self-interest the plaintiff seeks to vindicate is consistent with antitrust goals."
160. See ABA MONOGRAPH No. 16, supra note 83, at 118-26 (describing prevalence of competitor
challenges in pre-Brunswick world). According to the ABA's survey, of the 144 private merger challenges
filed from 1977-1988, fifty were filed by third-party competitors, thirty-nine by hostile takeover targets,
twenty-two by customers (including terminated distributors), eleven by disappointed bidders, five by
employees or suppliers, and seventeen by other types of plaintiffs. Id.
161. See Brodley, Antitrust Standing, supra note 114, at 46-78 (arguing that courts should use equity
mechanisms to ensure competitor-plaintiffs have proper incentives).
162. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224-25 (1993)
(requiring an almost insurmountably high burden). But see LaPage's Inc., 324 F.3d at 155-59 (defining
exclusionary conduct more broadly).
163. See, e.g., R.C. Bigelow, Inc. v. Unilever N.V., 867 F.2d 102, 107-11 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 815 (1989) (holding that a competitor has standing to challenge a merger if the resulting postmerger
market share is sufficient to increase the probability of postmerger predatory behavior); Cmty. Publishers, Inc.
v. DR Partners, 139 F.3d 1180, 1183 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that the District Court's determination that "this
is one of those rare cases [in which] a competitor plaintiff has successfully proved a threat of antitrust injury"
was not clearly erroneous). This interpretation of the Cargill standard is far from universal. See ALD 5TH,
supra note 76, at 846 n.61 (listing cases where competitor was denied standing). Nonetheless, a large number
of potential merger parties are amenable to federal suit somewhere within the Second and Eighth Circuits'
jurisdiction, and so competitor suits continue to be a realistic possibility in connection with many mergers.
164. Some argue that the decline in private merger challenges in the 1980s and 1990s was ipso facto
undesirable. See, e.g., Brodley, Antitrust Standing, supra note 114, at 4-10 (stating that apparently unlawful
mergers went forward unchallenged as a result of the restrictive standing requirements). But because private
parties and their attorneys have incentives for opportunistic, profit-maximizing behavior not shared by most
government enforcers, it is illogical to assume that more private enforcement is necessarily better. Brodley's
"incentive compatibility" arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. Id. at 80-103 (arguing that the plaintiff's
private interest in forestalling a merger and the public interest in maintaining competition must be compatible
to have effective enforcement). Nonetheless, this Article expresses no opinion as to whether there was too
much or too little private enforcement activity during the 1980s and 1990s. The primary purpose in
highlighting the "dead period" is to contrast the conditions responsible for the decline to the conditions
prevailing today and in the future.
165. Lower courts appear to be evenly split as to whether a hostile takeover target can invoke section 7
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company is not usually injured by the anticompetitive effects of an acquisition. 66
Instead, any injury it suffers from a merger or acquisition would typically be unrelated
to the potential anticompetitive consequences of the acquisition, which will typically
redound to the target company's benefit in the form of higher profits.
c. Illinois Brick
Having already struck a significant blow in Brunswick, the Supreme Court again
weakened the private merger enforcement regime just a few months later by further
limiting the universe of potential antitrust plaintiffs. In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,167
the Court barred "indirect" purchasers-buyers who purchased products subject to
antitrust violations two or more levels below the defendants in the chain of
distribution-from filing suit to recover antitrust damages. 1
68
In an extended exercise in speculative pragmatism, the Court acknowledged that
indirect purchasers could bear some or all of the costs of an antitrust violation because
upstream distributors could often pass through overcharges.' 69 But the Court rejected
indirect purchaser claims, concluding that allowing such suits could lead to double
recoveries and extraordinary difficulties in apportioning damages among different
victims. 170  Instead, the Supreme Court held that in most cases, only direct
purchasers-those who bought the product directly from the antitrust defendant-could
sustain private claims. 17 1 The Supreme Court has not explicitly applied Illinois Brick
after Cargill. See ALD 5th, supra note 76, at 869 n.162 and the cases cited therein. For example, in Anago,
Inc. v. Technol. Med. Prods., 976 F.2d 248, 251 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. dismissed, 510 U.S. 985 (1993), the Fifth
Circuit rejected a target's section 7 challenge on antitrust injury grounds, holding that "[p]roof that a plaintiff
will be adversely affected by the merger itself will not suffice in this Court, unless the injuries are related to
the anticompetitive effects of the merger." By comparison, the Second Circuit has held that the target
company's loss of independence "is causally related to the injury occurring in the market place" and has
granted standing on that ground. See Consol. Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 257-58 (2d
Cir. 1989), cert dismissed, 492 U.S. 939 (1989). For the contrary view that targets should have standing, see
Brodley, Antitrust Standing, supra note 114, at 78-104 listing the rationales for granting target standing.
166. That is, unless we dramatically expand our definition of "injury to competition" to encompass the
sorts of things Professor Brodley unpersuasively suggests we should consider. See Brodley, Antitrust
Standing, supra note 114, at 78-106 (suggesting that effects of an unlawful merger injure the target firm and
benefit its shareholders only by illegal means); see also Consol. Gold Fields, 871 F.2d at 257-58 (reaffirming
target standing to challenge takeovers). In extolling the virtues of the takeover target as the best possible
litigant, Brodley demonstrates a subtle preference for atomism by dismissing the takeover target's unique
incentives to behave opportunistically for reasons utterly unrelated to the competitive effects of a merger.
Brodley, Antitrust Standing, supra note 114, at 79, 95-103. The primary problem among several inherent in
Brodley's analysis is that it assumes the fact of a violation, when the opportunism critique is based upon the
costs associated with improper use of section 7. Brodley's approach is inherently atomistic because it
implicitly prefers a world in which merger activity is to be discouraged.
167. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
168. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 726, 735-36.
169. Id. at 730-33.
170. Id. at 730, 737.
171. Compare Richard A. Posner & William M. Landes, Should Indirect Purchasers Have Standing to
Sue Under the Antitrust Laws? An Economics Analysis of the Rule of Illinois Brick, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 602,
604 (1979) (supporting the rule), with AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, 346a-k (2000) (criticizing the
rule), and Robert G. Harris & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Passing on the Monopoly Overcharge: A Comprehensive
Policy Analysis, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 269, 275 (1979) (criticizing application of the rule when passing on is
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to merger challenges, but lower courts have held that Illinois Brick applies in the
merger context as well.
172
Illinois Brick has had a substantial chilling effect on all types of private antitrust
litigation. In the thousands of industries typified by multiple layers of distribution,
Illinois Brick completely denies relief to the ultimate consumers of a product (and to
every other indirect purchaser in the chain). 173 Illinois Brick instead leaves the "private
attorney general" role in the hands of direct purchasers who have existing commercial
relationships with the wrongdoers, and who may have been able to pass through part or
all of any illegal overcharge they endured to their customers.
Illinois Brick likely deters private merger challenges more than it deters antitrust
conduct suits. It may well be wishful thinking to expect a direct purchaser to challenge
one of its suppliers' business decisions to purchase a competing supplier. And it is not
clear that a direct purchaser's incentive to sue necessarily increases as the
anticompetitive character of the transaction increases. In fact, the opposite may be true.
The more concentrated the industry, the fewer alternative suppliers to whom a direct
purchaser can turn if it has burned its bridges by way of a section 7 suit. Moreover, in
more concentrated upstream industries, there is a greater likelihood that the direct
purchaser will be able to pass through all or most of any merger-related price increases
to its own customers, and will thus be less interested in a section 7 lawsuit. 174
But even if Illinois Brick had no special effect upon private merger challenges, the
general rule it announced eliminated a large, potentially motivated category of possible
plaintiffs from the universe of parties with standing to challenge allegedly illegal
transactions. In fact, in many multi-level industries, Illinois Brick denies recovery to
the classes of customer most likely to suffer actual damages from increased prices.
Taken together, Illinois Brick and the antitrust injury doctrine were a particularly
brutal combination, dramatically limiting the ability of the two most motivated (if
potentially opportunistic) groups of potential plaintiffs to seek relief. Illinois Brick
prevents most indirect purchasers from challenging anticompetitive mergers, and the
antitrust injury doctrine erected substantial hurdles for competitors and target
companies. By the end of 1977, the only private parties 175 that could reliably challenge
a merger without being thrown out of court were the direct purchasers of the merged
companies' goods. Although direct purchaser merger suits are not unheard of, 176 direct
purchasers in most multi-level industries have substantially less incentive to act as
traceable). Judge Posner has softened his stance somewhat in recent years. See Richard A. Posner, Address,
Federalism and the Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws by State Attorneys General, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
5, 12-13 (2004) [hereinafter Posner, Federalism and Enforcement] ("Although I personally think the Illinois
Brick doctrine is sound, this is far from certain; its contours moreover are controversial and it is valuable to
have diversity and experimentation in this area, from which a consensus may someday emerge").
172. Lucas Auto. Eng'g, Inc. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 140 F.3d 1228, 1233-34 (9th Cir. 1998).
173. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 729 (refusing to extend standing to "any party in the chain").
174. This is dependent upon a number of variables, including elasticities of demand.
175. Excluding state antitrust enforcers.
176. See, e.g., Diskin v. Daily Racing Form, Inc., No. 92 Civ. 6374, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9129, at *15
(S.D.N.Y. July 7, 1994) (holding individual newspaper buyer had standing as direct purchaser because
intermediate distributors were not independent entrepreneurs).
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"private attorneys general" than either indirect purchasers or competitors of the
merging parties. 1
77
d. The 1982 Merger Guidelines
In 1982, the Department of Justice struck yet another blow against private merger
enforcement with the introduction of its 1982 Merger Guidelines.17 8 The 1982 Merger
Guidelines and their progeny dramatically improved antitrust merger analysis, but they
certainly were not good for private plaintiffs.
Up until the early 1980s, government enforcers and private parties alike relied
upon a combination of case law-almost all of it favorable to antimerger plaintiffs-
and the similarly plaintiff-friendly 1968 Merger Guidelines to analyze transactions. 79
But by the late 1970s, both the 1968 Guidelines and the S-C-P-influenced judicial
precedent they paralleled and promoted were under attack. Chicago School critics
claimed that existing low market share thresholds for illegality were both arbitrary and
incorrect, and that these thresholds unfairly condemned large numbers of competitively
neutral or even procompetitive business combinations.180
The Department of Justice issued its 1982 Merger Guidelines against this
backdrop.181 Like their 1968 predecessor, the 1982 Guidelines "describe[d] the general
principles and specific standards normally used by the Department [of Justice] in
analyzing mergers." 182 But unlike the 1968 Guidelines, the 1982 Guidelines did not
rely exclusively upon market structure, expressed in terms of nominal market share
thresholds, as the primary relevant metric for competitive analysis. Instead, they
177. For a contrary perspective, see Posner & Landes, supra note 171, at 609-15, arguing that direct
purchasers should be more motivated to sue. Posner & Landes' argument is based in part upon a neoclassical
assessment of detection costs at various levels of distribution. Id. at 609-11. Their analysis is less persuasive
in the context of mergers, which are or become public knowledge at or near the time of completion. The
"detection costs" associated with anticompetitive mergers are lower than those relating to secret conduct
offenses; and the causal relationship between a price increase and a potentially illegal merger much more
readily apparent. Id. at 610-15.
178. Merger Guidelines, 47 Fed. Reg. 28,493 (Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div. June 30, 1982), available
at 1982 WL 141384 [hereinafter 1982 Merger Guidelines].
179. See Edward Cavanaugh, Antitrust Remedies Revisited, 84 OR. L. REv. 147, 182 (noting that the
rules adopted in the 1968 Guidelines struck down a merger where the share of the relevant market was less
than eight percent).
180. See, e.g., Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 343-44 (disallowing a potentially efficient merger solely on the
grounds of market share threshold). The 1968 Merger Guidelines indicated that government challenge was
likely, even in "less highly concentrated" markets, when the acquiring firm accounted for 5% of the market,
and the acquired firm accounted for five percent or more. 1968 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 45, § 6. As
the acquiring firm's market share rose to twenty-five percent, the 1968 Guidelines recommended challenging
acquisition of any firm with one percent or more of the market. If the market was "highly concentrated"
(shares of the four largest firms accounting for approximately seventy-five percent or more of the market), the
challenge thresholds were even lower. See id. §§ 5-6 (if acquiring firm has fifteen percent or more of the
market, the Guidelines recommend challenging acquisition of any firm with one percent or more of the
market).
181. 1982 Merger Guidelines, supra note 178.
182. Id. § I.
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introduced a more rigorous economics-based framework for analyzing the competitive
effects of mergers that remains essentially unchanged today.
183
The 1982 Guidelines imposed structure on the merger review process. Enforcers
analyzing a transaction were first required to define relevant product and geographic
markets potentially affected by the merger. 1 4  The new Guidelines then directed
enforcers to calculate a "Herfindahl-Hirschman Index" or "HHI," for the premerger
market and for the hypothetical postmerger market.185 The HHI is a measure of market
concentration obtained by summing the squares of each market participant's market
shares.' 8 6 Under the 1982 Merger Guidelines analysis, the agencies were to compare
the premerger HHI with the proposed transaction's hypothetical postmerger HHI.' s7
Large absolute postmerger HHIs and large merger-induced increases in HHI triggered
additional government scrutiny.
88
Assuming a merger met or exceeded the Merger Guidelines' thresholds for
additional scrutiny, enforcers were then to consider whether entry or other factors
would mitigate the competitive harm likely to result from the transaction. 8 9 Finally,
the investigators were to consider whether one of several affirmative defenses
applied. 190 The Merger Guidelines effectively supplanted existing judicial precedent as
the decisional law of mergers, very quickly within the agencies and more slowly in the
increasingly rare judicial decisions addressing questions of substantive liability under
section 7.
As the Guidelines approach slowly filtered into the courts, it shifted the
substantive liability standards significantly in defendants' favor. While few would now
dispute that liability standards under the Guidelines are superior to the pre-Guidelines
precedent, the change did not help private plaintiffs. The adoption of the 1982 Merger
183. The Horizontal Merger Guidelines were significantly revised in 1984 and 1992, and were slightly
revised in 1997. See generally Thomas B. Leary, Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission, Remarks on the
Essential Stability of Merger Policy in the United States, Prepared for the Guidelines for Merger Remedies:
Prospects and Principles, Joint U.S./E.U. Conference (Jan. 17, 2002), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leary/learyuseu.htm. The central analytical themes, however, have not changed.
See id. (discussing the most recent Horizontal Merger Guidelines).
184. The 1968 Guidelines also discuss relevant market definition, but in much less concrete terms.
Compare 1982 Merger Guidelines, supra note 178, § II(A), (C), with 1968 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note
45, § 3.
185. 1982 Merger Guidelines, supra note 178, § Ill(A).
186. Id.
187. See id. § III(A)(1) (directing agencies to consider both postmerger concentration and increase in
concentration caused by the merger, as measured by HHI).
188. See id. § Ill(A)(1)(c) (stating that because large postmerger HHIs are indicative of highly
concentrated markets with significant competitive concerns, the Department will favor any close question in
favor of challenging a merger).
189. See id. § lll(A)(2)(c)(l)-(3) (stating that, beyond market concentration, the DOJ should consider
ease of entry, likelihood and profitability of collusion, nature of product, terms of sale, buyer market
characteristics, and conduct of firms in market).
190. See 1982 Merger Guidelines, supra note 178, § V(A)-(B) (discussing the availability of affirmative
defenses to seemingly anti-competitive mergers such as achieving efficiencies and the taking over of a
"failing" firm).
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Guidelines also played an important role in setting the stage for the coming private
merger challenge crisis.'91
Confronted with all these disincentives, it is worth asking the question: Is there
any reason to believe private merger challenges will make a comeback? The answer to
that question is a resounding and somewhat surprising yes.
II. THE COMING WAVE OF PRIVATE ANTITRUST MERGER CHALLENGES
Over the past fifteen years, at least five separate developments have helped point
the compass back in the direction of private merger challenges. First, the Supreme
Court conclusively established the availability of divestiture remedies to private
litigants.'92  Second, Congress recalibrated the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act ("HSR")
premerger filing thresholds, increasing them substantially above their 1978 levels in
real terms. L93 Third, the government has suffered a string of recent court defeats. 194
Fourth, state antitrust enforcement has increased substantially. 195 Fifth, Illinois Brick
Co. v. Illinois196 now appears vulnerable. Each of these developments will work to
increase private antitrust merger litigation in the future.
A. Divestiture as a Remedy in Private Merger Suits
Until 1990, federal courts had different opinions as to whether private plaintiffs
could seek divestiture (the complete unwinding of a merger) in section 7 suits. 197
Although section 16 of the Clayton Act directly authorizes private plaintiffs to seek
equitable remedies, courts disagreed as to whether the "death penalty" of divestiture
was properly characterized as injunctive relief. 19 8
191. The long-term net effects of the Merger Guidelines upon private merger challenge activity levels
are difficult to assess. Immediately after their introduction, they almost certainly deterred private suits. And
working hand-in-hand with HSR, it seems likely that they had a net deterrent effect through the 1990s as well.
But the Guidelines themselves were at least partially responsible for a massive increase in merger activity and
for a related decrease in government enforcement, and thus may ultimately yield a higher absolute level of
private enforcement.
192. See California v. Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 295-96 (1990) (stating that divestiture is available
to private litigants who have shown "threatened loss or damage").
193. Compare Act of December 21, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-553, § 630(a), 114 Stat. 2762, codified at 15
U.S.C. § 18a(a)(2) (2000) (setting the minimum filing threshold at $50 million), with Hart-Scott-Rodino
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 201, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976) (setting the minimum
filing threshold at $15 million).
194. See infra notes 246-57 and accompanying text, suggesting how recent court defeats will curb the
government's appetite for fully litigating merger challenges, leading to an increase in private merger
challenges.
195. See infra notes 258-62 and accompanying text, for a discussion that more states have aggressively
enforced antitrust regulations, independent of the federal government, and in some cases filing suit where the
federal government chose not to challenge the transactions at all.
196. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
197. Compare Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Gen. Tel. & Elec. Corp., 518 F.2d 913, 920 (9th Cir. 1975)
(holding that remedy of divestiture not available as in private actions), with Cia. Petrolera Caribe, Inc. v. Arco
Caribbean, Inc., 754 F.2d 404 429 (1st Cir. 1985) (declining to adopt a per se exclusion of divestiture from the
equitable relief available for private actions).
198. See Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 518 F.2d at 920 (finding that, in private actions, divestiture is not
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The Supreme Court resolved that question in favor of private divestiture actions in
1990. In California v. American Stores Co.,199 the Court allowed the State of
California to seek divestiture in connection with a merger between the American Stores
supermarket chain and its competitor Lucky Stores, Inc. 200 Private plaintiffs are now
unambiguously authorized to seek divestiture as a remedy.
Because the vast majority of private merger challenges take place after the
transaction has been completed, the American Stores holding tilted the balance of
power dramatically in private plaintiffs' favor. The prospect of unwinding an already
completed merger may be more damaging to merger defendants than a treble damages
award, and it would almost certainly pose a greater threat than any injunctive relief
short of divestiture. Moreover, because proof of damages is often difficult in merger
cases brought at or near the time of completion, the availability of a "death penalty"
sanction provides substantial additional incentives for private plaintiffs to file section 7
claims.2" 1 It also encourages defendants to resolve those claims in advance of trial.
B. Recalibration of the HSR Thresholds
Even while American Stores made private suits more attractive after 1990, falling
HSR premerger filing thresholds exercised an opposite influence through the end of the
twentieth century. Private suits remained relatively uncommon because, by the late
1990s, a huge percentage of transactions were subject to some form of premerger
government review.
20 2
In 2000 Congress finally ended HSR's unintended incremental journey toward
universal premerger filing requirements. Effective February 1, 2001, Congress raised
the premerger filing thresholds substantially, increasing the most important threshold
from $15 million to $50 million.20 3 Depending on the measure of inflation, $50 million
in the year 2000 was approximately equivalent to between $16.5 million and $22.05
included in "injunctive relief' under section 16 of the Clayton Act). But see Cia. Petrolera, 754 F.2d at 428-
29 (examining legislative background, legislative history, and plain language of the statute and declining to
adopt a per se exclusion of divestiture from the injunctive relief available under section 16 of the Clayton Act).
199. 495 U.S. 271 (1990).
200. In the context of the antitrust laws, all challenges not brought by the federal government qualify as
"private." Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. at 296. This includes challenges brought by non-federal governmental
subdivisions, including individual states. Id.
201. The incentive to file a claim should not be confused with the incentive to pursue a claim to
judgment. Even if divestiture is unlikely, its availability to private plaintiffs and the relatively liberal standard
of proof associated with injunctive relief in antitrust cases put substantial pressure on merger defendants to
resolve private merger suits in advance of trial.
202. In 2000, the last full year under the original thresholds, there were 4749 transactions reported to the
agencies. FTC/DOJ ANN. REP. TO CONG. app. A (2003) (line of transactions labeled: "Adjusted Transactions
in Which a Second Request Could Have Been Issued") (reflecting the number of transactions reported less the
transactions for which the government was not authorized to request additional information). In 1988, there
were 2391. FTC/DOJ ANN. REP. TO CONG. app. A (1997) (listing number of transactions reported less the
transactions for which the government was not authorized to request additional information).
203. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435 (1976) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2000)). See 66 Fed. Reg. 8680 (Fed. Trade Comm'n Feb. 1, 2001) (requiring
filing when the merger will result in the acquiring party holding an aggregate total amount of the voting
securities and assets of the acquired person in excess of $50 million).
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million in 1976 dollars. 2" Accordingly, the net effect of the legislation was to raise
real premerger filing thresholds to a level somewhere between ten percent and fifty
percent above the level Congress first established in 1976.
As important, the 2000 legislation is designed to maintain future premerger filing
thresholds at the same level in real terms. Now, for each fiscal year beginning after
September 30, 2004, the threshold is adjusted for inflation (or deflation) to reflect the
percentage change in the gross national product for such fiscal year compared to the
gross national product for the year ending September 30, 2003.205 The first such
adjustment recently went into effect. Effective March 2, 2005, the primary premerger
filing threshold is $53,100,000.206
The increase in premerger filing thresholds first went into effect in 2001. As
expected, the new thresholds dramatically decreased the number of premerger
filings.20 7 But the threshold change has also produced some surprising results. Both
the dramatic decrease in filings and the surprising data regarding post-increase agency
review suggest that more private challenges are on the way.
The increased thresholds no longer require premerger filings for most transactions
valued between $15,000,000 and $53,100,000. But the absence of premerger filing
requirements should not be confused with per se legality. The absence of filing
requirements simply means that transactions valued below the thresholds can be
completed without a waiting period during which the federal government can
204. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Cost Estimating Web site: Inflation Calculators,
http://wwwl.jsc.nasa.gov/bu2/inflate.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2006). Using the Consumer Price Index, $50
million in 2000 was roughly equivalent to $16.5 million in 1976. Id. Under the Producer Price Index, it was
equivalent to $22.05 million in 1976 dollars. Id. Using the GDP method, see supra notes 144-45, the new
threshold was roughly equivalent to $19.7 million in 1976 dollars. Id. Because Congress mandated that the
GDP method be used to calculate new annual threshold increases, it is fair to hypothesize that Congress
intended to increase real filing thresholds about thirty-one percent over the initial 1976 level. Clayton Act, ch.
323 § 8, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 19(a)(5) (2000)).
205. 15 U.S.C. § 19(a)(5). The inflation threshold adjustment is calculated using the same methodology
used since 1999 in connection with section 8 of the Clayton Act's thresholds regarding interlocking
directorates. The adjustment is performed as follows:
Thresholds in this subsection shall be increased (or decreased) as of October 1, of each year by an
amount equal to the percentage increase (or decrease) in the gross national product, as determined
by the Department of Commerce or its successor, for the year then ended over the level so
established for the year ending September 20, 2003.
Id.
206. Revised Jurisdictional Thresholds for Section 7A of the Clayton Act, 70 Fed. Reg. 5020-01 (Fed.
Trade Comm'n Jan. 31, 2005).
207. In FY 2000, the last full year under the old $15 million filing thresholds, the agencies received
filings on 4926 transactions. See FTC/DOJ ANN. REP. TO CONG. app. A (2003) (listing number of transactions
in the first line of the table as: "Transactions Reported"). In FY 2001, during which the revised thresholds
went into effect, the agencies reviewed 2376 transactions. Id. In FY 2002, the first full year under the new
thresholds, the agencies reviewed 1187 transactions. Id. In FY 2003, the agencies reviewed 968 transactions.
Draft Data Obtained from Premerger Notification Office (June 30, 2005) [hereinafter "Draft PNO Data"] (on
file with author). In FY 2004, the agencies reviewed 1377 mergers, and, in the first half of FY 2005 (through
June 30, 2005), the agencies had reviewed 1172. Id. Although some of the initial decrease in filings was
likely attributable to an overall decrease in the pace of merger activity in late 2001 and 2002, the vast majority
of the decrease in filings was almost certainly a function of the increase in filing thresholds. Figures for 2004
and the first half of 2005 suggest that merger activity is again on the upswing.
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investigate the transaction before completion. The thresholds say nothing about
whether a particular merger violates the Clayton Act because it may tend substantially
to lessen competition in a particular relevant market.
20 8
1. Relevant Markets in Merger Cases
Relevant market definition is central to most areas of antitrust law and is a
particularly important component of every merger analysis. The central question in
most antitrust cases is deceptively simple: Does the challenged conduct or transaction
unreasonably reduce competition?20 9 But before answering that question, antitrust
courts first require plaintiffs to define and prove a "relevant market"; that is, an "area of
effective competition."2 10 The purpose of the relevant market determination is to draw
a boundary "between those products and services that compete with each other to some
substantial degree and those that do not."'21' With the increase in HSR thresholds, there
are countless additional cognizable relevant markets nationwide in which potentially
problematic transactions can take place without premerger government review.
Relevant markets in antitrust cases consist of two components: (1) a relevant
product market, and (2) a relevant geographic market.212 The relevant product market
is defined as the set of products or services that legitimately compete with one
another.2t 3 The relevant geographic market is the geographic area in which that
competition takes place.
214
Relevant market definition is inherently fact-specific. It is also broadly subject to
the laws of common sense. For example, although it is possible to assert a relevant
product market consisting of "retail purchases of all new and used automobiles," it is
difficult to envision a brand new Mercedes SLK truly competing with a 1987 Yugo for
retail car shoppers' dollars in the real world. Whether a 1998 Lexus or a new Toyota
208. Clayton Act, eh. 323, § 2, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 13a (2000)).
209. The only category of antitrust violations for which no determination of reasonableness is required is
the so-called "per se" violations of section I of the Sherman Act. Naked price fixing, bid rigging, territorial or
customer allocations, and several other practices have been deemed so inherently pernicious and devoid of
redeeming value that no "reasonableness" inquiry is necessary or indeed permitted. Per se violations are also
the only major category of violations for which courts do not typically require a relevant market determination.
See generally ALD 5TH, supra note 76, at 46-79.
210. See, e.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont & Co. (DuPont 1), 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957) (citing Clayton
Act and stating that defining relevant markets is a "necessary predicate" to finding anticompetitive effects);
Capital Imaging Assocs., P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., Inc., 996 F.2d 537, 543 (2d Cir. 1993)
(finding that in order to analyze anticompetitive behavior, the relevant product market must first be
determined); United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (finding that courts
historically begin by defining relevant product and geographic markets in which the competition will be
effected by the merger).
211. ALD 5TH, supra note 76, at 525.
212. See 1992 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 83, §§ 1.1, 1.2 (defining "product market"
and "geographic market").
213. Id. § 1.1.
214. As a practical matter, it is generally necessary to define a relevant product market before defining
the relevant geographic market for that product.
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Camry competes with the new Mercedes is a closer question-the kind of question
typically the subject of intense debate and expert analysis in antitrust cases. 215
Relevant market definition is important to most antitrust cases, but it is absolutely
central to antitrust merger investigations. A merger is illegal only if it "may tend
substantially to lessen competition" in some relevant market.21 6  Accordingly, the
Merger Guidelines devote substantial space to establishing a framework for relevant
market definition.
217
a. Product Market Definition Under the Guidelines
Under the Guidelines approach, the basic relevant product market inquiry is
essentially a thought experiment. Starting with the smallest potential relevant product
market, the investigator must determine whether a hypothetical monopolist controlling
one hundred percent of the production of that particular product would be able to raise
price profitably by a small but significant amount.218 In the jargon of antitrust, this is
known as a "SSNIP" test, because it asks whether the hypothetical monopolist would
find it profitable to engage in a "small but significant and nontransitory increase in
price. ' 2 19 If the investigator concludes that a SSNIP for the first hypothetical product
market would be unprofitable because customers would substitute away to other
products, then those products are added into the relevant product market and the
thought experiment repeated until the hypothetical monopolist's SSNIP would be
profitable. Many courts have adopted the Merger Guidelines' SSNIP test for relevant
product market definition in both merger and non-merger antitrust cases.22
0
215. The 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines now provide the de facto standard for relevant market
determinations in all types of antitrust cases. 1992 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 83, § 1.0.
In the context of product market definition: "The Agency will delineate the product market to be a product or
group of products such that a hypothetical profit-maximizing firm that was the only present and future seller of
those products ("monopolist") likely would impose at least a 'small but significant and nontransitory' increase
in price." Id. § 1.11.
216. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 2, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 13a (2000)). Section
7 consistently has been interpreted to require some relevant market analysis, even before the introduction of
the Merger Guidelines. But see Franklin M. Fisher, Diagnosing Monopoly, in INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION,
ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW 1, 9-15 (John Monz ed., 1991) (arguing that direct evidence of anticompetitive
effect truncates need for relevant market analysis).
217. See 1992 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 83, §§ 1.0-1.5 (setting out framework for
"relevant market" by comprehensively defining product market, geographic market, identifying firms
participating in relevant market, market share calculation, and market concentration calculation).
218. There is no "magic percentage" price increase that qualifies as "small but significant" for purposes
of the SSNIP test. The most recent version of the Guidelines note that "what constitutes a 'small but
significant and nontransitory' increase in price will depend on the nature of the industry, and the Agency at
times may use a price increase that is larger or smaller than five percent." 1992 HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES, supra note 83, § 1.11. In much of the merger literature, price increases of five percent and ten
percent are commonly suggested as appropriate SSNIPs. See, e.g., Timothy J. Brennan, "Vertical Market
Power" as Oxymoron. Horizontal Approaches to Vertical Antitrust, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 895, 915 n.52
(2004) (stating that SSNIPs are "often taken to be" 5% to 10% over a year).
219. 1992 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 83, § 1.11 (emphasis added).
220. Although the SSNIP analysis is essentially a thought experiment, the inquiry is typically quite
rigorous. Economists and econometricians (quantitative economists focusing upon statistical analysis of data)
on both sides of an investigation or dispute develop sophisticated models for the sole purpose of helping to
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b. Geographic Market Definition Under the Guidelines
Relevant geographic markets are defined the same way, except that the operative
question is "where" rather than "what." Many products are sold in national or even
worldwide markets; in fact, many government merger challenges focus on transactions
in which the United States or the world is the relevant geographic market. But not all
challenged restraints fit the nationwide mold. 22 1 Even in today's global society, many
products compete in local or regional markets.
For example, a heart attack patient in Milwaukee may seek emergency medical
care in a nearby suburb, but is unlikely to seek such care just eighty miles away in
Chicago. And even in the age of electronic commerce, there remain countless other
goods and services for which the area of effective competition is relatively limited.
222
The Merger Guidelines apply the SSNIP test to geographic determinations as
well. To define a relevant geographic market, the Guidelines require investigators to
draw the smallest possible geographic market that would profitably sustain a
hypothetical monopolist's SSNIP without losing too many customers to suppliers
outside the proposed market. 223 If a SSNIP would not be profitable because customers
would defect to other areas, those areas must be included in the putative relevant
geographic market, the test repeated, and the geographic market expanded until a
profitable SSNIP would be possible. 224
The only operative question in most antitrust conduct cases is whether the
challenged conduct or transaction unreasonably restrains (or threatens to restrain) trade
within the properly defined relevant market. In the context of merger claims, the
threshold is somewhat lower-the court must ultimately determine whether a
challenged transaction may tend "substantially to lessen competition" within the
relevant market. 225 Once an investigator has defined the relevant market, the absolute
define the relevant market. This is in large part because market definition is often dispositive in antitrust
eases. See, e.g., Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1111-12 (following the Guidelines' SSNIP method in
defining the relevant product market); United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 322, 335-37
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, court uses the SSNIP test to define the
relevant product market for credit cards before proceeding to analyze Visa's behavior in that market).
221. Even certain apparently national mergers (e.g., a merger of national-scope oil companies) ultimately
may be analyzed for their effects upon local markets. In the oil example, the government often focuses on
localities where the merging parties enjoy particularly strong market presence. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed.
Trade Comm'n., Exxon/Mobil Agree to Largest FTC Divestiture Ever in Order to Settle FTC Antitrust
Charges; Settlement Requires Extensive Restructuring and Prevents Merger of Significant Competing U.S.
Assets (Nov. 30, 1999) (detailing gas station divestitures in Exxon/Mobil merger).
222. There exist many goods and services for which purchasers are unwilling or unable to travel long
distances to purchase, and for which out-of-area supply is not a viable option. The 1992 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines describe the inquiry as follows:
[Tihe Agency will delineate the geographic market to be a region such that a hypothetical
monopolist that was the only present or future producer of the relevant product at locations in that
region would profitably impose at least a 'small but significant and nontransitory' increase in price,
holding constant the terms of sale for all products produced elsewhere.
1992 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 83, § 1.21.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. See, e.g., FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109, 129-30 (D.D.C. 2004) (allowing plaintiff to
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impact of a merger is irrelevant. Even if a merger or acquisition threatens to limit
competition only within a financially small and geographically circumscribed local
market, it still violates the statute.
226
2. Why the Increased Filing Thresholds Encourage Private Claims
Many transactions valued below even the old $15 million reporting threshold
conceivably could have violated section 7.227 Thus, there existed even before 2001 a
theoretical category of potentially objectionable mergers that would not have been
subject to premerger filings, and would have been unlikely to draw government
attention before completion. But by 2001, the $15 million threshold for premerger
review was very low in real terms, and the economic incentives for private suit in a
sub-$15 million relevant market likely would not have been sufficient to draw much
interest from potential plaintiffs.
228
The increased thresholds change that equation. There are now countless
cognizable relevant markets in which a potentially objectionable transaction would not
be subject to federal premerger filings, but where the damages and interests at stake are
likely to generate sufficient incentives to file private suits. With annual inflation
adjustments keeping the filing thresholds constant in real terms, the number of
cognizable relevant markets below the thresholds should also remain relatively constant
over time.
present a weak prima facie case, the court ultimately found that defendant provided ample evidence to
determine the central question of whether the transaction will substantially lessen competition); United States
v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (focusing on evidence of market concentration and
anticompetitive activities in determining whether a transaction substantially lessens competition). Even in
postcompletion challenges, the court should analyze whether the transaction was likely to reduce competition
at the time of completion. See generally AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note I, 1205 (arguing that
continually reexamining mergers based on postcompletion competitiveness is unfair because, among other
factors, it encourages parties to delay litigation in hopes that subsequent developments make the merger seem
better or worse, and it inhibits a legally merged firm from establishing post-merger organization and
effectively conducting business decisions out of "fear of subjecting its once lawful creation to challenge").
Although market performance data can be relevant to this inquiry, it remains at root a prospective question.
226. See, e.g., FTC v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d 937, 939 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (granting
preliminary injunction in connection with a $40.5 million acquisition reportable under old thresholds but likely
unreportable under new thresholds), rev'don other grounds, 186 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 1999),
227. Consider a $500 thousand merger of the Floyd's Barber Shop in Mayberry, North Carolina with his
one and only crosstown rival. If the next closest barber shop is 20 miles away down a treacherous mountain
highway, that merger could tend substantially to lessen competition for barber services in the Mayberry, North
Carolina market.
228. The threat of entry is another possible explanation for the reluctance to bring private merger
challenges in potential cases falling below the old thresholds. Absent significant regulatory barriers, truly
anticompetitive transactions falling below the old filing thresholds are more likely to be subject to entry that
would be "timely, likely, and sufficient in its magnitude, character and scope to deter or counteract the
competitive effects of concern." 1992 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 83, § 3.0. An otherwise
anticompetitive transaction in a market subject to easy entry is unlikely to be found anticompetitive in a
postmerger challenge absent significant evidence of actual anticompetitive behavior. Even if potential
plaintiffs were not deterred by the application of entry analysis per se, it is likely that actual or potential entry
substantially mitigated the anticompetitive effects of otherwise objectionable small mergers.
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Potential private plaintiffs now have incentives to file claims that they did not
have before 2001. Fifty-three million dollars is more than three times greater than $15
million. While it may be no more likely now than it was in 2000 that private plaintiffs
will challenge transactions involving $15 million or less, a $30 million acquisition or a
$50 million transaction offers much more in potential damages than a $14 million
acquisition. Also, the increased thresholds will mean that many more publicly
announced and potentially anticompetitive transactions will not be subject to
mandatory premerger review.
Recent government merger review statistics support the theory that higher
premerger filing thresholds will lead to more private claims. In their most recent HSR
report to Congress, the DOJ and the FTC included their traditional compendium of
annual merger review statistics.22 9 As noted above, the absolute number of transactions
reviewed from year to year decreased substantially after 2000, the last full year under
the old $15 million thresholds.230 By fiscal year 2002, the first full year under the
thresholds, reported transactions had fallen to 1187, nearly eighty percent below their
high of 4926 in 2000.231
But far more interesting are the data relating to the number of "Second Requests"
issued by the government from year to year. 232 In the seven years leading up to the
threshold changes, the antitrust agencies issued Second Requests in connection with
between 2.0% and 3.8% of reported transactions on an annual basis-between 73 and
125 Second Requests each year.233 In the three years during and after the phase-in of
the revised thresholds, the agencies issued Second Requests in connection with 3.1%,
4.2%, and 3.6% of reported transactions for fiscal years 2001, 2002, and 2003,
respectively. 2
34
Comparing the last three years under the old thresholds to the first three years
under the new thresholds, there is some increase in the percentage of reported mergers
subject to intense scrutiny by the agencies. The agencies issued Second Requests for
2.7% of reported transactions in 1998, 2.6% in 1999, and 2.0% in 2000.235 After the
threshold changes, the number of Second Requests expressed as a percentage of all
reported transactions rose somewhat, to levels more in keeping with the percentages
from 1994-1997.236 But even though the percentage of transactions subject to a Second
Request doubled from 2.1% in 2000 to 4.2% in 2002, the number of overall filings fell
by almost 80% in that same time period.237
229. FTC/DOJ ANN. REP. TO CONG. app. A (2004).
230. See id. (showing "Transactions Reported" dropping from 4296 in 2000 down to 1454 in 2004).
231. Id.
232. Id.; Draft PNO Data, supra note 207.
233. FTC/DOJ ANN. REP. TO CONG. app. A (2003).
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See id. (showing post-threshold percentages between 2.1%-4.3% and 1994-1997 percentages
between 3.5%-3.8%).
237. See id. (showing transactions subject to Second Request dropping from 4749 in 2000 down to 1142
in 2002, roughly a seventy percent decline). Draft data from the government tells essentially the same story
for 2003, 2004, and the first half of 2005. Draft PNO Data, supra note 207. In 2003, there were 968 merger
filings, and 35 second requests (3.6%). Id. In 2004, there were 1377 and 35 (2.5%). Id. In the first half of
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Because the issuance of a Second Request is a reasonable proxy for the
conclusion that a merger may raise significant competitive risks,23 this data suggests
that additional private enforcement may be both necessary and inevitable. The
threshold increases dictate that the federal agencies now leave uninvestigated many
transactions they previously would have considered worthy of substantial attention.
These statistics strongly suggest that at least some of the transactions subjected to the
intense scrutiny of a Second Request before the threshold increase were transactions
that would no longer be subject to premerger filing requirements under the revised
thresholds.
This is also intuitively obvious from the absolute numerical data, which
demonstrate that the threshold increase was largely practical in nature and did not
represent any conclusion on the part of Congress or the agencies that smaller mergers
were inherently legal under section 7. If only the larger mergers were truly
competitively significant, we would expect the absolute number of Second Requests
issued to have remained relatively constant even as the thresholds rose. Instead, the
number of Second Requests fell precipitously, from ninety-eight in 2000 to forty-nine
in 2002.239 Even though there was a substantial decrease in overall merger activity
between 2000 and 2002, it was not an eighty percent decrease. 240 Some of the decrease
in Second Requests must have been the result of competitively significant transactions
slipping through the cracks in the absence of a premerger filing requirement. 2
4
'
Perhaps government enforcement will pick up some of the transactions its revised
premerger thresholds have left on the table. Both the DOJ and the FTC have indicated
recently a renewed commitment to pursuing postmerger challenges, when
appropriate. 242  But federal postmerger enforcement activity is likely to remain the
2005, there were 1172 filings and 43 Second Requests (3.7%). Id.
238. See also House Subcommittee's Analysis of Federal Enforcement: Federal Merger Enforcement
(1979-1987), 54 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1357, at 476, 476-78 (March 17, 1988) (showing
that from 1979-1987, 665 transactions triggered a Second Request, and 132 of those, or twenty percent,
resulted in Enforcement Actions, with an additional 41 transactions, or six percent, voluntarily abandoned after
FTC Second Requests).
239. FTC/DOJ ANN. REP. TO CONG. app. A (2003).
240. Although it is not an "apples-to-apples" comparison, FactSet MergerStat reported 9566 overall
transactions in 2000, 8290 in 2001 (-13% year-on-year), 7303 in 2002 (-12%), 7983 in 2003 (+9%), and 9783
in 2004 (+23%). Comparing 2002 with 2000, MergerStat reports only a 24% decrease in overall merger
activity (7303/9566). FACTSET MERGERSTAT, LLC, MERGERSTAT REVIEW 2005 196-97 (2005).
241. Data from earlier FTC/DOJ Annual Reports bear this out. For example, in FY 2000, the last full
year under the $15 million filing thresholds, the agencies issued a total of ninety-eight Second Requests.
Twenty-two of those were issued in connection with transactions valued at less than $50 million. FTC/DOJ
ANN. REP. TO CONG. ex. A (2000). Of those twenty-two, nine were issued in connection with transactions
valued at less than $25 million. Id. In FY 1999, 17 of 113 Second Requests were for transactions valued at
less than $50 million; in FY 1998 and FY 1997, the proportions were 27/125, and 27/122, respectively.
FTC/DOJ ANN. REP. TO CONG. ex. A (1999).
242. See Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., FTC Docket No. 9315, at 210 (Oct. 20, 2005),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d3915/index.htm (finding section 7 violation). On October 20, 2005, the Chief
Administrative Law Judge for the FTC issued a detailed and comprehensive opinion finding that the 2000
merger of Lakeland Health Services, Inc. and Highland Park Hospital with Evanston Northwestern Healthcare
violated section 7 of the Clayton Act. Id. at 210. See also United States v. Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc., No.
03-206KSF, 2004 WL 2186215, at *1-2, 6 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 31, 2004) (pursuing section 7 violation because a
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exception rather than the rule. The data suggest that before the threshold increases the
government issued Second Requests and even obtained relief in connection with
numerous now-unreportable transactions.243 It is reasonable to expect that this new
low-hanging fruit will occasion an increase in private enforcement activity in the
future.
The increase in filing thresholds also means that more private merger challenges
will take place well after mergers are completed. In many cases, potential plaintiffs
will not learn of the transaction until near or after closing. Moreover, private cases will
be more attractive to many private parties if they carry with them some prospect of a
significant damages recovery. For all their policy advantages, premerger suits do not
offer private plaintiffs any opportunity for significant damages awards. But postmerger
challenges do. Several years of even a five percent merger-induced price increase in a
$30 to $15 million market would translate to a substantial damages award. 244
Finally, it is important to note the deterrent effects of the old thresholds.
Reportability of a potential transaction under HSR must always be considered in
deciding whether to pursue a borderline or genuinely anticompetitive merger. Because
non-reportable transactions have a substantially lower likelihood of being challenged,
and because it remains easier to beg forgiveness than ask permission,245 the increase in
HSR thresholds has undoubtedly provided some additional incentive for parties to
engage in larger competitively questionable transactions.
3. Recent Government Defeats
There is at least one reason to believe the government might not pick up the slack
associated with the narrower net it cast in the increased threshold world. Over the past
decade, federal enforcers have lost more fully litigated merger challenges than they
have won.2
46
merger would give one corporation fifty percent ownership in two competing milk producers and lessen
competition in the dairy market).
243. See generally John Harkrider, Proving Anticompetitive Impact: Moving Past Merger Guidelines
Presumptions, 2005 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 317, 320-22 (2005) (stating that the Government obtains relief in
over half of all "significant" merger investigations, and the FTC sets a target that between sixty and eighty
percent of all Second Requests should result in enforcement action).
244. It is difficult to generate a "standard" or "average" ratio between the value of a transaction and the
annual sales affected by that transaction. This is in large part because different types of businesses have very
different equity-to-sales profiles. Still, it is not hard to imagine a $50 million merger involving approximately
that much in annual market sales. If a merger increases prices by five percent in a $50 million annual market
for three years before suit, the total damages suffered by all victims would be approximately $7.5 million.
Although treble damages are inappropriate in the context of most merger cases (see below), trebling remains
the law of the land as of this writing, so this aggregate claim would be worth $22.5 million under the current
law. If a significant percentage of those plaintiffs' claims could be aggregated, this suit could easily be
worthwhile to those plaintiffs and their attorneys.
245. See Molly S. Boast, Acting Dir., Fed. Trade Comm'n, Bureau of Competition, Report from the
Bureau of Competition Before the American Bar Association Antitrust Section, Spring Meeting 2001 (March
29, 2001) (transcript available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/boastmollys.htm) (noting both difficulties
in "investigating and challenging nonreportable transactions" and the FTC's limited resources).
246. The extent of the agencies' "losses" should not be overstated. The agencies continue to enjoy
substantial success in obtaining both structural relief and abandonment without formal litigation. Deborah
Platt Majoras, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, 2005 ABA Annual Meeting: Reflections on My First Year 7-8
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According to Westlaw, since March 1995, the Federal Trade Commission and the
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice together have won eight litigated
merger challenges. 247  In that same time, they have lost nine.248 The Department of
Justice has been particularly unsuccessful in court of late, losing three of four
challenges since 2000, and obtaining only one injunction.2 49 In 2004, the FTC and the
DOJ each lost major merger challenges at the district court level and chose not to
appeal. 250 In both cases, the district court held that the agency had failed to prove a
(Aug. 6, 2005) (transcript available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/majoras/050806abamtg.pdf). Moreover,
there are significant differences in agency procedures that make direct comparison between the FTC and DOJ
merger cases somewhat difficult.
247. See FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 727 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (finding merger of second and third
largest baby food manufacturers would be anticompetitive); FTC v. Libbey, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 34, 53
(D.D.C. 2002) (holding that effects of glassware company's merger with competitor could have substantially
lessened competition); FTC v. Swedish Match, 131 F. Supp. 2d 151, 173 (D.D.C. 2000) (granting injunction to
stop acquisition of competitor's tobacco business upon finding a probability that it would substantially lessen
competition); United States v. Franklin Elec. Co., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1035 (W.D. Wis. 2000) (prohibiting a
joint venture between turbine pump manufacturers due to a reasonable probability that it would substantially
impair competition); FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 66-67 (D.D.C. 1998) (enjoining merger
of wholesale prescription drug manufacturers and finding a probability of substantially lessening competition);
Cmty. Publishers, Inc. v. DR Partners, 139 F.3d 1180, 1184 (8th Cir. 1998) (disallowing an acquisition that
would substantially lessen competition in local newspaper business in northwest Arkansas); FTC v. Staples,
Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1093 (D.D.C. 1997) (finding probability that merger between office products
superstores will substantially lessen competition). For the purposes of this Article, "winning" or "losing" a
merger consists of winning or losing in a preliminary injunction proceeding. As discussed below, some cases
are litigated through to the Court of Appeals, while others reach final disposition at the district court level.
248. See FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1054-55 (8th Cir. 1999) (refusing to enjoin
merger of hospitals and finding Government failed to establish relevant geographic market); United States v.
Engelhard Corp., 126 F.3d 1302, 1307-08 (1 1th Cir. 1997) (finding Government failed to establish relevant
market and allowing merger); FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., No. 96-2440, 1997 WL 420543, at *3 (6th
Cir. July 8, 1997) (affirming District Court's decision that merger of hospitals will serve public interest); FTC
v. Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d 260, 271-72 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding FTC failed to establish relevant market and
allowing merger of hospitals); Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1175-76 (holding Government failed to prove
that merger of software manufacturers would substantially lessen competition); Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp.
2d at 158 (holding defendant coal company rebutted assertion that merger with competitor will substantially
lessen competition); United States v. Sungard Data Sys., Inc., 172 F. Supp. 2d 172, 193 (D.D.C. 2001)
(denying injunction and stating "defendants' customers, as well as their computer systems, are simply too
varied and too dissimilar to support any generalizations" about relevant product market); United States v. Long
Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 149 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (permitting merger of not-for-profit hospitals
and finding that Government did not show that merger substantially lessened competition); United States v.
Mercy Health Serv., 902 F. Supp. 968, 987 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (finding Government failed to establish relevant
geographic market and allowing merger) (merger abandoned during Government's appeal).
249. Franklin Elec. Co., 130 F. Supp. 2d at 1035-36.
250. See Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1175-76 (holding DOJ failed to prove that merger of software
manufacturers would substantially lessen competition); Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d at 158 (holding
defendant coal company rebutted FTC's assertion that merger with competitor will substantially lessen
competition). This author represented Oracle before the DOJ in that matter, but did not appear on Oracle's
behalf during the associated court proceedings. See also Press Release, Dept. of Justice, Justice Department
Will Not Appeal Oracle Decision (Oct. 1, 2004), www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press-releases/2004/205633.htm
(announcing DOJ's decision to not appeal); Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Statement of FTC General
Counsel William E. Kovacic (Sep. 9, 2004), www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/09/archcoalstmt.htm (announcing FTC's
decision not to appeal ruling).
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cognizable relevant market in which the proposed merger was likely to lessen
competition.
251
Both the DOJ and the FTC do the great majority of their merger work
extrajudicially through informal, intra-agency adversarial proceedings. Fully litigated
government merger cases remain rare. When a federal agency sues to stop a merger, or
even indicates its intention to sue, most parties abandon their transaction without
further proceedings. 25 2 Unlike most merger proponents and opponents, the government
is a constant player in the merger game. It is in the government's long-term best
interest to maximize its premerger leverage, and losing cases doesn't help. The
government will continue to bring the major merger challenges it considers important,
regardless of whether its theory of liability is airtight. But the government's recent
losing trend may well limit its interest in pursuing marginal cases. Those cases will
increasingly fall to private plaintiffs.
Private parties do not face the government's incentive structure. Most private
parties lack the ability to interpose themselves between two merging parties without
first filing suit. Therefore, regardless of the timing of the claim, private merger
challenges inevitably take the form of a lawsuit. Unlike the federal agencies, private
parties will find it extremely difficult to extract concessions or obtain relief without
filing suit. Furthermore, the most probable private plaintiffs are not likely to be repeat
players in merger challenge law at all-much less to have consistent and predictable
policy preferences regarding outcomes. The private merger plaintiffs decision
calculus is the same as a private plaintiffs calculus in virtually every other type of
litigation: Is this lawsuit, standing alone, worth it?
Accordingly, the government agencies' recent court failures are likely to promote
the filing of private merger challenges in at least two ways. First, because the agencies
are primarily interested in maximizing their success in the premerger context, the
government may file fewer suits, retreating into doctrinally safe areas for those suits it
does file. This will in turn leave more marginal suits available to private plaintiffs.
The government's unimpressive on-field performance may also make government
agencies reluctant to challenge completed mergers, at least on the margins. Once a
merger has been completed, the government's substantial HSR powers disappear. 253 In
the context of completed transactions, government enforcers are hardly more powerful
than private litigants. Like private plaintiffs, the government can negotiate with the
potential defendants before litigating, but they have virtually no power to force the
issue without filing suit. Because lawsuits have recently broken badly for the
government, and because a lawsuit breaking badly has precedential effects on the many
251. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1175-76; Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d at 158.
252. See FTC/DOJ ANN. REP. TO CONG. 8, 11 (2004) (explaining that in FY2004, FTC/DOJ challenged
twenty-four transactions and in all but two cases, which were litigated in district court, the parties either
abandoned the merger or voluntarily restructured it to alleviate competitive concerns).
253. See id. at 3 (stating that the primary purpose of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, made very clear by
legislative history, is to give antitrust enforcement agencies tools, such as reporting requirements and waiting
periods to allow for the investigation, review, and challenge of mergers before they have been consummated).
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other mergers the agencies review, the government may think twice before pursuing
completed transactions, notwithstanding their recent rhetoric. 54
This is not idle speculation. In their two most recent premerger defeats, the
agencies chose not to pursue appeals. 255 However they may try to spin it in public,
government decisions not to appeal must be based in some part upon the realization
that a negative court of appeals opinion has much more impact than a negative district
court opinion. Many section 7 determinations are heavily fact-intensive. Given the
deference that appeals courts must pay to lower courts' factual determinations, 256 and
given the very real chance that the government might lose again in a court with
substantially more precedential influence, discretion is often the better part of valor.
This is especially true because the majority of the agencies' merger control work is
done outside the courts. 25 7
Therefore, there is ample reason to believe that government losses in merger cases
will ultimately produce more rather than fewer private suits.
4. Increase in State Enforcement Activity
In the last ten years, state enforcement of the federal antitrust laws, and in
particular of section 7 of the Clayton Act, has increased substantially. Acting through
the National Association of Attorneys General, the states have adopted their own
Merger Guidelines2 58 and have established effective protocols for cooperation on
merger investigations. 25 9 Several states have demonstrated substantial independence
from the federal government in the area of merger review, seeking additional relief in
government challenges and occasionally filing suit even when the federal government
has decided not to challenge a particular transaction at all. 260
State independence is likely to increase even further over the next several years,
and, with it, state enforcement of section 7. Although some of the "opportunistic
254. See supra note 246 and accompanying text for a discussion of recent actions. But see Evanston Nw.
Healthcare Corp., F.T.C. No. 9315 (filed Feb. 10, 2004), http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d3915/index.htm
(listing all legal actions in this case). This victory culminated in a consent order settling the alleged
anticompetitive issues. Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., 70 Fed. Reg. 18,397 (Fed. Trade Comm'n Apr. 11,
2005) (analysis to aid public comment).
255. See supra note 250 and accompanying text for a discussion of Oracle Corp. and Arch Coal, Inc.,
two cases which the agencies lost challenges but chose not to appeal.
256. See H.J Heinz Co., 246 F.3d at 713 (stating that the appeals court will set aside the court's factual
findings only if they are "clearly erroneous").
257. The FTC and DOJ must continue to demonstrate their willingness to pursue court challenges, or
merging parties will increasingly run roughshod over government enforcers. Nothing in this Article is meant
to suggest that the agencies' recent losses will eliminate their desire to file suit-any effect will be felt on the
margins.
258. NAT'L Ass'N OF ATTORNEYs GEN., HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (1993), available at
www.naag.org/issues/pdf/at-hmerger-guidelines.pdf.
259. Nat'l Ass'n of Attorneys Gen., Protocol for Coordination in Merger Investigations Between the
Federal Enforcement Agencies and State Attorneys General, www.naag.org/issues/pdf/at-state-fed-
protocol.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2006).
260. See, e.g., Am. Stores, 495 U.S. at 295-96 (granting California's complaint, which sought injunctive
relief).
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behavior" concerns discussed below 261 are not as applicable to the states as they are to
other private parties, the recent pattern of state enforcement suggests that the states are
not wholly altruistic in their analysis of allegedly anticompetitive transactions. Instead,
at least some state enforcement activity seems to be driven by internal and external
politics, and the seriousness with which states pursue claims may correlate strongly
with their perception of the political value of the investigation.
262
5. The Last Piece of the Puzzle? Cracks in Illinois Brick's Mortar
Most recent private merger challenges have been filed by state governments or by
a target or direct competitor of the merging parties. By contrast, antimerger lawsuits
filed by consumers have been comparatively rare. 263 There are a number of reasons for
this disparity. It is at least partially explained by consumers' relatively diffuse
incentives to file suit, especially as compared to the incentives (whether noble,
opportunistic, or both) faced by a competitor, target, or a state antitrust enforcer. In the
typical merger case, no one consumer's actual or potential damages are likely to be
large enough to justify a lawsuit. Although mechanisms do exist for aggregating
claims (class actions, mass actions, etc.), 264 it is more difficult to facilitate collective
action than it is for a single, highly motivated entity to file a claim.
More important by far, though, are the limitations the Supreme Court imposed in
Illinois Brick Co. v. United States. Subject to the limitations of the antitrust injury
261. See infra Part Ill for discussion of how the current private merger challenge framework provides
incentives for plaintiffs that encourage opportunistic behavior.
262. See, e.g., Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1175-76 (detailing Oracle/PeopleSof merger challenge
in which State pursued more intense investigations when State itself was affected by merger after recently
purchasing PeopleSoft software).
263. See ABA MONOGRAPH No. 16, supra note 83, at 118-26 (survey stating that of the 144 private
merger challenges filed from 1977-1988, 50 were filed by third-party competitors, 39 by hostile takeover
targets, 22 by customers (including terminated distributors), II by disappointed bidders, 5 by employees or
suppliers, and 17 by other types of plaintiffs). But see Midwestem Mach., Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 167 F.3d
439, 430-31 (8th Cir. 1999) (Midwestern Mach. I) (postcompletion class action suit brought by frequent flyers
on Northwest Airlines, challenging merger with Republic Airlines), rev'd, 392 F.3d 265 (8th Cir. 2004)
(Midwestern Mach. 11) (dismissing frequent flyers' class action after statute of limitations had run); In re EVIC
Class Action Litigation v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. M-21-84 (RMB), 2002 WL 1766554, at *1-2
(S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2002) (denying motion to dismiss in class action section 7 claim filed by UPS customers);
Panache Broad. of Pa., Inc. v. Richardson Elec., Inc., No. 90 C 6400, 1999 WL 342392, at *4 (N.D. I11. May
14, 1999) (certifying class of purchasers for liability determination on Sherman Act and section 7 claims); KK
Motors, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., No. CIV. 98-2307, 1999 WL 246808, at *1 (D. Minn. Feb 23, 1999) (staying
class certification in boat manufacturer class action section 7 case against supplier of marine engines pending
Eight Circuit's resolution of related case).
264. See supra note 263 for a list of recent consumer class actions brought under section 7. See Brodley,
Antitrust Standing, supra note 114, at 36-38 (arguing that customers are ineffective plaintiffs in merger
injunction cases because a lack of monetary damages serves as a low incentive to invest heavily in the
litigation and customers lack detailed knowledge of relevant markets relative to business competitors).
Brodley's characterization of customers as ineffective plaintiffs seems to depend implicitly upon Brodley's
belief that obtaining a premerger injunction is the only viable metric by which to judge the efficacy of different
plaintiff classes. See id. at 22, 36-38 (stating that injunctions are the "standard remedy in merger enforcement"
cases because postnerger damages suits provide little deterrence, and arguing that plaintiffs lack the resources,
financial incentives, and detailed knowledge to effectively prosecute an injunctive merger challenge). In
addition, his trends from the first half of the 1990s seem to be inconsistent with the trends from 1995 forward.
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doctrine, it has long been the general rule that private plaintiffs can pursue antitrust
damages actions when they have suffered injury "by reason of anything forbidden in
the antitrust laws." 265  And private plaintiffs can seek injunctive relief "against
threatened loss or damage by violation of the antitrust laws. '266 Read literally, these
provisions would seem to authorize suit by an ultimate consumer any time a transaction
produces or threatens to produce antitrust injury. In fact, given the "antitrust injury"
hurdles competitors must clear before bringing suit in many jurisdictions (i.e.,
demonstrating a likelihood of exclusionary behavior by the merged business), the
consumer suit would appear to be the preferred vehicle for non-government private
enforcement of section 7. But Illinois Brick bars many of those claims.
The Supreme Court issued Illinois Brick as a complement to its earlier Hanover
Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.26 7 decision, in which it had held that alleged
antitrust violators could not defeat direct purchaser suits by arguing that the direct
purchasers passed along the full amounts of any overcharges to subsequent
purchasers.2 6  From the Supreme Court's perspective, Illinois Brick's converse
holding-that if the "pass-on" theory could not be used defensively by violators,
neither should it be used offensively by indirect purchasers-followed naturally and
necessarily from Hanover Shoe.2 69 The Supreme Court reasoned that allowing indirect
purchaser suits could create significant opportunity for double recovery, and that it
could make antitrust damages actions unnecessarily complex. 270
Although Illinois Brick is not without its supporters, 271 it has also been subject to
substantial criticism in the nearly thirty years since it was announced.27 2 More
importantly, many states with antitrust laws otherwise modeled after the federal
antitrust statutes have not followed Illinois Brick.2 73  In fact, a number of state
legislatures have passed "Illinois Brick repealers," statutes expressly authorizing
indirect purchaser damages suits. 274  Other states have rejected Illinois Brick
judicially.275 In many jurisdictions, the indirect purchaser suit has become a fixture of
265. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 488-89 (1968) (citing section 4 of
the Clayton Act, which outlines who may sue for damages under the Act).
266. Clayton Act ch. 323, § 16, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 26 (2000)).
267. 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968).
268. Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 494.
269. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 735-36.
270. Id. at 730-33. The Supreme Court also notes that indirect purchasers do not necessarily make good
plaintiffs because their incentives to sue are relatively diffuse compared to the incentives of direct purchasers.
Id. at 737-38. Regardless of whether this is factually correct, it is also something of a self-fulfilling prophecy.
271. See, e.g., Posner & Landes, supra note 171, at 604 (stating that allowing "indirect purchasers to sue
would probably retard rather than advance antitrust enforcement").
272. Id. (noting numerous legislative attempts to overrule the decision).
273. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-101 (2005) (declining to interpret Illinois Brick as precluding
indirect purchasers from bringing suit under Tennessee law).
274. See ALD 5TH, supra note 76, at 811-12 and accompanying footnotes citing to nineteen state statutes
and the District of Columbia's statute authorizing an indirect purchaser the opportunity to recover damages for
state antitrust violations.
275. See, e.g., Bunker's Glass Co. v. Pilkington PLC, 75 P.3d 99, 102 (Ariz. 2003) (refusing to read the
federal guidance clause as a manifestation of "legislative intent to rigidly follow federal precedent on every
issue of antitrust law"); Comes v. Microsoft Corp., 646 N.W.2d 440, 446 (Iowa 2002) (noting the state's
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state antitrust law, and most of the parade of horribles the Supreme Court envisioned in
Illinois Brick has failed to materialize.
276
Unfortunately, this patchwork application of Illinois Brick is far from costless.
Although the indirect purchaser suits seem to work relatively well within individual
states, commentators on both sides of the debate concur that the current "checkerboard
of state laws" produces "costly and inefficient" litigation. 277 They also generally agree
that the question of whether indirect purchasers should be allowed to pursue antitrust
damages claims should have a single answer across all U.S. jurisdictions. 2 78
In 2002, Congress created the Antitrust Modernization Commission, a bipartisan
group tasked with analyzing the antitrust laws and making recommendations to
Congress regarding potential improvements. 279 In a December 21, 2004 memorandum,
the Commission's "Civil Procedure and Remedies Working Group" recommended that
the full Commission study five major civil procedure and remedies issues. 280 Possible
statutory repeal of Illinois Brick topped the list.28' According to the Working Group,
the problems inherent in the "checkerboard" of state and federal indirect purchaser law
demonstrate the need for uniformity.28 2  Given the general state of play regarding
indirect purchaser actions, it seems most likely that the Commission ultimately will
recommend that Illinois Brick be repealed or modified to allow indirect purchasers
some recovery rights.283  The other primary alternative-federal preemption of
inconsistent state indirect purchaser statutes--does not appear to be in the cards for
now. 284
harmonization statute mandates that the provision "shall not be made in such a way as to constitute a
delegation of state authority to the federal government"); Hyde v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 473 S.E.2d 680, 686
(N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that the court is not required to construe the state's statute in harmony with the
limitations set forth in Illinois Brick).
276. See Michael S. Jacobs, Lessons from the Pharmaceutical Antitrust Litigation: Indirect Purchasers,
Antitrust Standing, and Antitrust Federalism, 42 ST. Louis U. L.J. 59, 86 (1998) (noting that federal courts
have ignored the claims of indirect purchasers, but that state courts have become "increasingly hospitable" to
their claims); Posner, Federalism and Enforcement, supra note 171, at 14 (noting an average of less than two
antitrust parens patriae suits per state have been brought over a twenty-seven year period).
277. Memorandum from the Civil Procedure and Remedies Working Group to the Commissioners of the
Antitrust Modernization Commission, at 3 (Dec. 21, 2004) [hereinafter Civil Procedure and Remedies
Working Group Memo], http://www.amc.gov/pdf/meetings/CivilProcedure.pdf.
278. See Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 Antitrust L.J. 925, 940 (2001) (insisting
that uniformity requires states to be stripped of their authority to bring antitrust suits).
279. Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 11052, 116 Stat. 1758 (2002).
280. Civil Procedure and Remedies Working Group Memo, supra note 277, at 2.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 3.
283. Admittedly, the other possible alternative is that the Commission recommends full federal
preemption of all state indirect purchaser laws, applying Illinois Brick across the board. While this solution
does not appear to be necessary or desirable, the Commission's recommendation decision is likely to be
binary-repeal Illinois Brick across the board or preempt all state indirect purchaser actions statutorily. Id. at
4.
284. Official comments submitted to the Commission were almost uniformly critical of the Illinois Brick
rule, albeit to varying degrees and with varying degrees of objectivity. These comments can be accessed at
www.amc.gov/public_studies-fr28902/remedies.htm.
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It is impossible to handicap whether or when Congress will repeal Illinois Brick.
Congress has a long history of ignoring expert advice regarding reformation of the
antitrust laws,285 and the Modernization Commission's final report to Congress is not
due until April 2007.286 That said, the vitality and success of state indirect purchaser
claims, the general tenor of the current academic debate, and the bipartisan recognition
that the current patchwork system is broken together suggest that repeal ultimately is
the most likely outcome.
If Illinois Brick is ultimately repealed, the final significant hurdle to private
merger challenges will be gone. End-user consumer class actions will be authorized as
to products sold through multiple levels of distribution. Class action plaintiffs' lawyers
will be able to file consumer suits challenging a whole host of potential and completed
transactions on behalf of plaintiffs to whom such suits are currently unavailable, or at
least unattractive. 2
87
Moreover, indirect purchasers do not face the same disincentives to sue that many
direct purchasers do. End-users cannot pass through overcharges. They do not have
longstanding commercial relationships with potential defendants and they do not face
retaliation from suppliers in the event of an unsuccessful (or even a successful) suit.
Given the commercial realities facing the prototypical direct purchaser, it is small
wonder that they are often reluctant to enter the fray, even in conduct cases. How
much more reluctant would they be to challenge an anticompetitive merger involving
one or more of their suppliers? Extending recovery rights down the distribution chain
would allow the law to bypass reluctant direct purchasers and would almost certainly
produce a dramatic increase in private enforcement activity. By authorizing suit at the
level most likely to feel the anticompetitive effects of an illegal transaction, repeal of
Illinois Brick would create significant incentives for private claims.
If Congress fails to repeal Illinois Brick, the coming wave of private merger
challenges may be delayed somewhat, but it will not be derailed. Over half of all states
have rejected Illinois Brick in connection with their state antitrust laws, many of which
explicitly contain or have been interpreted to include a "Baby section 7" analogous to
section 7 of the Clayton Act.288 If indirect purchasers continue to be denied a federal
remedy for the injuries they suffer in connection with allegedly anticompetitive
mergers, it is likely that they will increasingly take to the state courts in search of
compensation.
Moreover, large classes of direct purchasers (typically end-users of products or
services) whose ability to sue is not affected by Illinois Brick will still exist. These
285. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 260-61 (1977)
(recommending that Congress dramatically revise the Robinson-Patman Act, but this recommendation has
been largely ignored).
286. Antitrust Modernization Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 11052, 116 Stat. 1758 (2002).
287. Because Illinois Brick is founded upon concerns regarding the amount and apportionment of
damages, courts have refused to apply its limitations to suits seeking only injunctive relief. See In re Warfarin
Sodium Antitrust Litig., 214 F.3d 395, 400 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating the requirements for standing when seeking
injunctive relief are simply: "(1) threatened loss or injury cognizable in equity; (2) proximately resulting from
the alleged antitrust injury"). But even with the availability of attorney's fees, the injunctive relief suit may
not be as attractive to indirect purchasers as a damages claim.
288. See ALD 5TH, supra note 76, at 811-12 & nn.61-3 for citations to each state's statute.
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customers can and do file private merger challenges and are likely to increase their
litigation activity in the future.
289
In recent years, private antitrust enforcement under state law has increased
substantially, much of that in the form of indirect purchaser suits supplemental to
federal criminal or civil direct purchaser actions. This trend is likely to continue in the
context of private merger challenges, especially in connection with transactions that are
not subject to federal premerger review.
III. FLAWS IN THE LAW GOVERNING PRIVATE MERGER CHALLENGES
The stage is set for a private merger challenge revival.290 Standing alone, the
coming wave of private merger challenges is neither good nor bad. Private
enforcement is vital to the functioning of the antitrust system,291 for both mergers and
conduct offenses. Moreover, to the extent increased premerger filing thresholds allow
competitively significant mergers in smaller relevant markets to slip through the cracks,
the judicial system needs additional private claims to fill the gaps.
But there are threats associated with increased private enforcement as well.
Private rights of action are inherently risky in ways that government enforcement
actions are not. In redesigning the optimal postmerger enforcement regime, it is
absolutely critical that policymakers eliminate any aspect of the existing regime that is
likely: (1) to encourage excessive inefficient opportunistic behavior on the part of
private plaintiffs, or (2) to produce excess consumer welfare costs in the form of a
return to atomism.
Two characteristics of the "current" legal regime are worthy of particular
attention, primarily because they are not truly "current." Instead, these characteristics
are anachronisms from the atomism era. As such, they create two separate
opportunities for mischief. First, they tilt the playing field substantially in favor of
private plaintiffs-something that arguably would have been consistent with the strong
1950s/60s norm against horizontal market concentration, but is inconsistent with
current antitrust thinking. Second, they open the door to renewed hostilities between
289. See supra note 263 for a list of recent class action purchaser challenges.
290. It is difficult to determine whether there has been any significant increase in private merger
challenges in the last several years, but the factors suggesting an increase is imminent do not necessarily
suggest that it should already have happened. For example, although the premerger filing thresholds increased
in 2001, there was a significant decrease in overall merger activity from late 2000 through 2003. See FED.
TRADE COMM'N & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MERGER CHALLENGES DATA, FISCAL YEARS 1999-2003, at 4-13,
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/201898.pdf (charting merger challenges for the relevant years).
Because appropriate, private plaintiffs are likely to need a damages incentive before filing suit, it is too early to
expect substantial private enforcement activity in connection with the recent increase in merger activity.
Similarly, Illinois Brick repeal or modification is unlikely for at least two more years. In the parlance of the
DOJ Antitrust Division's merger review process, this Article proposes a "fix it first" remedy. See R. Hewitt
Page, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen. Antitrust Div., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Speech before the Bar of the City
of New York at the Milton Handler Annual Antitrust Review 11-13 (Dec. 10, 2002) (transcript available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/200868.pdf) (noting a fix-it first remedy allows parties to restructure
an otherwise problematic transaction).
291. See AlliedSignal, Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 183 F.3d 568, 575 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that
Congress included this private right as a means of protecting competition); ABA MONOGRAPH No. 16, supra
note 83, at 12-21.
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the competing principles of economic liberty. Because the current equilibrium is close
to optimal, the law should close these loopholes as quickly as possible.
There are two central problems with the current private merger challenge
framework that encourage excessive opportunistic behavior and restart the shooting
war between the competing components of the competition norm.
First, as currently structured, merger challenges allow private plaintiffs to impose
disproportionate costs upon defendants. 292 While this disproportionality arguably
would support an atomistic competition policy aimed toward severely limiting merger
activity, it is completely at odds with a regime in which mergers and acquisitions are
presumptively legal. Given the unique structure of the private merger challenges, the
costs private plaintiffs can impose upon merger defendants, and the current thinking
regarding the value of merger activity, the law must mitigate plaintiffs' ability to
impose excess costs.
Second, current law often authorizes private merger challenges long after the
subject transaction has been completed.2 93  Although antitrust damages suits are
technically subject to a four-year limitations period,294 still-valid (and still-cited)
Supreme Court precedent allows plaintiffs to circumvent this restriction. Under one
formulation of the standard, no violation of the Clayton Act occurs until the transaction
"threatens to ripen into a prohibited effect," regardless of when the transaction was
completed. 295 In the case announcing the rule, the government challenged stock
acquisitions over thirty years after the fact.296 Additionally, the Supreme Court has
reached the same effective result from a different direction by applying a tort-style
"accrual" standard to merger challenges.2 97 Under that standard, a private merger
claim does not "accrue" (and the limitations period does not begin to run) until the
private plaintiff claims to have suffered injury, regardless of when the transaction was
completed. These rules may be well-suited to a regime in which atomistic competition
is the explicit goal. But neither of these doctrines makes sense in today's promerger,
efficiency-focused environment.
A. Imposition of Costs
Antitrust is expensive. Even meritless antitrust suits are staggeringly costly to
defend. With complex, high volume discovery and bet-the-company importance the
rule rather than the exception, seven-figure attorneys' fees are common in many
antitrust cases, even in the context of a successful defense. 298 With the prospect of
292. See infra Part III.A.I for a discussion of defendants' inability to impose similar costs on plaintiffs.
293. See infra Part III.B for a discussion of the timing of merger challenges.
294. Clayton Act ch. 323, § 4B, 38 Stat. 730 (1014) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 15b (2000)). Equity
suits are likely subject to a similar laches period. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Gen. Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 518 F.2d
913, 929 (9th Cir. 1975).
295. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (DuPont 1), 353 U.S. 586, 597 (1957), modified by,
366 U.S. 316, 328-31 (1961).
296. Id. at 590.
297. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 338 (1971) (stating that under the
Clayton Act, each time a potential plaintiff is injured the statute of limitations begins anew).
298. See, e.g., U.S. Football League v. Nat'l Football League, 887 F.2d 408, 409 (2d Cir. 1989)
[Vol. 78
A TOMISM AND THE PRIVATE MERGER CHALLENGE
treble damages and "death penalty" equitable sanctions added in, the risks associated
with antitrust litigation can be overwhelming.
1. Structural Impediments to an Equitable Cost Structure
Moreover, unlike many other types of antitrust litigation, most meritless merger
challenges are not easily disposed of on motions to dismiss or at the summary judgment
stage.2 99 Assuming a plaintiff has standing to bring a section 7 claim, virtually any
merger challenge involving a significant transaction and a facially reasonable relevant
market is destined to survive summary judgment. Whether a particular transaction
"may tend substantially to lessen competition" is an inherently fact-specific inquiry.300
Accordingly, even if so inclined, courts may find it difficult to ply their traditional
gatekeeper trade in the context of merger challenges and are often obligated to allow a
full hearing on the merits.
But the substantial expenses associated with the defense of merger challenges are
just part of the story. So too are the difficulties associated with disposing of merger
litigation in its preliminary stages. Equally if not more important is the massive
inherent disparity in costs between private plaintiffs and defendants in the typical
merger case. In virtually every merger case, plaintiffs can and do impose significant
costs upon defendants in the form of massive discovery requests, etc. 30 1 Because
merger defendants have little or no corresponding ability to impose substantial costs on
private merger plaintiffs, the opportunistic incentives are skewed dramatically. 302
In many traditional commercial cases or tort lawsuits, and in some antitrust
lawsuits, there is relative parity between plaintiffs and defendants with respect to the
costs of litigation. Discovery flows both ways, and bidirectional debates as to liability,
damages, counterclaims, and other matters permit defendants to impose costs upon
plaintiffs in close proportion to the costs plaintiffs can impose upon defendants. In
those cases, plaintiffs' ability and incentive to act opportunistically within the litigation
is substantially limited by the defendant's ability to "do unto plaintiffs" as plaintiffs
have done unto them.
By contrast, the typical merger case does not offer the defendant much
opportunity to "push back" against plaintiffs. 30 3 Whether the plaintiffs are competitors,
targets, or consumers, the only relevant inquiry in a merger case is whether the
(upholding the district court's decision to award more than $5 million in attorney's fees which included more
than $1 million in paralegal fees).
299. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986).
300. See supra Part II.B. 1 for a discussion of the difficulty in determining exactly what constitutes "less
competition."
301. This is really just the entropy principle writ legal. The filing of a lawsuit is analogous to the
introduction of disorder into a system. It is far harder to cleanup a mess than to make it in the first place.
302. See, e.g., R. Preston McAfee & Nicholas V. Vakkur, The Strategic Abuse of the Antitrust Laws, 15-
16 (Social Science Research Network, Working Paper No. 594581, 2004), available at http://papers.ssm.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=594581 (noting that some defendants have the ability to counter sue, while
merger defendants typically do not).
303. Plaintiffs' participation in merger challenges is not costless. Expert testimony, analysis of
discovery materials, etc. are not free. But these costs are usually but a fraction of the costs bome by
defendants in a merger case.
20051
TEMPLE LA WREVIEW
challenged transaction reduces competition-an issue largely divorced from the
plaintiffs participation in the market at any level. Defendants can ultimately obtain
limited discovery from plaintiffs (typically related to expert testimony and damages
issues), but the costs associated with responding to defendants' requests are fairly
limited, especially measured against defendants' costs in responding to the wide-
ranging discovery in which merger plaintiffs invariably engage.
304
In fact, under the unique rules governing section 7, one popular defensive
response to disproportionality-overwhelming plaintiffs with discovery materials-is
unlikely to be particularly effective. Plaintiffs can and do impose massive discovery
burdens on merger defendants, but plaintiffs' substantive claims are rarely dependent
upon the "needle in a haystack" defendants have hidden among gigabytes of data.
Instead, the discovery materials produced by defendants are often ancillary to the
plaintiffs' economic analysis centerpiece.
The "final costs" to plaintiffs and defendants differ substantially on an expected
value basis.305 In most merger challenges, there is little or no basis for a counterclaim
and no way to increase plaintiffs' risks beyond the cost of the challenge itself.
Moreover, the American Rule works only in one direction in antitrust cases-an award
of attorneys' fees is mandatory if the plaintiff prevails, but defendants cannot recovery
their attorneys' fees if the plaintiffs are unsuccessful. 0 6 Accordingly, plaintiffs' risks
in nonfrivolous merger cases are typically limited to their costs of litigation, even if
they lose.
A defendant stands to lose substantially more in the typical merger challenge. In
addition to its own disproportionately high legal fees, a defendant may ultimately be
304. Even a premerger government investigation typically involves massive discovery obligations. See
Fed. Trade Comm'n, Request for Additional Material and Documentary Material, at 5-11 (Model Request
Form), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2004/04/040428modelrequest.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2006)
(requiring target companies to divulge an enormous amount of information in an FTC investigation). A
private postmerger suit is typically far more onerous.
305. In game theory economics, the term "expected value" has a precise meaning. Formally, it is the
sum of the products of the different potential outcomes or payoffs and their respective anticipated marginal
probabilities. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 247-51 (1994). An economically
rational actor should be indifferent between a guaranteed payment of its expected value and proceeding
forward to the completion of the game. Id. (noting that most litigants prefer known costs to potentially greater
unknown costs). For example, ifa particular dispute has a 10% chance of resulting in a $1 million plaintiffs'
verdict, a 70% chance of resulting in a $500 thousand plaintiffs' verdict, and a 20% chance of resulting in a
defense verdict, the defendant's expected payout is ($1,000,000 x 0.10) + ($500,000 x 0.70) + ($0 x 0.20) =
$450,000. Absent externalities or multiple iteration incentives, the defendant should be willing to pay up to its
expected value of $4.5 thousand to resolve the case. That number could rise substantially if the costs of
defense are factored in, although those costs are relevant only on a prospective basis--once incurred, they are
economically irrelevant sunk costs. It is possible to craft a formal game theoretical model of the private
merger challenge based upon a symmetric information variant of the "P'ng Settlement game." See Ivan Park-
Liang P'ng, Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement & Trial, 14 BELL J. OF ECON. 539, 539-50 (1983) (outlining
the basic variables influencing plaintiffs and defendants to either proceed with the suit or settle the matter); see
also ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES & INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 59-62 (3d ed. 2001)
(applying the P'ng settlement game to show why it should be true that a defendant will settle for an amount up
to the expected legal costs).
306. See, e.g., U.S. Football League, 887 F.2d at 409 (awarding over $5 million in legal fees to the
plaintiffs).
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responsible for plaintiffs' legal fees and treble damages. 3°7 Such a defendant may also
ultimately face equitable sanctions up to and including divestiture of the acquired
assets. 30 8 If a judge or jury ultimately concludes that a merger violated section 7, the
consequences to the defendant can be disastrous. It is incumbent upon defendants to
calculate their exposure early and often in merger cases, and defendants may often
prefer to bargain their way out of private merger suits by paying up to their perceived
expected costs for a dismissal.
30 9
2. Treble Damages Make No Sense in Merger Cases
Courts have reflexively interpreted section 7 of the Clayton Act to authorize treble
damages awards for successful plaintiffs. 310 This is the correct decision as a matter of
statutory interpretation-section 4 of the Clayton Act explicitly authorizes treble
damages for injuries suffered "by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws. '311
But as a matter of sound policy, there is no modem justification for treble damage
awards in the vast majority of private merger cases. Treble damages may still make
sense in the context of cartel behavior, monopolization, and other conduct offenses. 312
Those behaviors are still presumptively (and in some cases, per se) illegal, and the
deterrence value of a treble damages remedy is substantial.
By contrast, the law now presumes that mergers and acquisitions are legal, even
beneficial. 313 Treble damages awards may have been acceptable as deterring conduct
307. See Clayton Act, ch. 323 § 4, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000)) (stating
"any person who shall be injured ... shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee").
308. Califomia v. Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 280-81 (1990); United States v. E.I. du Pont De
Nemours & Co. (DuPont 11), 366 U.S. 316, 328-31 (1961).
309. See supra note 306 for a discussion of possible methods for calculating likely costs.
310. See, e.g., Gottesman v. Gen Motors Corp., 414 F,2d 956, 961 (2d Cir. 1969) (holding that treble
damages are available when a violation of section is found); Parrish v. Wilton Enter., Inc., No. 75 C 4400,
1984 WL 2942, at *5-6 (N.D. II1. Feb. 16, 1984) (same); Int'l Rys. v. United Brands Co., 405 F. Supp. 884,
899 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (noting money damages and injunctive relief are available for section 7 violations); Isidor
Weinstein Inv. Co. v. Hearst Corp., 310 F. Supp. 390, 391 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (citing Gottesman for the
proposition that treble damages are available for section 7 violations).
311. Clayton Act ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 730 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000)) (emphasis added).
312. For varying perspectives on the propriety of multiple damages in antitrust conduct cases, see
Edward D. Cavanagh, Detrebling Antitrust Damages: An Idea Wose Time Has Come?, 61 TUL. L. REV. 777,
847 (1987) [hereinafter Cavanagh, Detrebling Antitrust Damages] (finding multiple damages are "neither fair
nor desirable in every case"); Edward D. Cavanagh, Contribution, Claim Reduction, and Individual Treble
Damage Responsibility: Which Path to Reform of Antitrust Remedies?, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1277, 1336 (1987)
[hereinafter Cavanagh, Contribution] (arguing the preferred approach is to give courts the discretion to permit
detrebling); Frank H. Easterbrook, Treble What?, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 95, 101 (1986) (arguing plaintiffs should
only recover to the extent they can show "a real antitrust injury"); Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust "'Treble"
Damages Really Single Damages?, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 115, 173 (1993) (noting antitrust violations "probably
give rise to single damages at most"); William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U.
CHi. L. REv. 652, 653 (1983) (presenting "an economic analysis of optimal antitrust penalties").
313. See, e.g., Leary, supra note 69, at 121 (noting the policy debates concerning mergers do not consist
of debates over the fundamental direction of antitrust enforcement); Kolasky & Dick, supra note 19, at 218-19
(noting that after the DOJ published the 1982 Merger Guidelines, courts began viewing mergers as promoting
efficiencies of the market).
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inconsistent with an atomism norm, but they make no sense now. 314 Encouraging
procompetitive transactions is more difficult in a world where parties crossing an ill-
defined and distant line are subject to a multiple damages award. Moreover, none of
the justifications traditionally offered in defense of antitrust treble damages-
deterrence, punishment, compensation for undetected conduct-apply to merger
transactions that are typically public and procompetitive.
315
Under current rules, the potential private merger plaintiff faces an unfairly
attractive calculus, regardless of the merits of its potential claim. 316 Even for most
nonreportable transactions, the payoffs can be substantial-attorneys' fees plus treble
damages that could easily run to millions of dollars in a typical case. 317 When the
downside to filing is low, even a low-probability case begins to look attractive.
Moreover, the availability of equitable relief up to and including the "favored" remedy
of divestiture gives plaintiffs additional bargaining power. For that reason, the hostage
value of a private suit may be significant, even if the plaintiff has questionable interest
in pursuing its claims through trial.
B. The Timing of Merger Challenges
The Clayton Act purports to impose a four-year limitations period on damages
actions brought under the antitrust laws. 318 For suits seeking injunctive relief, the four-
year statutory damages limitation period likely defines the outer boundaries for an
equitable laches period in connection with private section 7 suits. 319
Notwithstanding these limitations, the decisional law governing the timing of
private merger challenges has preserved and perpetuated two lines of cases
314. Interestingly, commentators who have considered the elimination of treble damages have not done
so in connection with private merger challenges. See, e.g., Cavanagh, Contribution, supra note 312, at 1328-
36 (noting that commentators who advocate the abolition of mandatory trebling argue they should be
maintained in certain cases). The justifications offered for retaining the treble damages remedy as to other
classes of conduct simply do not apply to merger challenges.
315. Multiple damages might be justifiable in merger cases on a showing of heightened culpability; for
example, intent to accomplish anticompetitive ends. Cavanagh, Contribution, supra note 312, at 1332. This
would essentially lead to an antitrust analogue of the law governing "willful" patent infringement, with the
attendant waiver of privilege issues. For a discussion concerning the negative effects of the waiver provision
on the attomey-client relationship in patent law, see John Dragseth, Note, Coerced Waiver of the Attorney-
Client Privilege for Opinions of Counsel in Patent Litigation, 80 MINN. L. REv. 167, 167-70, 184-90 (1995).
316. The incentives and equilibria suggested by the cost disparities can be presented in the form of a
standard game theoretical model. Although reasonable minds may disagree as to the appropriate payoffs and
probabilities associated with the model, it is obvious that the cost disparities skew the incentives against
merger defendants, regardless of the merits of a plaintiffs merger claim. Treble damages skew the incentives
even further.
317. See, e.g., U.S. Football League, 887 F.2d at 409 (awarding over $5 million in damages and legal
fees to the plaintiffs).
318. Clayton Act ch. 323, § 4B, 38 Stat. 730 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 15b (2000)).
319. See Int'l Tel. & Tel. Co., 518 F.2d at 929 (adopting four-year laches period in connection with
section 7 divestiture suit); AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, 1205b (recommending four-year or shorter
laches period for section 7 cases because of hardships imposed by postmerger equitable relief). But see
Scherer, Post-Chicago Analysis, supra note 65, at 22-23 (suggesting a "probationary period" for potentially
anticompetitive mergers).
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dramatically extending the time during which private parties can file suit.320 These
doctrines date from, and were appropriate to, an atomistic competition policy based
upon S-C-P market theory because they offer an opportunity to revisit and revise
"imperfect" market structures on the pretext that the identified "imperfections" in a
given market arose out of a long-completed merger or acquisition.
But neither doctrine makes any sense in the context of modem section 7
enforcement. Antitrust law now encourages rather than condemns most mergers, and
market dynamism renders suspect any purported causal relationship between a long-
completed merger and current market performance. Market dynamism also mitigates
the concerns courts articulated in adopting liberal time-of-suit rules, making it
exceedingly unlikely that merging parties would be able to lie in wait by delaying
anticompetitive conduct until after a limitations period has passed. Finally, unlike
certain other types of antitrust violations, most allegedly anticompetitive mergers are
public knowledge before or near the time of completion, and there are effective tools
for analyzing the actual and likely competitive effects of a transaction either before or
immediately after it has been completed. In light of these factors, the rules allowing
suit beyond a reasonable limitations period must be eliminated.
These doctrines survive largely by historical accident. The HSR-driven decrease
in the pace of postmerger litigation and the reflexive adoption of ill-fitting standards
from other areas of antitrust law combined to preserve these anachronisms when
virtually every other area of the antitrust law has evolved beyond the norms these rules
implicitly support. But these rules also persist at least in part because atomism itself is
not completely dead, and because the rules appear to mitigate the risks associated with
the accumulation of economic power.
Taken together, these cases allow private plaintiffs to extend their window for
opportunistic behavior indefinitely into the future. Moreover, they invite a return to
atomism, encouraging private parties and courts alike to substitute their intuitions
regarding appropriate market structure for the judgment of the market itself. Public
policy supports neither outcome. The hidden costs of the antiquated time-of-suit rules
governing private merger challenges threaten to overdeter socially beneficial merger
and business activity by exposing merging parties to perpetual risk of suit and,
paradoxically, by increasing their risk of future liability in direct proportion to their
success in the market.
320. This is not, by and large, a problem with the substantive law governing suits brought before or near
the time of a merger's completion. In recent years, courts have begun to apply modern, Guidelines-based
analysis in evaluating such challenges. See, e.g., FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 716 n.9 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (noting the Guidelines are not binding on courts, but that they are a "useful illustration"); FTC v. Tenet
Healthcare, Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1053 (8th Cir. 1999) (employing the Guidelines while evaluating a "critical
loss" argument made by the defendant); AlliedSignal, Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 183 F.3d 568, 574 n.3 (7th
Cir. 1999) (citing the Guidelines); FTC v. PPG Indus., Inc., 798 F.2d 1500, 1503 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (relying on
the Guidelines in determining whether a market is "concentrated" or "unconcentrated"); United States v.
Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1175 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (citing the Guidelines extensively in evaluating the
plaintiff's claims); FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109, 120 (D.D.C. 2004) (noting the Guidelines set
forth an "analytical framework" for courts to employ in antitrust cases).
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1. DuPont and Its Pre-HSR Progeny
In 1917, DuPont was looking for investment opportunities.3 2' It ultimately
decided to invest heavily in General Motors stock, purchasing a twenty-three percent
ownership stake in the automaker between 1917 and 1919. Over time, most of General
Motors' divisions shifted their purchase of automotive fabrics and finishes to DuPont
products. In 1949, some thirty years after DuPont's final stock purchase, the
Department of Justice filed a lawsuit seeking and ultimately obtaining DuPont's full
divestiture of its ownership in General Motors. 322 At the time of suit, General Motors
commanded approximately fifty percent of the U.S. automotive market, and DuPont
provided over sixty percent of GM's fabrics and finishes. 323 Hearing the case as a
direct appeal from the Northern District of Illinois, the Supreme Court reversed the trial
court's decision that the Department of Justice's suit was time-barred.
324
The Court's substantive determination turned on its analysis of the close
relationships between General Motors' and DuPont's fabrics and finishes businesses.
Writing for an unusual four-justice majority, Justice William Brennan stated:
The fact that sticks out in this voluminous record is that the bulk of du Pont's
production [of automotive fabrics and finishes] has always supplied the
largest part of the requirements of the one customer in the automobile
industry connected by a stock interest. The inference is overwhelming that
du Pont's commanding position was promoted by its stock interest and was
not gained solely on competitive merit.325
On the basis of that inference, the Supreme Court held that DuPont's 1917-19 stock
purchases violated section 7 and remanded the case to the district court for further
hearing on appropriate equitable relief.326
Modem readers may find DuPont somewhat jarring. When DuPont acquired
General Motors stock, anticompetitive effects were completely unforeseeable. With
only eleven percent of the U.S. automobile market in 1919, General Motors was not yet
a dominant producer of automobiles, and the automotive fabrics and finishes markets
321. See DuPont 1, 353 U.S. at 599-600 (noting that between 1917 and 1919 DuPont purchased a
twenty-three percent interest in General Motors).
322. Although the time-of-suit holding at issue in this Article is found at DuPont 1, 353 U.S. at 590, the
Supreme Court ultimately ordered DuPont to divest itselfofGM stock in DuPont I. 366 U.S. at 334.
323. DuPont 1, 353 U.S. at 596.
324. Id. at 607.
325. Id. at 605. William Brennan was sworn in as an Associate Justice on October 16, 1956. DuPont
was argued less than one month later, on November 14-15, 1956. DuPont 1, 353 U.S. at 586. The DuPont
opinion was issued on June 3, 1957 and appears to be Justice Brennan's first opinion. Justices Clark, Harlan,
and Whittaker did not take part in the decision, and Justices Burton and Frankfurter dissented, leaving Justice
Brennan to write for a rare four-member majority. Id. at 608.
326. Justice Burton's dissent was joined by Justice Frankfurter. DuPont 1, 353 U.S. at 609-10 (Burton,
J., dissenting). Burton essentially describes the Government's Clayton Act claim as an afterthought. Id.
(noting that this was the first case in which the government sought to apply the Clayton Act to a vertical
integration). He then criticizes the majority for: (1) applying section 7 to a vertical acquisition; (2) holding
that the time chosen by the Government in bringing the action is controlling rather than the time of the stock
acquisition itself; and (3) disregarding the facts found by the district court and finding that the facts of the case
justified a finding of illegality. Id. at 611, 612-54.
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were themselves in their infancy. In fact, the primary product at issue in this 1949 case
about 1917-19 stock acquisitions was not even invented until 1924.327 Notwithstanding
the fact that no substantial lessening of competition was even possible at the time of the
transactions, the Supreme Court found liability thirty-eight years later, based upon
several decades of subsequent events.
The opinion's opening paragraphs capture the essence of the S-C-P paradigm and
telegraph the result. According to the Court, the question is:
[W]hether du Pont's commanding position as General Motors' supplier of
automotive finishes and fabrics was achieved on competitive merit alone, or
because its acquisition of the General Motors stock, and the consequent close
intercompany relationship, led to the insulation of most of the General
Motors market from free competition, with the resultant likelihood, at the
time of suit, of the creation of a monopoly of a line of commerce. 328
With that formulation, DuPont comes very close to holding outright that a
"commanding position" in a market violates section 7 of the Clayton Act if there is any
merger or acquisition in a defendant's past that could be even fractionally responsible
for the defendant's success. Moreover, it seems to shift the plaintiff's burden of proof
squarely onto defendants. 329 After all, the opinion asks not whether the transaction
"tends substantially to lessen competition," but whether the defendant obtained its
position "on competitive merit alone. '330 As important, the modem reader likely
would see inequity in a forced divestiture where neither the purchaser nor the
purchased had substantial shares in the very markets at issue at the time of the
transaction 331
The largely extrajudicial evolution of merger law has rendered DuPont's atomistic
normative framework moot. A 1950s judge would hardly recognize today's
Guidelines-driven world, in which mergers involving two of the five or six most
significant competitors in a market are routinely approved. 332 A modem-day DuPont
challenge would almost certainly be decided very differently.
The days of the eight percent market share liability trigger333 are long gone. But
DuPont is not dead yet. For a number of reasons, the Court's "time-of-suit" holdings-
327. "Duco," a nitrocellulose-based lacquer finish that became the industry standard for automobiles for
several generations. DuPont Refinish Homepage, http://www.dupontrefinish.com (last visited Feb. 4, 2006)
(providing technical data about DuPont automotive paints).
328. DuPont 1, 353 U.S. at 589-90.
329. See also United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 549 (1966) (noting that section 7 only
requires the plaintiff to prove a merger may substantially lessen competition anywhere in the country); Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 346 (1962) (finding the plaintiff easily met the burden of proof).
330. DuPont 1, 353 U.S. at 588-89.
331. Although the term "General Motors market" itself seems foreign to any modem reader familiar with
standard relevant market analysis, it may be wise to give the Supreme Court the benefit of the doubt on that
issue. According to the opinion, at the time of suit, GM manufactured approximately fifty percent of the
automobiles in the United States, and the opinion takes care to distinguish other types of finishes and fabrics
from automotive finishes and fabrics. DuPont !, 353 U.S. at 596.
332. See, e.g., Kolasky & Dick, supra note 19, at 208 (noting that courts are increasingly likely to
balance the anticompetitive effects of a restraint against competition-enhancing effects).
333. See, e.g., 1968 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 45, 5 (in markets with 4-firm concentrations of
75% or higher, "the Department will ordinarily challenge mergers between firms accounting for,
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allowing the government to challenge transactions thirty years or more after
completion, and apparently allowing courts to analyze competitive effects of merger as
of the time of suit, rather than the time of completion-are still alive and have in fact
been extended to private challenges.334 In light of the ever-increasing incentives
toward private postmerger suits, it is worth examining DuPont's timing holdings in
detail.
a. The Time-of-Suit Holding
According to DuPont, the test of a violation of section 7 is whether, "at the time of
suit, there is a reasonable probability that the acquisition is likely to result in the
condemned restraint. '335  A merger or acquisition is "within reach of [section 7]
whenever the reasonable likelihood appears that the acquisition will result in a restraint
of commerce or in the creation of a monopoly of any line of commerce."
336
Justice Brennan reasoned that section 7 of the Clayton Act was designed to arrest
anticompetitive transactions in their "incipiency." 337 This is hardly a controversial
conclusion.338 But to the DuPont Court, "incipiency" meant at "any time when the
acquisition threatens to ripen into a prohibited effect. '339 The DuPont court noted that
previous merger challenges previously had been brought "at or near the time of
acquisition," but dismissed the relevance of timing in those cases, stating: "None of
these cases holds, or even suggests, that the Government is foreclosed from bringing
the action at any time when a threat of the prohibited effects is evident. '340
Accordingly, the Supreme Court allowed the government's challenge of DuPont's
thirty-year-old GM stock purchases to go forward and affirmed a finding of illegality
based upon market facts obtaining at or near the time of suit, rather than at the time the
acquisition was completed.
341
The DuPont time-of-suit holding would be controversial today even if it remained
limited to government challenges of stock-only acquisitions.3 42 DuPont seems to hold
unequivocally that the time of completion of a challenged transaction is largely
irrelevant to the question of when a suit can be filed. Instead, DuPont apparently
approximately, the following percentages of the market: Acquiring Firm 4%, Acquired Firm 4% or more;
Acquiring Firm 10%, Acquired Firm 2% or more; Acquiring Firm 15% or more, Acquired Firm 1% or more).
334. See infra note 368, for cases in which courts have employed this time-of-suit analysis.
335. DuPont 1, 353 U.S. at 607 (emphasis added).
336. Id. at 593 (emphasis added).
337. Id. at 589.
338. See ALD 5TH, supra note 76, at 316 n.4 (noting that early case law contains statements that the
purpose of section 7 was to reach incipient anticompetitive actions).
339. DuPont 1, 353 U.S. at 597.
340. Id. at 598.
341. Id. at 620 (Burton, J. dissenting). Justice Burton's view has more or less carried the day with
modem commentators and federal enforcement agencies, but his analysis has not gained the same purchase
with his judicial descendants. See Scott A. Sher, Closed But Not Forgotten: Government Review of
Consummated Mergers Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 41, 66 (2004)
(suggesting Justice Burton's dissent "may resonate with a majority" of the Supreme Court Justices sitting in
2004).
342. See generally Sher, supra note 341, at 58-69 (analyzing the impact of the DuPont decision).
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stands for the proposition that violations of section 7 themselves take place whenever
conditions converge to make a previously completed transaction look like a bad idea in
retrospect, regardless of how long ago the transaction was completed or what has
happened to the market in the interim.34 3 Because a "violation" under DuPont can take
place years or decades after the merger was completed, the opinion implicitly requires
courts to analyze the competitive conditions prevailing at the time of suit in connection
with their determinations of whether the transaction tended to substantially lessen
competition.
344
Justice Burton's dissent points out that section 7 itself contradicts the four-justice
majority's time-of-suit holding because the statute prohibits a transaction only if the
effect of the acquisition itself (and not the effect of holding that which was acquired)
was to substantially lessen competition. 345 As he stated, "The statutory language is
unequivocal. It makes the test the probable effect of the acquisition at the time of the
actual acquisition, and not at some later date to be arbitrarily chosen by the
Government in bringing suit."
'346
2. The Expansion of the DuPont Doctrine
In their well-known antitrust law treatise, Areeda and Hovenkamp suggest that the
incipiency holding in DuPont appropriately applies only to government challenges and
then only to stock transactions falling short of full business integrations. 347  Though
this would be a useful way to limit the negative impact of a holding that allows
plaintiffs to reach back thirty years or more to undo business combinations that were
not foreseeably anticompetitive at the time of consummation, Areeda's interpretation
appears to reflect at least some wishful thinking. 348 Courts have expanded rather than
circumscribed DuPont's reach.
349
a. Consolidated Foods
In 1965, the Supreme Court itself expanded DuPont beyond the stock purchase
context, applying DuPont in a traditional "business integration" merger case. In FTC v.
343. See supra Part III.B. 1 for a discussion of the important aspects of the reasoning in DuPont.
344. See generally BORK, supra note 13, at 208-10, for a thorough criticism of DuPont's holding. In
1993, Bork published a new edition of The Antitrust Paradox with a new introduction and epilogue. BORK,
THE ANTITRUST PARADOX ix-xiv, 426-39 (Free Press 1993) (1978). The DuPont doctrine is one of the few
holdovers from the original publication for which Bork cannot claim vindication in the new material. Id. at ix-
xiv.
345. See DuPont 1, 353 U.S. at 620 (Burton, J., dissenting) (noting the statute prohibits acquiring, not
holding, the stock).
346. Id.
347. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note I, 1 1205c3.
348. The DuPont opinion itself would seem to cut against Areeda's interpretation, because it imposes
liability for the purchase of "all or any part of the stock of another company." DuPont I, 353 U.S. at 592
(emphasis added). But see AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, 1200-1205f, 251-320 (arguing the
"holding" of assets acquired through an unlawful merger does not affect the statute of limitations under section
7 of the Clayton Act).
349. See infra Part llI.B.2.a for a detailed analysis of this expansion.
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Consolidated Foods Corp.,3 5 0 the Court stated that, under DuPont, "post-acquisition
conduct may amount to a violation of section 7 even though there is no evidence to
establish probability in limine," and held that Consolidated Foods' purchase of a rival
producer of dehydrated onion and garlic over ten years before suit violated section 7 of
the Clayton Act.
351
Consolidated Foods is a remarkable example of the then-dominant S-C-P
preference for atomistic markets. It explicitly holds (as DuPont had implied) that
postacquisition conduct can constitute a violation of section 7 even when there is no
evidence at or before completion that a particular merger will lessen competition.35 2
And it does not matter whether the transaction could have foreseeably affected
competition at the time of its completion. In the Consolidated Foods/DuPont world,
therefore, there is no rest for the weary if they have a merger in their history. A past
merger may be enough to condemn future success, regardless of whether that merger
had any foreseeable competitive effects at all at the time of consummation.
b. General Dynamics
The Supreme Court reiterated the Consolidated Foods holding in United States v.
General Dynamics Corp.,353 in which it found that "[t]he mere nonoccurrence of
anticompetitive effects from a merger would, of course, merely postpone rather than
preclude a divestiture suit." 354  The Court justified its conclusion as follows: "If a
demonstration that no anticompetitive effects had occurred at the time of trial or of
judgment constituted a permissible defense to a section 7 divestiture suit, violators
could stave off such actions merely by refraining from aggressive or anticompetitive
behavior when such a suit was threatened or pending."355 The Court stated that "a
merger may be attacked ab initio long after its culmination if effect on competition not
apparent immediately after the merger subsequently appears. '356
General Dynamics offers the only possible justification for the survival of the
DuPont rule and functionally similar "accrual" standards-that the rules arguably
prevent defendants from lying in wait until the limitations period has passed to exercise
the market power they obtained through an illegal merger.357 But this justification is
350. 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
351. Consol. Foods, 380 U.S. at 598, 601. Scott Sher correctly analyzes Consolidated Foods as
"confus[ing] the rule about the role of post-acquisition evidence in section 7 claims" with the DuPont time-of-
suit holding. Sher, supra note 341, at 69. However, DuPont is also operative on its own terms in
Consolidated Foods-the challenge took place over ten years after merger completion. Consolidated Foods
highlights the practical difficulties associated with disentangling the rules regarding postacquisition evidence
with the rules regarding time of suit in the context of challenges brought long after completion.
352. See Consol. Foods, 380 U.S. at 598 (holding the Court of Appeals did not err in examining
postacquisition evidence in the case).
353. 415 U.S. 239 (1974).
354. Gen. Dynamics, 415 U.S. at 504-05 & n.13. General Dynamics was also a traditional business
integration merger case, not a partial stock ownership case like DuPont. Id. at 488-89.
355. Id. at 504-05. The Court's fears were largely unfounded.
356. Id. at 505 n.13.
357. See supra note 356 and accompanying text for the Court's justification of the DuPont rule.
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inconsistent with economic reality, and, therefore, it offers no real support for the
continued existence of the DuPont standard.
3 58
c. ITT Continental Baking
The Supreme Court's most recent explanation of the DuPont doctrine, albeit in
dicta, came in 1975. In United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co.,3 5 9 the Court
stated:
Thus, there can be a violation at some time later even if there was clearly no
violation-no realistic threat of restraint of commerce or creation of
monopoly-at the time of the initial acts of acquisition. Clearly, this result
can obtain only because "acquisition" under section 7 is not a discrete
transaction but a status which continues until the transaction is undone.
360
Although this statement is dicta within the context of Continental Baking, it remains
the Supreme Court's clearest and most alarming articulation of a DuPont doctrine that
remains virtually undisturbed to this day.361 Since Continental Baking, lower courts
have reaffirmed DuPont in the government challenge context.
362
d. Expansion to Private Claims
If the government challenge cases discussed above had fixed the outer boundaries
of DuPont there would be less reason to worry.3 63 While we might prefer a world in
which no party can challenge mergers too long after their completion, the incentives of
government actors differ substantially from those of private parties. As a general rule,
358. See infra Part III.B.4.d for an explanation of how market dynamism weakens any justification for
the DuPont rule.
359. 420 U.S. 223 (1975).
360. Cont 1 Baking, 420 U.S. at 242.
361. Continental Baking involved a government suit to enforce a previously entered consent decree
prohibiting certain bakery mergers. The Supreme Court allowed the government to recover daily fines,
reasoning by analogy to the DuPont rule that each new day brought a separate actionable violation of the
consent decree. Id. at 226.
362. See, e.g., United States v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 575 F.2d 222, 230-31 (9th Cir. 1978) (citing
DuPont to define the scope of relief available under section fifteen of the Clayton Act in a government
challenge to an acquisition).
363. As recently as January 2005, the FTC cited DuPont for the proposition that the government retains
the authority to challenge mergers long after they have been consummated. See Complaint Counsel's Revised
Pretrial Brief, Nw. Healthcare Corp., F.T.C. No. 011 0234 (Jan. 27, 2005), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9315/050127ccrevisedpretrialbrief.pdf. On February 10, 2004, the FTC filed an
administrative complaint seeking divestiture and other equitable remedies in connection with a hospital merger
completed in January 2000, just over four years before suit was filed. Complaint at 11-12, Evanston Nw.
Healthcare Corp., F.T.C. No. 9315 (Feb. 10, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0 110234/040
210emhcomplaint.pdf. As of this writing, the Administrative Law Judge has rendered an initial decision
holding that the FTC had met their burden of proof as to the anticompetitive effects of the merger. Initial
Decision at 1, Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., F.T.C. No. 9315 (Oct. 20, 2005), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9315/051020initialdecision.pdf. The ALJ's decision is currently on appeal to
the full Commission. Notice of Appeal at 1, Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., F.T.C. No. 9315 (Nov. 2, 2005),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9315/051102enhmedgrpnotofappeal.pdf. The ALJ's opinion relies
heavily (and unnecessarily) upon DuPont's time-of-suit holding. See Initial Decision, supra, at 152-53 (citing
DuPont standard for determining when a violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act has occurred).
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federal antitrust enforcers can be expected to act in accordance with their perception of
the public interest. 364  More importantly, the great bulk of federal government
enforcement has shifted to the premerger context. DuPont is largely irrelevant in an
HSR world.
365
But lower courts have not been content to limit DuPont to government challenges.
Instead, they have expanded the DuPont doctrine to cover private merger challenges as
well. 366 In fact, the first such extension occurred in connection with the same
DuPont/GM stock acquisitions, when the Second Circuit Court of Appeals authorized
private shareholders' treble damages suit under section 7 almost forty years after
DuPont's last GM stock purchase in 1919.367 More recently, other courts have
explicitly or implicitly endorsed DuPont in the private challenge context. 368 The
extension of the doctrine to private challenges creates substantial opportunity for
opportunistic behavior. 369
364. Like all government actors, the antitrust agencies are of course subject to capture by special
interests; however, few would disagree that the public choice risks associated with agency behavior are less
than the personal utility-maximization risks associated with private behavior.
365. However, see supra note 362 for an example of the continued application of the DuPont rule in
government challenge cases.
366. See infra note 368 for examples of the DuPont rule applied in the private merger challenge context.
367. See Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 414 F.2d 956, 961 (2d Cir. 1969) (finding that a section 7
violation can constitute grounds for awarding treble damages to private parties).
368. See, e.g., California ex rel Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 266 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1055 (N.D. Cal. 2003)
(citing Cont 'l Baking, 420 U.S. 223). The Mirant opinion represents the best recent example of the atomism-
promoting nature of the DuPont doctrine. In that case, plaintiff sued under section 7 seeking divestiture of
power plants defendants had purchased from a regulated monopoly in a deregulation auction. Id. at 1053.
Despite the fact that the acquisitions actually increased competition in comparison to the predecessor
monopoly, the court allowed the plaintiff's claims to go forward. Id. at 1056. The Mirant holding implicitly
endorses the atomistic worldview-that the fact of an acquisition is enough to open the door to "corrective"
market intervention. See BORK, supra note 13, at 209-10, discussing how the courts' interpretations of section
7 of the Clayton Act lead to differing results depending on whether a firm has had a merger in its history or
not. See also U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Indiana Gas Co., 350 F.3d 623, 628 (7th Cir. 2003) (Easterbrook, J.) (citing
DuPont to conclude that a private party was not barred from bringing a claim under sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act more than four years after the merger); Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039,
1051 (8th Cir. 2000) (explaining that private section 7 claims can be filed after an acquisition because it is
often difficult to "evaluate the real impact and effect of an acquisition until the transaction has been
completed"); S. Austin Coal. Cmty. Coun. v. SBC Comm. Inc., 191 F.3d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 1999)
(Easterbrook, J.) (in a private section 7 suit filed before merging parties obtained final government approval,
Easterbrook rejected defendants' purported fear of a laches defense in postcompletion suit, questioning
whether a laches risk "was ever substantial in light of DuPont"); Midwesteri Mach., Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc.
(Midwestern Mach. 1), 167 F.3d 439, 443 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing to DuPont to illustrate the continuing vitality
of private section 7 claims even after an acquisition occurs), rev'd, 392 F.3d 265, 268 (8th Cir. 2004)
(Midwestern Mach. II); Reading Int'l, Inc. v. Oaktree Capital Mgmt. LLC, 317 F. Supp. 2d 301, 310-11
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (dismissing section 7 claim on antitrust standing grounds, but citing DuPont time-of-suit
holding approvingly in context of mergers as much as fourteen years old); Julius Nasso Concrete Corp. v. DIC
Concrete Corp., 467 F. Supp. 1016, 1023-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (denying motion to dismiss section 7 claims
based upon fifteen-year-old and six-year-old acquisitions because, under DuPont, "in addition to prohibited
acquisitions giving rise to immediate section 7 claims, subsequent anticompetitive acts committed by the
merged enterprise give rise to separate causes of action.").
369. See infra Part llI.B.4 for a discussion of the consequences of the drawbacks in private merger
challenge law.
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3. The Zenith Radio "Accrual" Standards Cause the Same Problem
Despite its throwback reasoning, the substance of DuPont cannot easily be
dismissed today. In fact, without congressional intervention, the heart of the DuPont
holding-that a merger can be challenged whenever it "threatens to ripen into a
prohibited effect"-is likely to live on indefinitely. 370 There are at least two reasons
for the DuPont rule's persistence. First, courts have explicitly endorsed the DuPont
"time-of-suit" holding repeatedly in recent years. 371  In fact, Judge Diane Wood
recently acknowledged the vitality of the holding in a law review article. 372 In
criticizing the lack of certainty the U.S. system affords merging parties after
completion, she noted that "there is always a risk ... that any plaintiff will challenge a
merger... many years after its consummation on the grounds that it now appears to
have had anticompetitive effects. '373 Second, DuPont lives on implicitly in the law
governing the time at which a private merger claim "accrues" as to private plaintiffs. 374
Moreover, the "accrual" doctrine appears in the form of a generally accepted rule
imported reflexively from the world of more traditional lawsuits. Accordingly, accrual
standards enjoy a veneer of modem respectability and reflexive acceptance that may be
difficult to strip away. Appearances notwithstanding, the DuPont line and the section 7
accrual cases create the same practical problem.
The cases governing "accrual" under section 7 originate in a different branch of
the antitrust family tree than the DuPont cases. In fact, the section 7 accrual rules have
been imported wholesale, with little apparent forethought or analysis, from cases
governing "accrual" in the context of antitrust conduct violations like price fixing or
monopolization. 375 The policy concerns that may justify relatively liberal "accrual"
rules for antitrust conduct cases do not apply to private merger claims.
a. Zenith Radio and Section 7
In Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,376 the Supreme Court
addressed when an action "accrues" under the antitrust laws for purposes of starting the
four-year limitations period.3 77  Plaintiff Hazeltine Research had filed patent
370. See DuPont 1, 353 U.S. at 597 (concluding that a section 7 claim may be brought "any time that an
acquisition may be said with reasonable probability to contain a threat that it may lead to a restraint of
commerce").
371. See supra note 368 for a discussion of recent cases endorsing the time-of-suit rule.
372. See Diane P. Wood, Antitrust at the Global Level, 72 U. CHi. L. REV. 309, 321-22 (2005)
(acknowledging the validity of the "time-of-suit" doctrine but discussing the continuing problems it presents).
373. Id. (citing DuPont 1, 353 U.S. at 607).
374. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Res., Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 339 (1971) (holding that each time a
private plaintiff is injured by a violation of section 7, a separate cause of action accrues and the statute of
limitations is extended); Midwestern Mach. 11, 392 F.3d at 275-76 (finding that a cause of action for a section
7 violation accrues on the date that damages are suffered); Concord Boat, 207 F.3d at 1051 (stating that the
statute of limitations for a section 7 action starts to run at the moment the act causes injury).
375. See, e.g., Zenith Radio, 401 U.S. at 339 (involving conduct by radio and television manufacturer
using patent pools to exclude competitor from foreign markets in violation of the Sherman Act).
376. 401 U.S. 321 (1971).
377. Zenith Radio, 401 U.S. at 339.
20051 1009
TEMPLE LAW RE VIEW
infringement claims against Zenith in 1959.378 In 1963, Zenith filed an antitrust
counterclaim alleging that Hazeltine's participation in certain patent pools violated the
Sherman Act.379 The Supreme Court's opinion addressed whether Zenith's June 1,
1963 suit would support recovery for damages suffered after June 1, 1959, "as the
consequence of pre-1954 conspiratorial conduct. '380
The Court allowed Zenith to recover damages in connection with Hazeltine's pre-
1954 conduct, even though Zenith had filed the lawsuit over nine years later.381 The
Court held that an antitrust cause of action accrues "each time a plaintiff is injured by
an act of the defendants." 382 Accordingly, a potential antitrust plaintiff has four years
from the date of each injury it suffers within which it must file suit to recover for that
injury.383 The Court referenced the "hombook law, in antitrust actions as in others"
that "even if injury and a cause of action have accrued as of a certain date, future
damages that might arise from the conduct sued on are unrecoverable if the fact of their
accrual is speculative or their amount and nature unprovable. ' ' 384 Accordingly, the
Court reasoned, a refusal to award future profits as too speculative in an antitrust treble
damages action
is equivalent to holding that no cause of action has yet accrued for any but
those damages already suffered. In these instances, the cause of action for
future damages, if they ever occur, will accrue only on the date they are
suffered; thereafter the plaintiff may sue to recover them at any time within
four years from the date they were inflicted.385
The Court justified this holding on the basis of congressional intent, noting that
"[o]therwise future damages that could not be proved within four years of the conduct
from which they flowed would be forever incapable of recovery, contrary to the
congressional purpose that private actions serve 'as a bulwark of antitrust
enforcement. ,386
Zenith Radio has itself become the "hombook law" governing the time at which
all private antitrust claims "accrue" for the purpose of starting the limitations clock.387
Zenith Radio is defensible in the context of antitrust conduct cases where (1)
plaintiffs' injuries are often by their very nature concealed and difficult to uncover, and
(2) the enforcement paradigm heavily favors deterrence. But as discussed below, the
Zenith Radio accrual rule is wholly indefensible when applied to modern merger
claims. Unfortunately, it has been adopted wholesale in several lower court merger
378. Id. at 338.
379. Id.
380. Id. at 338.
381. Id.
382. Zenith Radio, 401 U.S. at 338.
383. See Clayton Act, ch. 323 § 4B, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 15b (2000))
(establishing a four year statute of limitations for actions under the Sherman Act).
384. Zenith Radio, 401 U.S. at 339.
385. Id.
386. See id. at 340, (quoting Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968)).
387. See, e.g., ALD 5TH, supra note 76, at 893 n.314 (citing Zenith Radio for the proposition that a cause
of action does not accrue until damages are ascertainable).
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cases without any significant consideration of the substantial differences between
section 7 claims and other antitrust violations.388
b. Zenith Radio and DuPont Effectively Announce the Same Rule for Private
Merger Claims
In the context of private suits, the DuPont rule governing the time a violation of
section 7 occurs is functionally identical to the Zenith Radio rule governing accrual.
There are, of course, facial differences between the two standards. For example,
DuPont's "incipiency" orientation countenances prophylactic challenge without a
showing of actual damage, while Zenith Radio ties accrual to the time plaintiff suffered
harm.389 But in the end, these distinctions are relevant only on the margins. As a result
of both rules, private plaintiffs can challenge mergers many years after the limitations
period should have run and need only allege recent harm under Zenith Radio (or recent
threat of a "prohibited effect" under DuPont) to circumvent the statute of limitations
completely.
Recent cases have made this convergence explicit. For example, in December
2004, the Eighth Circuit reversed its initial opinion in Midwestern Machinery ,390 in
which the court had held that DuPont authorized private plaintiffs to challenge
Northwest Airlines' acquisition of Republic Airlines eleven years after the merger was
completed. 391  In its 2004 opinion, the Eighth Circuit demonstrated the functional
congruence of the two rules in an odd way, partially closing the DuPont door392 while
endorsing Zenith Radio as authorizing section 7 claims for a period of four years after
the plaintiff first suffers injury.393 In fact, the DuPont portion of the opinion offers an
incisive and telling criticism of the DuPont rule, especially as it has been applied to
private claims over time.394  Because the plaintiffs in Midwestern Machinery based
388. See, e.g., Midwestern Mach. 11, 392 F.3d at 276 (applying the Zenith Radio rule but distinguishing
the case factually because plaintiff, Midwestern Machinery, suffered injury immediately upon completion of
the merger in question); Concord Boat, 207 F.3d at 1051 (citing Zenith Radio in an antitrust action brought by
a group of boat builders against a boat engine manufacturer); Telectronics Proprietary, Ltd. v. Medtronic, Inc.,
687 F. Supp. 832, 843-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (applying Zenith Radio to deny defendant's summary judgment
motion based on the claim that the statute of limitations for plaintiff's section 7 cause of action had expired).
389. Compare DuPont 1, 353 U.S. at 607 (finding section 7 violation at the moment when an action
"threatens to ripen into the prohibited effect"), with Zenith Radio, 401 U.S. at 339 (section 7 violation occurs
on "date [anticompetitive harms] were inflicted").
390. See Midwestern Mach. II, 392 F.3d at 268 (reversing its decision in Midwestern Machinery I by
affirming the district court's granting of summary judgment to defendant because the statute of limitations on
plaintiff's section 7 action had run).
391. Midwestern Mach. I, 167 F.3d at 443.
392. See Midwestern Mach. II, 392 F.3d at 269-276 (distinguishing DuPont, as it involved "whether an
acquisition that did not violate section 7 at the time that it occurred could be the basis for a later suit" rather
than a statute of limitations issue).
393. See id. at 276 (applying the Zenith Radio rule for when the statute of limitations should be tolled).
394. See, e.g., id. at 271 ("Midwestern's theory would expose merged firms to potential liability in
private suits as long as the firm remained merged because, assuming that the initial merger violated the
Clayton Act, every subsequent action by the merged firm would be a continuing violation designed to maintain
the merged firm's viability."); see also Concord Boat, 207 F.3d at 1050 (refusing to extend four-year statute of
limitations under DuPont rule because plaintiffs injuries occurred at the time of acquisition).
2005] 1011
TEMPLE LAW REVIEW
their claims solely upon the market power Northwestern allegedly obtained as a result
of the merger, the court held that the violation occurred at the time of completion, and
that the limitations period had run.395
But in dicta following its holding, the court offered potential plaintiffs a roadmap
for the future, noting that Midwestern's claims would not have been time-barred under
Zenith Radio had it first suffered injury within four years of suit.3 96 Thus, even in the
Eighth Circuit, where DuPont arguably has the least current sway, a private plaintiff
can challenge a long-completed transaction by simply alleging that the damages it
suffered as a result of the acquisition first began to accrue within the four-years before
it filed suit.3 97
The continued viability of any rule authorizing private claims decades after a
merger has been completed makes no sense and creates powerful negative incentives
for potential plaintiffs and potential defendants alike. As one commentator has put it,
"For the mergers that were permitted and turn out to be anticompetitive, the remedy
must lie in either the single-firm part of the law [Sherman Act § 2] or the concerted
action part [Sherman Act § 1], if any such harm can be proven. '398 Moreover, given
the persistent power of stare decisis in antitrust law3 99 and the coming increase in
private merger claims, 400 this is not an issue that can be cast aside in hopes that it will
fade away.
4. What's Really Wrong with DuPont and Zenith Radio?
DuPont likely owes its continued existence primarily to historical accident-the
Chicago School revolution was rewriting the common law just as HSR premerger
review dramatically reduced the number of postmerger challenges that would have
offered an opportunity to modernize the rule. DuPont survives at least in part because
395. Midwestern Mach. 11, 392 F.3d at 276.
396. Id. at 276. The court also perpetuated DuPont to a limited extent, stating that the DuPont rule
would apply "[i]f assets are used in a different manner from the way that they were used when the initial
acquisition occurred" Id. at 273; see also Nasso, 467 F. Supp. at 1023 (applying DuPont to conclude that the
cause of action for plaintiffs claims of specific anticompetitive behaviors arose when these events occurred
rather than when the "mergers that made these actions possible" were completed).
397. See Midwestern Mach. 11, 392 F.3d at 276 (explaining that plaintiff's cause of action filed eleven
years after a merger was barred by statute of limitations because plaintiff claimed to have realized injury
immediately upon completion of the action).
398. Wood, supra note 372, at 322. See also BORK, supra note 13, at 209-210 (arguing that section 7
discourages growth among firms that have merged with other businesses by applying "more severe standards
to size by merger than to size by internal growth"). Areeda & Hovenkamp appear to take a different view, and
would authorize a section 7 suit long after completion if the defendant eventually uses the merger "in a way
that is not inherent in the merger itself." AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, 320c5 at 224. This view
establishes a double standard discriminating against growth by merger. Instead, if a party acquires market
power and uses it to, for example, engage in actionable predatory pricing after the limitations period has
expired, the law should condemn only the predatory pricing, and not the method of growth that allegedly
provided the power to engage in inappropriate conduct.
399. See, e.g., A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1404-05 (1989)
(explaining that several Supreme Court antitrust holdings have been questioned but that "[i]nferior federal
courts, in order to provide equal justice under law, must apply the holdings of cases still on the books").
400. See supra Part II for a discussion of the coming wave of private merger claims.
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a large percentage of merger claims are now handled premerger through agency
review.
401
Zenith Radio owes its continued application to private merger claims in part to the
advent of the HSR process as well. Zenith Radio also persists out of reflexive habit and
good breeding-its importation from antitrust conduct cases has gone virtually
unquestioned because it "comes from a good family." But understanding why these
rules persist does not answer the fundamental question: Why are DuPont and Zenith
Radio bad rules?
At first blush, the DuPont and Zenith Radio doctrines may appear quite
reasonable. After all, couldn't the Supreme Court's fears that section 7 violators will
simply wait until the coast is clear before behaving badly be well founded? And
shouldn't the government and the courts have the ability to step in at any time when a
market becomes, in their opinion, less than perfectly competitive? That worldview
dominated for many years,402 but it is demonstrably wrong. Common sense, basic
economics, the experience of the last ten years, and the statute itself prove the
doctrines' infirmities. If left unchanged, the coming increase in private suits will
amplify their ability to do substantial harm to the American economy.
a. DuPont and Zenith Radio Are Inconsistent with the Text of Section 7
As Justice Burton noted in his DuPont dissent, the text of section 7 does not
support claims where there was no realistic threat of restraint of commerce at the time
of the acquisition.4" 3 Rather, "the offense described by section 7 is the acquisition,"
and "[w]hen the acquisition has been made, the offense, if any, is complete. '40 4 It is
manifestly inequitable to extend the window for private suit indefinitely into the future,
doubly so if the transaction did not raise competitive concerns at the time of
completion.
405
b. The Repose/Redress Continuum
American law has long recognized that wrongdoers should be entitled to
protection from suit after a reasonable time has passed since their commission of an
allegedly illegal act.40 6 The Clayton Act makes this explicit as to the antitrust laws:
damages claims are not allowed more than four years after a cause of action accrues. 40 7
401. See, e.g., Sher, supra note 341, at 41 (claiming that HSR's requirements of premerger agency
approval have minimized the need for postmerger challenges).
402. See supra Part I.C.l for a discussion of the mid-twentieth century paradigm of atomism.
403. DuPont 1, 353 U.S. at 622 (Burton, J., dissenting). Cf General Dynamics, 415 U.S. at 242
(explaining that a merger may be challenged if its "effect on competition not apparent immediately after the
merger subsequently appears").
404. DuPont 1, 353 U.S. at 620 (Burton, J., dissenting).
405. See id. at 623 ("The Court's holding is unfair to the individuals who entered into transactions on the
assumption, justified by the language of section 7, that their actions would be judged by the facts available to
them at the time they made their decision.") (citing Phil C. Neal, The Clayton Act and the Transamerica Case,
5 STAN. L. REv. 179, 220-21 (1953)).
406. See generally Josephine H. Hicks, Note, The Constitutionality of Statutes of Repose: Federalism
Reigns, 38 VAND. L. REV. 627 (1985) (analyzing statutes of repose as limitations on tort recovery).
407. See Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 4B, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 15b (2000))
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Although the concept of repose inherently implies that certain injured parties may be
denied relief if their suit comes too late, that social cost is judged acceptable in light of
the benefits accruing from offering alleged wrongdoers a clean slate after some period
of time.
In the context of private merger challenges, the repose/redress tradeoffs favor a
hard and fast limitations period. Although there is substantial value to allowing private
postmerger suits,40 8 the very fact that merger activity is often inherently desirable
counsels against extension of the limitations period beyond that applicable to
deliberately wrongful acts. Equity requires that we grant merging parties repose rights
equal to or greater than the repose rights enjoyed by the criminal and the careless.
c. The Importance of Precedent
Precedent is peculiarly powerful in antitrust law. After the introduction of
premerger review, it is arguably doubly powerful in the context of section 7. The
Supreme Court has not decided a merger case on the merits since General Dynamics in
1974. 40 9  This is unlikely to change anytime soon because the likely appellants
(especially government enforcers) are unlikely to pursue certiorari, few pending
mergers would survive a lengthy appeal process, and the Supreme Court typically
accepts only a small fraction of the cases in which the parties seek review.
Accordingly, DuPont and Zenith Radio are likely to remain the law of the land for the
foreseeable future.
4 10
As Judge Easterbrook has explained, it is often difficult if not impossible for
lower courts to discard still-valid Supreme Court precedent, no matter how firmly the
lower Court believes that the Supreme Court "would not reach the same decision today
if the question were open anew. '411  Disregarding Supreme Court precedent is
dangerous: "it is presumptuous-more, it produces uncertain and unequal application
of the law-for an inferior court to act on a belief that a given decision will be among
the handful that the Supreme Court overrules or significantly limits. '412
Accordingly, the power of precedent suggests that DuPont and Zenith Radio are
in need of legislative attention.
d. Market Dynamism
Markets are inherently dynamic. Although so-called "post-Chicago" learning
suggests that certain anticompetitive equilibria may be more stable and persistent than
the Chicago School's more strident adherents suggest, there is little genuine debate
(imposing a four-year statute of limitations on claims brought under the Sherman Act).
408. See supra notes 291-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of why private merger challenges
are an important part of the antitrust system.
409. See General Dynamics, 415 U.S. at 500-01 (affirming the finding of no violation of section 7 in
acquisition of coal company stock).
410. Incremental judicial erosion of both doctrines is possible, but the coming increase in private merger
litigation demands a quicker and more decisive response. See, e.g., Midwestern Mach. II, 392 F.3d at 276
(attempting to limit the application of the DuPont time-of-suit rule).
411. A.A. Poultry, 881 F.2d at 1405.
412. Id.
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regarding the underlying changeability of markets. Market dynamism weakens any
justification for the DuPont/Zenith Radio approach in two important ways.
i. Dynamism renders "lying in wait" unreasonable
There are essentially two possible justifications for the DuPont/Zenith Radio time-
of-suit rules. First, as the Supreme Court suggested in General Dynamics, the rules
theoretically could prevent merging parties from waiting until the "coast is clear"-
until the limitations period has passed-before beginning to reap the anticompetitive
benefits of an illegal transaction. 413 Under this theory, potential plaintiffs would
experience no harm and, thus, have no incentive to enforce section 7 until after their
window of opportunity had closed.
But the vast majority of merging parties would have little prospect of "lying in
wait" successfully throughout the duration of a reasonable limitations period. The
Supreme Court's "predatory pricing" jurisprudence helps explain why. Under current
predatory pricing law, a plaintiff must do more than show that the defendant priced
below cost in an attempt to drive it out of business. 414 It must also prove that the
defendant had a reasonable expectation of recouping its foregone profits after its
predatory pricing program succeeded in knocking out its competitor(s). 415 If the
defendant cannot reasonably expect to recoup its losses, then its low prices during the
alleged predatory period are nothing more than a windfall to consumers that should not
be discouraged.416 Most predatory pricing claims fail the recoupment test.417
Even if a merger provides the surviving entity with market power, that entity
would find it exceedingly difficult to wait until a reasonable limitations period had
passed to begin flexing its muscles. 418 Modem markets change quickly, and it is prima
413. See General Dynamics, 415 U.S. at 504-05 (expressing concern that potential defendants could
avoid a section 7 claim merely by "refraining from aggressive or anticompetitive behavior" for the four-year
statute of limitations); see also Consol. Foods, 380 U.S. at 598 (arguing that the statute of limitations should
not be manipulated by the parties in a way that they "bid[e] their time" until the anticompetitive effects of a
merger are "allowed fully to bloom").
414. See Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222-24 (1993)
(articulating the requirements to prove a claim of predatory pricing).
415. Id. at 225-27. See also Kenneth G. Elzinga & David E. Mills, Testing for Predation: Is
Recoupment Feasible?, 34 ANTITRUST BULL. 869, 871-72 (1989) (proposing an "investment test" for predation
and establishing a formal economic model for assessing the likelihood of recoupment for rational economic
actors).
416. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 224.
417. See, e.g., United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003) (concluding that defendant
airline's pricing was not predatory because the government failed to establish that defendant's pricing was
below an appropriate measure of cost); Virgin Al. Airways Ltd. v. British Airways PLC, 257 F.3d 256, 271-
72 (2d Cir. 2001) (denying airline's claim of predatory pricing against competitor because plaintiff was unable
to provide proof of competitor's recoupment losses); Taylor Pub'g Co. v. Jostens, Inc., 216 F.3d 465, 477 (5th
Cir. 2000) (finding that defendant school yearbook manufacturer's attempts to lure customers through what
plaintiff characterized as "sham pricing" was not predatory); see also Elzinga & Mills, supra note 415, at 878-
89 (demonstrating that in two of three then-recent cases, recoupment period would have been too long to have
been reasonable).
418. This Article does not recommend that the existing four-year statutory limitations period be altered,
but rather that it be enforced rigidly from the date of completion. It is possible that a merging party could wait
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facie unreasonable to assume that anticompetitive market dynamics at the time of
completion will persist for more than four years in the absence of anticompetitive
conduct by the merged entity. Moreover, the existence of a hard and fast limitations
period would not ultimately eliminate the prospect of a remedy-the government is not
subject to a limitations period and could be encouraged to take action in the unlikely
event that a party successfully executed a "lying in wait" strategy. Assuming an
anticompetitive merger, the merging party's incentive is to take advantage of its market
power before market forces erode it. The merged entity would almost always act well
within the four-year limitations period and would cause damages triggering an
incentive to sue.
ii. Dynamism renders suspect the causal link between the merger and
market performance
In addition to a "lying in wait" justification, one could argue that section 7's
prophylactic purpose and "incipiency" focus demand a remedy that can be
implemented at the first sign of poor market function, no matter how late the date. But
it would be virtually impossible to extract the effects of an allegedly anticompetitive
transaction from other variables affecting market price when suit is filed more than four
years after completion. Moreover, while the "prophylactic purpose" of section 7 is
important, it no longer justifies ex post speculative intervention when the merged
parties have become "too successful" by some subjective measure. This is especially
true in the utility-maximizing context of private merger litigation.
Any justification dependent upon a court's ex post imperative to "correct"
perceived market failures carries no weight in a post-Chicago world. This is
particularly true with respect to mergers, which the law now encourages far more than
it discourages. Because markets are ever-changing, any attempt to authorize private
merger challenges more than four years after completion is necessarily an "ends justify
the means" end-run around modem antitrust analysis and inherently would be little
more than a naked attempt to impose a subjectively more desirable structure on a
market. The antitrust law cannot countenance such a result.
e. Postmerger evidentiary problems and predictability
DuPont and (in the merger context) Zenith Radio implicitly encourage courts to
assess the effects of a challenged transaction at or near the time of suit, rather than at
the time of completion. 419 Justice Burton's DuPont dissent highlights the irrationality
of any analysis based solely upon postmerger conditions.421 Professors Areeda and
out a significantly shorter limitations period before beginning to raise prices. Although there is no magic time
threshold beyond which "lying in wait" is automatically economically infeasible, four years is more than
enough.
419. See DuPont 1, 353 U.S. at 877 (the test for establishing a section 7 violation is whether at time-of-
suit there is reasonable probability that the acquisition will result in prohibited effects); Zenith Radio, 401 U.S.
at 338-40 (concluding that plaintiffs injured by antitrust conspiracy can recover damages suffered prior to date
of claim and reasonably expected future damages).
420. See DuPont 1, 353 U.S. at 623 (illustrating factors which would be included in an analysis relying
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Hovenkamp have ably identified the myriad problems attendant with section 7
assessments that stray from analyzing the competitive effects of a transaction at the
time of completion. 421 This Article cannot add substantially to their analysis, but does
note that the "time of assessment" concerns Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp
articulate are yet another reason to reject DuPont and Zenith Radio.
f Traditional justifications for accrual rules do not apply to merger challenges
The traditional justifications for "time of injury" accrual rules in other kinds of
cases do not apply in the merger context. First, the law now encourages the vast
majority of mergers.4 22 To the extent the Zenith Radio accrual rule (or the DuPont
"time of violation" rule for that matter) has some deterrent purpose, that purpose is
largely at odds with the law's overall attitude toward mergers.
Second, most mergers are public knowledge before or near the time of
completion. Because the potential harm associated with an allegedly anticompetitive
transaction can be assessed at or near the time of completion, potential parties can
monitor any harm associated with that transaction (e.g., increased prices, exclusionary
conduct, etc.).
Finally, any alleged harm arising from a merger challenged outside the four year
limitations period is too speculative to justify upsetting the repose/redress continuum
discussed above.
5. Consequences of the Weaknesses in Private Merger Challenge Law
The law of private merger challenges must minimize the negative implications of
two separate incentives. First, the law must recognize that private plaintiffs act out of
self-interest, not altruism. The procedural and substantive law should therefore work
together to minimize private parties' ability to act opportunistically without eliminating
the value inherent in the private enforcement system.
Second, the law must explicitly address the tension inherent in the American
competition norm, and it must eliminate or at least mitigate the courts' ability and
willingness to countenance "buyer's remorse" once a firm has reached an arguably
objectionable size. The "disproportionate costs" issue and the "time-of-suit" problem
each implicate both concerns.
a. Risks Associated with Disproportionate Imposition of Costs
The differential cost structure associated with private merger litigation encourages
plaintiffs to engage in opportunistic behavior. 423  Private plaintiffs can impose
massively disproportionate costs on defendants throughout the pretrial phase of
litigation and are also entitled to treble damages and attorneys' fees if they are
solely on post-merger conditions and stating that result could be legitimate transactions being declared illegal).
421. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, 1205, at 296-320, for a discussion of the use of post-
acquisition evidence in merger challenges.
422. Kolasky & Dick, supra note 19, at 208.
423. See supra Part 1II.A for a discussion of the imposition of costs in antitrust cases.
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successful. 424 Defendants, on the other hand, find it difficult to impose balancing costs
upon private merger plaintiffs. 4 25 Because plaintiffs can impose massive costs upon
defendants without incurring proportional costs themselves, the risks of opportunistic
behavior are substantial.
The differential cost structure associated with private merger challenges also
subtly invites a return to atomism, albeit indirectly. The entire private merger
challenge framework inherently promotes an atomistic competition policy by
overdeterring potential merging parties from engaging in what is now recognized to be
socially beneficial behavior. The treble damages remedy in particular serves only
atomistic ends because it is pointed toward a "maximum deterrence" norm that the law
has discarded as unnecessary and counterproductive in the context of merger law.
426
b. Timing of Challenges
DuPont and Zenith Radio also encourage opportunistic behavior and economic
opportunism on the part of private plaintiffs. By allowing private parties to challenge
mergers many years or even decades after completion, the law currently provides
undue incentives for private suit. Moreover, the more distant a suit from the date of
completion, the less likely that any alleged market imperfections or "anticompetitive"
outcome was actually merger-induced. Coupled with the disproportionality of costs
inherent in the private merger enforcement paradigm, the time-of-suit rules announced
by DuPont, Zenith Radio, and their progeny provide perverse incentives for private
suit.
DuPont is an explicit product of the long-discredited atomism norm, and Zenith
Radio is implicitly so in the merger context. Taken to their logical ends, these two
lines of cases encourage courts and private parties both to treat any merger as a
potential "back door," allowing direct intervention into markets they regard as
functioning improperly. By implicitly divorcing the liability inquiry from the liability
event, these time-of-suit rules allow private merger challenges in perpetuity.
4 27
Ironically, the DuPont/Zenith Radio doctrine becomes more dangerous as a party
with a merger in its corporate history becomes more successful. As discussed above,
the American competition norm emphasizes both the freedom to succeed and the
freedom from success. 428 When a party with a merger somewhere in its background
begins to succeed, DuPont and Zenith Radio offer an opportunity to reel it back in. But
while this may be attractive in the abstract, it makes no sense as a matter of iterative
policy. For if the brass ring of success-high profits-is denied to parties whose route
involves mergers or acquisitions, those potentially efficient and productive stops will
be avoided next time around.
424. See supra Part I.A. I for a discussion of the inequitable imposition of costs in private merger
challenge cases.
425. See supra notes 306-10 and the accompanying text for a discussion of a defendant's inability to
recover costs of litigation upon defeating a plaintiffs post-merger challenge.
426. See supra Part III.A.2 for arguments against imposing treble damages in merger cases.
427. See supra Part tII.B.4 for a discussion of the problems with the DuPont/Zenith Radio rules.
428. See supra Part L.A for a discussion of the development of the American competition norm.
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Neither the current time-of-suit rules nor the continued availability of treble
damages and disproportionate cost imposition in merger suits comport with sound
antitrust policy. As the frequency of private merger challenges increases in years to
come, these structural flaws in the current regime are likely to overdeter legitimate
merger activity. They will also encourage opportunistic behavior among private
parties, and they will encourage courts to attempt to "fix" markets in which the
presence of a past merger opens doors that are appropriately unavailable in the context
of traditional single-firm antitrust standards.
IV. A FEW PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
A. Solving the Disproportionate Costs Riddle
1. Pretrial Phase
The private plaintiffs ability to impose disproportionate costs upon merger
defendants begins with the filing of the lawsuit, continues through the pretrial
discovery phase, and ultimately culminates with the prospect of a treble damages award
and divestiture order. As discussed above, the application of a "unidirectional British
rule"-attorneys fees awarded to prevailing plaintiffs, but not to prevailing
defendants-substantially exacerbates the problem.4 29 Even more disturbing, there is
absolutely no basis in the public policy governing merger regulation for the uniform
imposition of treble damages in connection with the typical merger case.
Though it may not be practicable to level the playing field completely, there are
several possible changes Congress could make to tilt the scales back in favor of merger
defendants. Because merger defendants' underlying conduct is substantively different
from that of the price-fixers and bid-riggers at whom the existing cost structure is
aimed, they are entitled to different treatment.
To deal with the issue of pretrial costs, Congress should consider imposing the
English rule, under which the prevailing party receives some or all of its reasonable
attorneys' fees from the loser, or under which there is formal cost sharing during the
pretrial phases of litigation. Congress has already adopted "loser pays" rules for
antitrust suits challenging qualified export companies430 or research joint ventures. 431
The "loser pays" rules exist in these contexts to "reduce the threat of litigation against
such favored activities. '432 Because merger and acquisition activity is also favored and
429. See supra note 306 and accompanying text for an articulation of the rule concerning recovery of
attorney's fees in merger challenge cases.
430. 15 U.S.C. § 4016(b)(4) (1992).
431. 15 U.S.C. § 4304(a).
432. Donald 1. Baker, Keynote Address, Revisiting History--What have We Learned About Private
Antitrust Enforcement that We Would Recommend to Others?, 16 Loy. CONSUMER L. REv. 379, 386 (2004).
See generally Donald 1. Baker, Restating Law and Refining Remedies: The Trading Company Act, The Joint
Research Act, and the Local Government Antitrust Act, 55 ANTITRUST L. J. 499, 512 (1986) (arguing for
imposition of the English rule on costs for unsuccessful treble damages suits but maintaining the current rule
for single damage claims).
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because of the massive disparities in cost associated with private section 7 claims, a
"loser pays" solution is also appropriate here.
Of course, one could argue that "loser pays" is the glib answer to virtually any
problem involving unbalanced incentives favoring a plaintiff or defendant. But the
circumstances counseling such a radical departure from the American rule in this case
are almost unique to modem antitrust merger law. Unlike many other types of claims
(whether antitrust "conduct," contract, tort, or otherwise), antitrust merger claims tread
on extremely thin ice, and the risks and costs associated with overdeterrence are
enormous. The law in fact encourages most merger activity as efficient and socially
beneficial, but the current cost litigation cost structure can discourage beneficial
activity. Thus, an English rule "loser pays" statute would help level the playing field
and encourage an optimal level of private enforcement far more reliably than it would
in the context of wrongs for which the law seeks a much higher level of ex ante
deterrence.
In addition, the traditional justifications for the current rule do not apply to private
merger challenges. The one-way American rule currently applicable to all antitrust
damages claims exists in part to encourage small plaintiffs to enforce their legal rights
without facing the risk of bearing a much larger adversary's costs. 433 This justification
does not apply to the typical merger suit, whether brought by a competitor, a target, or
aggregated purchasers pursuing a class action. These parties are typically sophisticated
and have substantial resources-additional financial incentives are unnecessary. 434
Alternatively, a "cost sharing" approach, spreading pretrial costs among plaintiffs
and defendants, could ameliorate the problems with the pretrial framework. Although
such a program would be subject to its own opportunism concerns, the incentives for
opportunistic suit would be mitigated significantly if plaintiffs were to bear some of the
responsibility for defendants' discovery costs. The prospect of cost sharing would
substantially temper plaintiffs' incentive to impose massive pretrial costs upon
defendants, secure in the knowledge that there is little a defendant can do to it in return.
If the plaintiff faces cost sharing, it will affect his willingness to file suit in the first
place.
2. Toward an Appropriate Level of Damages
The concerns motivating the adoption of a treble damages remedy for antitrust
violations simply do not apply to the traditional merger case today. Most mergers are
either competitively neutral or are actually procompetitive, and the law is now designed
to encourage rather than discourage merger activity. Mergers do not take place via
coded conversations in smoky hotel rooms, but are instead announced on the pages of
the Wall Street Journal. Because treble damages increase the risk of opportunistic suit
433. AT&T Wireless, PCS, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 210 F.3d 1322, 1330 (1 lth Cir. 2000) (Cames, J.
concurring) (discussing similar civil rights provision makes private suits financially feasible and provides
incentives for private enforcement).
434. See id. (Carnes, J. concurring) (explaining that fee-shifting statute "was intended to help the civil
rights Davids of the world do battle with the governmental Goliaths. AT&T Wireless is a $7 billion subsidiary
of a $62 billion multi-national corporation. My, how the Davids have grown.")
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without any accompanying increase in valuable enforcement or deterrence, the law
must change.
But again, the answer is not so easy as simply imposing a "single damages"
remedy for section 7 violations. Given the peculiar nature of the merger law, intent
actually matters in the context of section 7. It is possible (and with the revised HSR
thresholds, perhaps even likely) that parties will pursue intentionally anticompetitive
transactions. Intentionally anticompetitive conduct should be deterred. Borrowing
from tort law, therefore, we should impose single damages for the typical
anticompetitive merger-that is, a merger in which the parties were merely "negligent"
in failing to comprehend the impact of the transaction.
Treble damages, by contrast, should be reserved for deliberately anticompetitive
behavior paralleling the intentionally anticompetitive conduct forbidden under sections
1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.435  If the plaintiff proves by a preponderance of the
evidence that one or both of the merging parties knew or believed that the merger
would have anticompetitive effects, the court should award treble damages.
B. Solving the Time-of-Suit Problem
The "time-of-suit" issue reveals inherent tension between two antitrust policy
goals. The law encourages private enforcement, especially when circumstances seem
to portend greater need for private enforcement. But it also seeks an environment in
which procompetitive mergers are encouraged and merging parties can enjoy repose
without constantly worrying that their merger might be subject to a treble damages suit
or a divestiture action.436
Where there's tension, there's compromise. It is possible to argue in good faith
that the limitations period for private merger challenges should be short indeed. The
vast majority of competitively problematic transactions are highly public. Moreover,
most mergers are procompetitive, and the public policy concerns that countenance
lengthy limitations periods for obvious wrongs (e.g., breaches of contract, antitrust
conduct violations, patent infringement, etc.) do not apply to mergers where illegality is
a matter of degree rather than type. It makes little sense to allow lengthy reachback
when (1) the conduct giving rise to the cause of action is public, and (2) general
deterrence goals are subsidiary to other concerns, especially vis-A-vis other types of
claims.
Indeed, both the prospective "in their incipiency" nature of section 7 itself and the
well-developed analytical tools associated with prospective merger review make it
435. Contra Cavanagh, Detrebling Antitrust Damages, supra note 312, at 829-30 (arguing against
limiting treble damages to cases where plaintiffs prove intentional violations). The concerns Cavanagh
idc.itifies which lead him away from recommending detrebling do not apply to merger challenges. Similarly,
the difficulties he envisions with limiting treble damages to cases involving "covert acts" would not
overwhelm a merger regime in which trebling was tied to evidence of intent to injure competition. See id. at
831-33 (explaining that overt anticompetitive activity can cause as much damage as covert, and that such cases
result in losses that warrant treble damages). Factfinders have successfully categorized wrongdoing by degree
for centuries, and an "intent" inquiry is not as inherently complex as the "covert acts" condition Cavanagh
posits and rejects. See id. (discussing reasons to reject a "coverts acts" limitation on treble damages).
436. See Wood, supra note 372, at 321-22 (expressing concern about risk under the time-of-suit rule
challenging a merger many years after it has occurred).
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possible for private plaintiffs to step into the breach quickly and effectively in the event
of a failure of government enforcement. The law expressly allows for full substantive
recovery on a showing of likely prospective harm, and Guidelines and economic
principles allow sophisticated predictions concerning whether a particular transaction
will cause problems in the future. These factors suggest that an extremely short
limitations period may be appropriate.
On the other hand, private enforcement must be attractive to potential plaintiffs if
it is to serve as an effective complement to public enforcement. Despite the availability
of attorneys' fees and powerful injunctive relief (up to and including divestiture), it
may be difficult to persuade appropriate private enforcers to file suit in the absence of
substantial financial incentives. The law appropriately prevents plaintiffs from
recovering speculative future damages they have not yet suffered. 437  Moreover, the
availability of effective injunctive relief (and the bar on speculative damages)
necessarily implies that the early-filing private plaintiff will not suffer any future
damages for which it can be compensated anyway.
Accordingly, a substantial limitations period during which damages can accrue is
necessary. Private plaintiffs generally will be called upon to challenge anticompetitive
mergers that somehow slip through the cracks of government enforcement. A very
short limitations period only makes sense, therefore, when there exist sufficient
incentives for an optimal level of enforcement during the period. A too-short
limitations period is unlikely to create sufficient incentives for appropriate plaintiffs to
file suit. Moreover, in the short term, the Supreme Court's "lying in wait" concerns are
potentially valid.4 38 The parties to an anticompetitive merger would have at least some
ability and incentive to forego the anticompetitive benefits of an acquisition in the short
term. Accordingly, it is not wrong or inequitable to allow damages to accrue long
enough to (1) increase plaintiffs' incentive to sue, and (2) make it extremely difficult
for potential defendants to "lie in wait."
For these reasons, Congress should explicitly do away with the DuPont "time of
violation" analysis and the Zenith Radio "accrual" rule as to private merger challenges.
Although any specific limitations period is admittedly somewhat arbitrary, the existing
four-year statute of limitations upon private section 7 claims likely will strike the right
balance between providing private enforcement incentives and limiting opportunistic
behavior. This period should run from the date the transaction is completed, and
should not be subject to any extension under DuPont or Zenith Radio principles. The
same concerns suggest that Congress should amend section 16 of the Clayton Act to
limit suits for injunctive relief to a period of four years following the completion of an
allegedly anticompetitive merger or acquisition.4 39 Moreover, it is absolutely critical
437. See Zenith Radio, 401 U.S. at 339 (holding that a cause of action for damages accrues only on the
date that the injury is actually suffered).
438. See supra notes 414-19 and accompanying text for a discussion of lying-in-wait and the four-year
statutory limitations period.
439. See Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Gen. Tel. & Elec. Corp., 518 F.2d 913, 928 (9th Cir. 1975) (using the
statute of limitations under section four of the Sherman Act as a guideline for determination of whether the
doctrine of laches applies to private suits seeking injunctive relief under section 16 of the same act); AREEDA
& HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, 1205b, at 298-99 (advocating the position that "where the anticompetitive
effects of the merger are known or readily predictable, the same four-year period that applies to damages
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that liability attach only for transactions that were foreseeably anticompetitive at the
time of completion. Although the limited use of postacquisition evidence may be
appropriate to demonstrate anticompetitive effect,440 any other "time of assessment"
creates additional overdeterrence problems.
CONCLUSION
Over the past thirty years, the majority of American antitrust law has settled into
an efficient equilibrium that has largely passed by the law governing private merger
challenges. Although the modest history of private merger litigation under section 7 of
the Clayton Act seems to suggest that this oversight is of limited importance, storm
clouds are gathering. As forces combine to produce more private challenges in the
future, it is incumbent upon Congress to ensure that those private challenges will not
cause more problems than they solve. Current law allows plaintiffs to impose
disproportionate costs upon defendants, and it allows private suits too long after the
completion of a merger. These problems are vestiges of antitrust law's atomism-
seeking past that inherently encourage atomistic goals by overdeterring beneficial
merger activity and give courts and private enforcers the ability and incentive to
intervene inappropriately wherever they conclude that a market in which a defendant
with a merger in its history participates is insufficiently competitive. Neither rule is
consistent with the efficiency norm of the current antitrust equilibrium.
Accordingly, Congress should adopt "loser pays" or cost-sharing rules to address
the pretrial cost disproportionality problem inherent in the current regime. Congress
should also eliminate the treble damages remedy for most section 7 cases, reserving
multiple damages for cases in which plaintiffs prove that defendants knowingly
completed an anticompetitive merger. To resolve the time-of-suit problem, Congress
should impose a firm four-year limitations/laches period for private merger actions
without extension under the "accrual" or "ripening" principles announced in Zenith
Radio and DuPont.
should apply to laches against a private party as well").
440. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, 1205f, at 319-20, for a claim that when using market
share data it may be appropriate to include statistics for the years immediately after a merger as well as the
years prior to a merger. But see Sher, supra note 341, at 64-68 (arguing that the use of post-acquisition
evidence of anticompetitive effect should only be used when it is a result of anticompetitive behavior taken
after a merger rather than post-merger market forces).
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